Veto players and policy trade-offs : an intertemporal approach to study the effects of political institutions on policy
Date
2010-03
Authors
Tommasi, Mariano
Scartascini, Carlos
Stein, Ernesto
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Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Abstract
The capacity to sustain policies over time and the capacity to adjust policies in the
face of changing circumstances are two desirable properties of policymaking
systems. The veto player approach has suggested that polities with more veto
players will have the capacity to sustain policies at the expense of the ability to
change policy when necessary. This paper disputes that assertion from an
intertemporal perspective, drawing from transaction cost economics and repeated
game theory and showing that some countries might have both more credibility
and more adaptability than others. More generally, the paper argues that when
studying the effects of political institutions on policy outcomes, a perspective of
intertemporal politics might lead to predictions different from those emanating
from more a-temporal approaches.
Description
Fil: Tommasi, Mariano. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Scartascini, Carlos. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Stein, Ernesto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Scartascini, Carlos. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Stein, Ernesto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.