Evolving to the impatience trap : the example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

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dc.creator.AutorLevine, David K.
dc.creator.AutorModica, Salvatore
dc.creator.AutorWeinschelbaum, Federico
dc.creator.AutorZurita, Felipe
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T15:40:14Z
dc.date.available2017-01-31T15:40:14Z
dc.date.issued2011-08
dc.descriptionFil: Levine, David K. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.descriptionFil: Modica, Salvatore. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.descriptionFil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.descriptionFil: Zurita, Felipe. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.description.abstractThe literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two- population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the wrong populations.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/11946
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);109
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleEvolving to the impatience trap : the example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
dc.typeDocumento de Trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
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