Concrete doesn't pay with votes : public works and electoral accountability

dc.contributor.MentorRossi, Martín A.
dc.creator.AutorDuarte Baracat, Agustín
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-12T19:47:26Z
dc.date.available2023-05-12T19:47:26Z
dc.date.issued2022-12
dc.descriptionFil: Duarte Baracat, Agustín. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.description.abstractI study how voters respond to public works generating incentives for the strategic behavior of rulers in relation to how the projects are allocated. To determine the electoral effect, I use a difference in difference approach for the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires between the 2017 and 2019 elections. I studied the public works policy in an integral manner, disaggregated by its level of visibility, disaggregated by its type and I contemplated the possibility of heterogeneous effects by income. I found no significant electoral effect of the public works policy as a whole. Instead, only a determined type of projects (based on city government classification) is valued by a determined social class as for instance, the poor value investments in education infrastructure and the rich value improved public spaces.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationDuarte Baracat, A. (2022). Concrete doesn't pay with votes : public works and electoral accountability. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/22975
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/22975
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleConcrete doesn't pay with votes : public works and electoral accountability
dc.typeTesis
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/tesis de maestría
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersion
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