Banking crises, implicit government guarantees, and optimal insurance scheme

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dc.contributor.authorDruck, Pablo
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-14T18:52:25Z
dc.date.available2022-07-14T18:52:25Z
dc.date.issued2000-04
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/19545
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCiclo de Seminarios (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);00-6
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleBanking crises, implicit government guarantees, and optimal insurance scheme
dc.typeSeminario
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workshop
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/seminario
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
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