Concrete doesn't pay with votes : public works and electoral accountability
Date
2022-12
Authors
Duarte Baracat, Agustín
relationships.isContributorOfPublication
Rossi, Martín A.
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Abstract
I study how voters respond to public works generating incentives for the strategic behavior
of rulers in relation to how the projects are allocated. To determine the electoral effect, I
use a difference in difference approach for the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires between the
2017 and 2019 elections. I studied the public works policy in an integral manner, disaggregated
by its level of visibility, disaggregated by its type and I contemplated the possibility
of heterogeneous effects by income. I found no significant electoral effect of the public works
policy as a whole. Instead, only a determined type of projects (based on city government
classification) is valued by a determined social class as for instance, the poor value investments
in education infrastructure and the rich value improved public spaces.
Description
Fil: Duarte Baracat, Agustín. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Keywords
Citation
Duarte Baracat, A. (2022). Concrete doesn't pay with votes : public works and electoral accountability. [Tesis de maestría, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/22975