On favoritism in auctions with entry

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dc.creator.AutorArozamena, Leandro
dc.creator.AutorWeinschelbaum, Federico
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-27T17:44:59Z
dc.date.available2016-12-27T17:44:59Z
dc.date.issued2010-05
dc.descriptionFil: Arozamena, Leandro. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.descriptionFil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.description.abstractWe examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders welfare more than her own private utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/11927
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);103
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleOn favoritism in auctions with entry
dc.typeDocumento de Trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
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