Collective action : experimental evidence
Date
2014-12
Authors
Anauati, María Victoria
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Galiani, Sebastián
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Abstract
We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics
predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of
stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we
increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to
those that contribute) the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also suggests
new avenues to refine the theory. We find that as the payoff of a successful collective
action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs on the expected share of
cooperators. Although this does not qualitative affect comparative static predictions,
using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution
reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding
also allows as to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation in a ‘belief
effect’ and a ‘range of cooperation effect’.
JEL classification codes: D72, C92, H41.
Key words: Collective action, multiple equilibria, laboratory experiment.
JEL classification codes: D72, C92, H41.
Key words: Collective action, multiple equilibria, laboratory experiment.
Description
Fil: Anauati, María Victoria. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.