Documentos de Trabajo del Departamento de Economía

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A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses
(2006) Weinschelbaum, Federico; Arozamena, Leandro
On favoritism in auctions with entry
(2010-05) Arozamena, Leandro; Weinschelbaum, Federico
We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders welfare more than her own private utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritsm
(2012-03) Arozamena, Leandro; Shunda, Nicholas; Weinschelbaum, Federico
In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller ´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue.
The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions
(2009) Weinschelbaum, Federico; Arozamena, Leandro