Competencia imperfecta con costos de sustitución y efectos de red
Date
2018-11
Authors
D'Ercole, Favio
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Kawamura, Enrique
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Abstract
El trabajo explora a nivel teórico la competencia por precios durante dos períodos entre dos firmas ubicadas en los extremos de una ciudad lineal. Los consumidores enfrentan costos de sustitución por comprar por cambiar de marca y perciben efectos por la red de quienes compran el mismo producto. Las empresas pueden adoptar una de tres estrategias, representadas cada una de ellas por un programa matemático de maximización de beneficios con restricciones. Las estrategias se denominan «conservadora», «expansiva» y «agresiva». El equilibrio «conservadora – conservadora» racionaliza la observación «naive» realizada por algunos autores que las empresas no prestan atención a sus competidoras, concentrándose únicamente en sus clientes. En realidad, este equilibrio emerge como resultado de una competencia «atenta» a la estrategia de la competidora. Si la competidora cambia su estrategia por «expansiva», la firma reaccionará bajando los precios para disuadirla.
This work explores at a theoretical level the prices competition during two stages between two firms located at the ends of a linear city. Consumers have costs to switch between products of different brands and perceive effects by the network of those who buy the same product. Firms can choose between three strategies, represented by three mathematical programs of profit maximization with restrictions. The strategies are called “conservative”, “expansive” and “aggressive”. The “conservative-conservative” equilibrium rationalizes the “naive” observation made by some authors about firms do not pay attention to their competitors, focusing exclusively on their buyers. Actually, this equilibrium arises as a result of competition when each firm is awake to the strategy of the competitor. If the competitor changes its strategy by “expansive”, the firm will react by lowering the prices to dissuade it.
This work explores at a theoretical level the prices competition during two stages between two firms located at the ends of a linear city. Consumers have costs to switch between products of different brands and perceive effects by the network of those who buy the same product. Firms can choose between three strategies, represented by three mathematical programs of profit maximization with restrictions. The strategies are called “conservative”, “expansive” and “aggressive”. The “conservative-conservative” equilibrium rationalizes the “naive” observation made by some authors about firms do not pay attention to their competitors, focusing exclusively on their buyers. Actually, this equilibrium arises as a result of competition when each firm is awake to the strategy of the competitor. If the competitor changes its strategy by “expansive”, the firm will react by lowering the prices to dissuade it.
Description
Fil: D'Ercole, Favio. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.