Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/10908/610
Título : Eficiencia en subastas de múltiples objetos
Autor/a: Mendiburu Díaz, Carlos H.
Mentor/a: Kawamura, Enrique
Palabras clave : Auctions -- Mathematical models.
Subastas -- Modelos matemáticos.
Fecha de publicación : 2011
Editor: Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Resumen : This research aims to systematize recent ndings about efficiency in multi-object auctions. The main questions are: Is it possible to reach efficiency in multi-object auctions? How? What factors affect efficiency, in theory and in practice? Several issues arise in the study of efficiency in auctions. For example, results vary depending on players attitude toward risk, on whether we assume private or common values, on whether objects are identical (which requires specify- ing whether each player has unit-demand or multi-unit demand), or heterogeneous (assuming players have de ned valuations for each possible package). A general point is that if one can use observed bids to infer valuations, it is possible to reach e¢ ciency. For instance, it has been shown that efficiency can be achieved in multi-object auctions when players have independent private values and in common values settings with one-dimensional signals. This in general is not true with common values and multidimensional signals. Finally, there is a growing litera- ture about experiments with auctions, designed in order to compare auction formats in terms of efficiency.
Descripción : Fil: Mendiburu Díaz, Carlos H.. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10908/610
Aparece en las colecciones: Tesis de Maestría en Economía

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