Veto players and policy trade-offs : an intertemporal approach to study the effects of political institutions on policy

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dc.creator.AutorTommasi, Mariano
dc.creator.AutorScartascini, Carlos
dc.creator.AutorStein, Ernesto
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-02T16:05:06Z
dc.date.available2016-12-02T16:05:06Z
dc.date.issued2010-03
dc.descriptionFil: Tommasi, Mariano. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.descriptionFil: Scartascini, Carlos. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.descriptionFil: Stein, Ernesto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.description.abstractThe capacity to sustain policies over time and the capacity to adjust policies in the face of changing circumstances are two desirable properties of policymaking systems. The veto player approach has suggested that polities with more veto players will have the capacity to sustain policies at the expense of the ability to change policy when necessary. This paper disputes that assertion from an intertemporal perspective, drawing from transaction cost economics and repeated game theory and showing that some countries might have both more credibility and more adaptability than others. More generally, the paper argues that when studying the effects of political institutions on policy outcomes, a perspective of intertemporal politics might lead to predictions different from those emanating from more a-temporal approaches.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/11925
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);101
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleVeto players and policy trade-offs : an intertemporal approach to study the effects of political institutions on policy
dc.typeDocumento de Trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
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