On favoritism in auctions with entry

Files
[P][W] doc103.pdf(689.45 KB)
Date
2010-05
Authors
Arozamena, Leandro
Weinschelbaum, Federico
relationships.isContributorOfPublication
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Abstract
We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders welfare more than her own private utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
Description
Fil: Arozamena, Leandro. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Keywords
Citation
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11927
Collections
Documentos de Trabajo del Departamento de Economía