One for all and all for one : institutions and ethnic conflict

dc.contributor.MentorMurphy, Tommy E.
dc.creator.AutorGüizzo Altube, Matías
dc.date.accessioned9/17/2021 11:35Z
dc.date.available9/17/2021 11:35Z
dc.date.issued2021-07
dc.descriptionFil: Güizzo Altube, Matías. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.description.abstractThis thesis aims to unravel how institutional improvements help in ethnic conflict resolution, in line with Easterly’s (2001) results. As the main strands of the literature focus on intergroup relations by representing them as reputation games, they lose sight of groups’ greed for economic and political power. Here I develop a theoretical model with multiple extensions on that of Skaperdas (1992), in which not only group incentives for conflict but also the individual choice to belong to a group or to emancipate can be identified. The theoretical results show that institutional improvements can shift the equilibrium towards a more peaceful one, either as partitioned or non-partitioned societies. Finally, these results are tested with Mexican data at the municipality level.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationGüizzo Altube, M. (2021). One for all and all for one : institutions and ethnic conflict. [Tesis de grado, Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía]. Repositorio Digital San Andrés. http://hdl.handle.net/10908/18735
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/18735
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleOne for all and all for one : institutions and ethnic conflict
dc.typeTesis
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/tesis de grado
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/updatedVersion
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