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Comments on Dani Rodrik’s ‘Why is There So Much Economic Insecurity in Latin America?’

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Understanding the Political Economy of Structural Reform: The Case of Argentina

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Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments

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Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law

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The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy

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The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina

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Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990s

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The institutions of regulation: An application to public utilities

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Are we playing the same game? : the economic effects of constitutions depend on the degree of institutionalization

This paper addresses an important source of variation within democracies – the degree of institutionalization. The concept of institutionalization describes the extent to which politics takes place, and is believed to take place, via formal political institutions. Countries vary in their degree of institutionalization, hence, in the degree to which political actors pursue their goals via conventional politics or via “alternative political technologies”. This paper postulates that if politics is conducted largely outside of formal channels, the structure of the formal channels should not matter much as a determinant of policy outcomes. To address this issue this paper proposes a new index of institutionalization and with it revisits seminal work regarding the impact of constitutions on public spending. The findings show that the effect of constitutional rules on policy outcomes is conditional on the degree of institutionalization.

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Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes. An Intertemporal Transactions Framework