Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritsm
| dc.creator.Autor | Arozamena, Leandro | |
| dc.creator.Autor | Shunda, Nicholas | |
| dc.creator.Autor | Weinschelbaum, Federico | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T17:48:30Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T17:48:30Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-03 | |
| dc.description | Fil: Arozamena, Leandro. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. | |
| dc.description | Fil: Shunda, Nicholas. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. | |
| dc.description | Fil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina. | |
| dc.description.abstract | In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller ´s welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value, single-unit model under favoritism. At the optimal auction there is a reserve price, or an entry fee, which is decreasing in the proportion of preferred bidders and in the intensity of the preference. Otherwise, the highest-valuation bidder wins. We show that, at least under some conditions, imposing a no-discrimination constraint raises expected seller revenue. | |
| dc.format | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11947 | |
| dc.language | eng | |
| dc.publisher | Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Documento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);110 | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | |
| dc.title | Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritsm | |
| dc.type | Documento de Trabajo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | |
| dc.type | info:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo | |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/draft |