The role of information on the efficiency of democratic representative institutions

Abstract

How does information affect Democratic Representative Institutions? I propose a three stage model of circular spatial competition that captures electoral processes and takes the analysis to a new level, which is the capability of parliaments or legislatures to generate consensus. These institutions are understood as technologies that transform the results from electoral processes into consensus, which is a key feature of democratic systems, and they are affected by an information factor. Using a simple scenario, I argue that the growth of available information for voters can make it harder for political parties to represent a broader range of preferences and rise the equilibrium number of parties, which has a negative impact on consensus. This effect is smaller when politicians have a preference for consensus. I also explore how voter participation could be understood in this setup and how information can affect voter turnout by rising the cost of moving through the agenda circle and potentially rise the equilibrium number of parties. My model provides a framework for empirical research, allowing for factor calibration in order to test theoretical predictions using real data. By drawing attention to the complex relationship between information and the functioning of Democratic Representative Institutions, I expect to contribute to a better understanding of the role that information plays in democratic systems.