Evolving to the impatience trap : the example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game
Date
2011-08
Authors
Levine, David K.
Modica, Salvatore
Weinschelbaum, Federico
Zurita, Felipe
relationships.isContributorOfPublication
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Abstract
The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems,
finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in
the context of a game, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, it offers a two-
population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while
favoring patience in the other. Moreover, not only evolution but also efficiency may
prefer impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve
impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the
wrong populations.
Description
Fil: Levine, David K. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Modica, Salvatore. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Zurita, Felipe. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Modica, Salvatore. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Zurita, Felipe. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.