Family business : causes and consequences of political dynasties

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dc.creator.AutorRossi, Martín A.
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-06T17:39:19Z
dc.date.available2017-02-06T17:39:19Z
dc.date.issued2014-10
dc.descriptionFil: Rossi, Martín A. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.description.abstractI explore the causes of the existence of political dynasties in democratic societies. In particular, I investigate the causal relationship between tenure length and posterior dynastic success. Since tenure length is potentially endogenous in a model of political dynasties, I exploit a natural experiment in Argentina that provides a source of exogenous variation for tenure length. I find that having a longer tenure in Congress increases the probability of having a relative in future congresses. I also find that dynastic legislators have lower performance than non-dynastic legislators.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/11951
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);114
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.titleFamily business : causes and consequences of political dynasties
dc.typeDocumento de Trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
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