The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions

Simple item page
dc.creator.AutorWeinschelbaum, Federico
dc.creator.AutorArozamena, Leandro
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-07T16:01:30Z
dc.date.available2011-09-07T16:01:30Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.descriptionFil: Weinschelbaum, Federico. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.descriptionFil: Arozamena, Leandro. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10908/436
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherUniversidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectAuctions -- Corrupt practices -- Mathematical models
dc.titleThe effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions
dc.typeDocumento de Trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.typeinfo:ar-repo/semantics/documento de trabajo
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
Files
Original bundle
Thumbnail Image
Name:
[P][W] doc82.pdf
Size:
718.04 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
License bundle
Thumbnail Image
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download
Collections
Documentos de Trabajo del Departamento de Economía