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Seminario del Departamento de Economía

*“The Effects of Permanent Inflation
Stabilization on Firms' Debt Maturity: a
Case Study of Argentina.”*

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THE EFFECTS OF PERMANENT INFLATION STABILIZATION ON FIRMS' DEBT MATURITY: A CASE STUDY OF ARGENTINA

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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION

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The idea that the maturity of financial contracts tends to be shorter in high inflation environments than it is in stable ones, is not new in the economics profession. Among academics, the idea can be found in advanced, or even elementary textbooks¹. Among practitioners, the phenomenon is well known as well². In particular, the developments that took place in the Argentine financial system have attracted the attention of both academicians and policymakers. Consider, first, the following passage taken from Cavallo (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1977):

"Before persistent inflation get started, Argentina had a reasonably well developed financial system. A very active market for public bonds and private securities did exist, as well as a well-developed capital market, and commercial banks issued long-term certificates of deposits that permitted them to finance long-term loans to farmers and entrepreneurs"

Consider, next, the following passage taken from the Recent Economic Developments IMF document for Argentina in 1984 (p.36):

"The persistence of high inflation in Argentina has made financial markets extremely volatile as the bulk of transactions has tended to be at very short-term positions -typically between 7 and 30 days for free operations and for regulated-rate deposits- and at various times the authorities have

* Comments received from Roger Betancourt and Francisco Rodríguez were extremely helpful. I bear sole responsibility for the contents of this paper, however.

¹ Heymann and Leijonhufvud (1995), especially chapters 3 and 5, and Krugman and Obstfeld (1996, page 388), respectively, provide illustrative examples.

² See, for instance, E. Rojas and P. Rodríguez (1997, especially pages 42-43) for the case of Venezuela, or the IMF Recent Economic Developments (year 1983, page 31; year 1989, pages 42-43) for the case of Peru.

established instruments (including indexed deposits and loans) with a view to lengthening the term of operations".

Some recent studies have analyzed the effects of high inflation on the financial system³, but, somewhat surprisingly, no systematic study of the behavior of long-term debt has been done so far *at the level of the firm*, to the best of my knowledge⁴.

In this paper, I test the hypothesis that the ratio **long-term debt/ total debt** tends to be lower for firms operating in high inflation environments, than for firms operating in low inflation environments. The idea that underlies this hypothesis is very simple: the higher degree of uncertainty that prevails in a high inflation economy leads firms to shorten the maturity of debt, in equilibrium⁵.

2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY


Using firm-level data from the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the Worldscope databases, I apply the *treatment-control methodology* to get a *difference-in-difference estimate* of the increase in long-term corporate debt after a permanent stabilization of inflation takes place. The control group consists of Mexican firms operating in a high inflation regime (2 digit inflation on an annual basis) for seven consecutive years during the mid 1980s and the early 1990s. The treatment group consists of Argentine firms operating in a high inflation regime during the first three years of the proposed experiment, and in a low inflation regime during the last four years of the experiment. It is probably worth recalling that a major stabilization program took place during 1991 in Argentina, that permanently brought the inflation rate down to zero. No such a development took place in Mexico.

³ A recent paper on the effects of inflation *on the financial system* is the one by Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2000).

⁴ Demircuc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) present some very preliminary cross-country evidence that long-term corporate debt tends to be negatively related to inflation, but the focus of their study is not on the effects of inflation.

⁵ Neumeyer (1998) constructs a general equilibrium model that rationalizes this fact. A simpler, partial equilibrium, framework that also accounts for this fact is provided by Guerrero (2000).

The following graph shows the time pattern that the ratio long-term debt/total debt followed in both the treatment and control groups. The chart clearly shows that before stabilization took place in Argentina, the ratio (LTD/TD) followed a very similar pattern for both the Mexican and the Argentine firms. However, as long as stabilization takes place in Argentina, the patterns start to diverge, as expected.



The purpose of the exercise is to get an unbiased estimate of the increase in (LTD/TD) for the Argentine firms after stabilization takes place. The control group is included to construct a counterfactual scenario for the Argentine firms (i.e., what would have happened in the absence of intervention), detrending the ratio corresponding to the Argentine firms from its secular component. In this way, I avoid attributing to stabilization the part of the change in (LTD/TD) that is due to the secular trend that the data for the Argentine firms exhibits before stabilization takes place.

The following table presents the numbers used to construct the graph depicted above.

TABLE 1

	TREATMENT GROUP	CONTROL GROUP
	LTD/TD	LTD/TD
year 1	0.37	0.48
year 2	0.33	0.46
year 3	0.27	0.39
year 4	0.27	0.29
year 5	0.29	0.25
year 6	0.30	0.22
year 7	0.32	0.20

The diff in diff estimate of the effect of stabilization on firms' (LTD/TD) is a Two Ways Fixed Effect procedure that utilizes the variation in the data in both the control and the treatment groups⁶. Table 2 summarizes the idea.

TABLE 2

	BEFORE	AFTER	DIF.
TREATMENT	0.32	0.29	-8.85%
CONTROL	0.44	0.24	-46.31%
	DIF.in DIF. ESTIMATE		37.46%

Following Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000), (LTD/TD) is explained with a vector of standard corporate finance determinants⁷. Descriptive statistics are provided below.

⁶ The One Way Fixed Effect estimates for all the regression exercises presented in this paper are available upon request from the author.

⁷ See the appendix for the definition of variables.

TABLE 3: SUMMARY STATISTICS

ARGENTINA		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations
ltdtd	overall	.2912317	.2359751	0	.8905493	N = 298
	between		.1983816	0	.6585236	n = 68
	within		.1304376	-.2280973	.7779006	T-bar = 4.38235
lnfa	overall	.4962022	.0523659	.3332202	.6325203	N = 299
	between		.0488594	.3375015	.6209346	n = 69
	within		.0184595	.3722738	.5604819	T-bar = 4.33333
nfata	overall	.4426295	.2237052	.0007951	.9196892	N = 299
	between		.2190459	.0029679	.9085047	n = 69
	within		.0692075	.0753652	.8218163	T-bar = 4.33333
nsnfa	overall	3.670549	15.52981	.0142829	243.5481	N = 295
	between		12.2906	.0142829	102.7537	n = 69
	within		10.06509	-85.25375	144.465	T-bar = 4.27536
pta	overall	.0181822	.1098222	-.5328916	.374442	N = 299
	between		.0800025	-.2040374	.1831369	n = 69
	within		.0778335	-.3899895	.2765546	T-bar = 4.33333
MEXICO		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations
ltdtd	overall	.324481	.2770735	-.0019735	.9563043	N = 666
	between		.2097266	0	.8644658	n = 115
	within		.1828848	-.2854342	.8404174	T-bar = 5.7913
lnfa	overall	.7582097	.1215169	.4188006	1	N = 221
	between		.1170502	.5313228	.9845624	n = 45
	within		.0639027	.6003441	.8910508	T-bar = 4.91111
nfata	overall	.5691991	.161089	.072475	.9615187	N = 401
	between		.148159	.2377594	.9467828	n = 76
	within		.0674794	.066301	.755356	T-bar = 5.27632
nsnfa	overall	1.518667	1.253637	.0455612	11.18144	N = 401
	between		1.004271	.0712596	4.522621	n = 76
	within		.7035486	-.5194618	10.04662	T-bar = 5.27632
pta	overall	.0536619	.0666138	-.3377416	.3752403	N = 665
	between		.0451472	-.0692658	.1957784	n = 115
	within		.0501224	-.2832627	.3655238	T-bar = 5.78261

3. RESULTS

Table 4 below presents the Two Ways Fixed Effect estimate of the impact of permanent stabilization on (LTD/TD). The ratio (LTD/TD) is regressed against a standard vector of corporate finance determinants and a dummy variable (stab) that takes value equal to one for the Argentine firms after stabilization and zero elsewhere.

TABLE 4

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	=	513
Group variable (i) : id	Number of groups	=	113
R-sq: within = 0.1461	Obs per group: min	=	1
between = 0.0603	avg	=	4.5
overall = 0.0243	max	=	7

corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.7296	F(11,389)	=	6.05
	Prob > F	=	0.0000

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lnfa	-1.04787	.1581392	-6.626	0.000	-1.358784	-.7369556
nfata	.2415098	.1036729	2.330	0.020	.0376806	.445339
nsnfa	.0005287	.0024969	0.212	0.832	-.0043804	.0054378
pta	-.0263727	.1143557	-0.231	0.818	-.2512053	.1984599
stab 	.0882467	.0350751	2.516	0.012	.0192861	.1572072
Iyear_2	.0045472	.0259352	0.175	0.861	-.0464436	.0555379
Iyear_3	.0990787	.0293674	3.374	0.001	.0413401	.1568173
Iyear_4	.0346901	.0300549	1.154	0.249	-.0244004	.0937805
Iyear_5	.0426247	.0298338	1.429	0.154	-.016031	.1012804
Iyear_6	.0619183	.0356302	1.738	0.083	-.0081336	.1319702
Iyear_7	.0431131	.0422373	1.021	0.308	-.0399289	.1261552
_cons	.7527131	.1023757	7.352	0.000	.5514341	.9539921
sigma_u	.32802423					
sigma_e	.14304079					
rho	.84022662	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u_i=0:	F(112,389) =	8.73	Prob > F = 0.0000
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As Table 4 shows, stabilization is a statistically significant variable that helps to explain the increase in (LTD/TD) for Argentine firms, after controlling for the effects of corporate finance determinants on firms' long-term debt.

For completeness, Table 5 below reports the Random Effect estimation results.

TABLE 5

Random-effects GLS regression	Number of obs	=	513
Group variable (i) : id	Number of groups	=	113
R-sq: within = 0.0626	Obs per group: min	=	1
between = 0.0130	avg	=	4.5
overall = 0.0397	max	=	7
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian	Wald chi2(11)	=	24.92
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)	Prob > chi2	=	0.0094

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
lnfa	-.1690982	.1146404	-1.475	0.140	-.3937892 .0555928
nfata	.3244159	.0801436	4.048	0.000	.1673373 .4814946
nsnfa	.0018608	.0022222	0.837	0.402	-.0024946 .0062162
pta	.0550803	.1100942	0.500	0.617	-.1607005 .270861
stab	.0457739	.0352678	1.298	0.194	-.0233498 .1148976
Iyear_2	-.0306504	.0269903	-1.136	0.256	-.0835505 .0222497
Iyear_3	.0321169	.0292532	1.098	0.272	-.0252182 .0894521
Iyear_4	-.0243033	.0305897	-0.794	0.427	-.0842579 .0356514
Iyear_5	-.0216302	.0302577	-0.715	0.475	-.0809342 .0376738
Iyear_6	-.0041724	.0366103	-0.114	0.909	-.0759272 .0675824
Iyear_7	-.0223345	.0435713	-0.513	0.608	-.1077326 .0630637
_cons	.2370262	.0769533	3.080	0.002	.0862004 .3878519

sigma_u	.18454874
sigma_e	.14304079
rho	.62470508 (fraction of variance due to u_i)

If this specification were the correct one, even when having the correct sign, stab would not be statistically significant anymore. To test which specification is correct, I asked STATA to perform a Hausman specification test. Results are shown in Table 6, below.

TABLE 6

Hausman specification test

ltdtd	---- Coefficients ----		Difference
	Fixed Effects	Random Effects	
lnfa	-1.04787	-.1690982	-.8787718
nfata	.2415098	.3244159	-.0829062
nsnfa	.0005287	.0018608	-.001332
pta	-.0263727	.0550803	-.0814529
stab	.0882467	.0457739	.0424728
Iyear_2	.0045472	-.0306504	.0351976
Iyear_3	.0990787	.0321169	.0669618
Iyear_4	.0346901	-.0243033	.0589933
Iyear_5	.0426247	-.0216302	.0642549
Iyear_6	.0619183	-.0041724	.0660907
Iyear_7	.0431131	-.0223345	.0654476

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic

$$\begin{aligned} \text{chi2}(11) &= (b-B)' [S^{(-1)}] (b-B), S = (S_{fe} - S_{re}) \\ &= 96.42 \\ \text{Prob} > \text{chi2} &= 0.0000 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the Hausman test permits to reject the null hypothesis that both procedures are providing unbiased estimates of the effect of stabilization on firms' debt maturity (if the null were not rejected, I should have taken the Random Effects estimate, because it gives efficient estimates). Thus, the Two Ways Fixed Effect procedure is the one providing the unbiased estimate of the effect of stabilization on firms' debt maturity and I can conclude that there is a statistically significant effect of permanent inflation stabilization on firms' long-term debt.

4. SOME EXTENSIONS

The results presented in the previous section could be subject to criticism, because I did not intend to control for other macroeconomic events that took place in the period under analysis in both countries. Concretely, both economies were subject to processes of financial liberalization (caps on interest rates were removed, controls on credit allocation by the central bank were suppressed, etc), experimented a remarkable increase in financial

development, and gained access to both international equity and bond markets. In this section, I make an attempt to control for all these developments, including an index of financial liberalization, an index of financial development, an index of firms' access to bond markets, and an index of firms' access to equity markets in the right hand side of my regressions⁸. Table 7 below presents the new Two Ways Fixed Effect results.

TABLE 7

i.year	Iyear_1-7	(naturally coded; Iyear_1 omitted)			
Fixed-effects (within) regression		Number of obs	=	513	
Group variable (i) : id		Number of groups	=	113	
R-sq: within	= 0.1678	Obs per group: min	=	1	
between	= 0.0673	avg	=	4.5	
overall	= 0.1011	max	=	7	
corr(u_i, Xb)	= 0.0442	F(15,385)	=	5.17	
		Prob > F	=	0.0000	

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lnfa	.0141999	.4609235	0.031	0.975	-.8920423	.9204421
nfata	.0941142	.116634	0.807	0.420	-.1352051	.3234335
nfnfa	.0000713	.0025389	0.028	0.978	-.0049206	.0050632
pta	-.0476963	.113903	-0.419	0.676	-.2716462	.1762535
access	.0424009	.0364346	1.164	0.245	-.0292348	.1140366
access2	.0306561	.081039	0.378	0.705	-.1286784	.1899906
findev	-1.17077	.4301481	-2.722	0.007	-2.016504	-.3250368
lib	-.1701748	.1263473	-1.347	0.179	-.4185919	.0782423
stab	.2339085	.0620704	3.768	0.000	.111869	.355948
Iyear_2	.0207226	.0263299	0.787	0.432	-.0310458	.072491
Iyear_3	.0742875	.0307168	2.418	0.016	.0138939	.1346811
Iyear_4	-.0690697	.0468355	-1.475	0.141	-.161155	.0230157
Iyear_5	-.0113246	.0363135	-0.312	0.755	-.0827222	.0600729
Iyear_6	.058058	.0410636	1.414	0.158	-.022679	.1387951
Iyear_7	.0477439	.0475193	1.005	0.316	-.0456859	.1411737
_cons	.7130929	.1136509	6.274	0.000	.4896389	.936547

sigma_u		.21317659
sigma_e		.14194862
rho		.69281471 (fraction of variance due to u_i)

F test that all u_i=0:	F(112,385) =	7.71	Prob > F =	0.0000
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⁸ See the appendix for the definition (and source) of the variables.

As Table 7 shows, once I control for all the macroeconomic developments that took place in both countries during the period of analysis, the effect of permanent stabilization on Argentine firms' (LTD/TD) remains statistically significant and with the correct sign. Certainly it is higher than it was in the previous section.

I present the alternative Random Effect estimate in Table 8 below

TABLE 8

i.year	Iyear_1-7	(naturally coded; Iyear_1 omitted)		
Random-effects GLS regression			Number of obs	= 513
Group variable (i) : id			Number of groups	= 113
R-sq: within	= 0.1590		Obs per group: min	= 1
between	= 0.1555		avg	= 4.5
overall	= 0.1668		max	= 7
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian			Wald chi2(15)	= 93.57
corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed)			Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
lnfa	.3004086	.1410003	2.131	0.033	.024053 .5767642
nfata	.1481419	.0788546	1.879	0.060	-.0064102 .302694
nsnfa	.0018935	.0021503	0.881	0.379	-.0023209 .006108
pta	-.0797684	.1057305	-0.754	0.451	-.2869964 .1274596
access	.0655204	.0358303	1.829	0.067	-.0047056 .1357464
access2	.0450126	.0794119	0.567	0.571	-.1106319 .200657
findev	-1.593858	.3903435	-4.083	0.000	-2.358917 -.8287987
lib	-.1454301	.0473176	-3.073	0.002	-.2381709 -.0526894
stab	.2841456	.0509341	5.579	0.000	.1843165 .3839746
Iyear_2	.0156622	.0264914	0.591	0.554	-.03626 .0675843
Iyear_3	.0589757	.0304891	1.934	0.053	-.0007819 .1187333
Iyear_4	-.1075227	.0350017	-3.072	0.002	-.1761249 -.0389206
Iyear_5	-.0363161	.0291019	-1.248	0.212	-.0933549 .0207226
Iyear_6	.0507361	.037675	1.347	0.178	-.0231055 .1245777
Iyear_7	.046021	.0453717	1.014	0.310	-.0429058 .1349478
_cons	.5525831	.1006814	5.488	0.000	.3552512 .7499151
sigma_u	.17681506				
sigma_e	.14194862				
rho	.60808706				(fraction of variance due to u_i)

In this specification, stab remains statistically significant and retains the correct sign. To discern which specification is correct, I include the Hausman specification test in Table 9 below.

TABLE 9

Hausman specification test

---- Coefficients ----			
	Fixed	Random	
ltdtd	Effects	Effects	Difference
lnfa	.0141999	.3004086	-.2862087
nfata	.0941142	.1481419	-.0540277
nsnfa	.0000713	.0018935	-.0018222
pta	-.0476963	-.0797684	.0320721
access	.0424009	.0655204	-.0231195
access2	.0306561	.0450126	-.0143565
findev	-1.17077	-1.593858	.4230876
lib	-.1701748	-.1454301	-.0247446
stab	.2339085	.2841456	-.050237
Iyear_2	.0207226	.0156622	.0050604
Iyear_3	.0742875	.0589757	.0153118
Iyear_4	-.0690697	-.1075227	.038453
Iyear_5	-.0113246	-.0363161	.0249915
Iyear_6	.058058	.0507361	.0073219
Iyear_7	.0477439	.046021	.0017229

Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic

$$\text{chi2}(15) = (b-B)'[S^{(-1)}](b-B), S = (S_{fe} - S_{re})$$

$$= 31.94$$

$$\text{Prob}>\text{chi2} = 0.0066$$

Again, the Fixed Effect is the correct specification.


5. SPLITTING THE SAMPLE

In this section, I split the sample in two parts according to the sample median value of different variables (such as size, fraction of physical capital in total assets, rate of profit

over assets, and revenues from sales) to try to infer how is that high inflation (or, more properly, stabilization) affects firms' (LTD/TD)⁹.

I start by splitting the sample between large and small firms (large firms being the ones for which the natural logarithm of total assets, as a proxy for size, is larger than the sample median value for that variable). Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) present preliminary cross-country evidence that the effect of inflation is not very different between large and small firms.


To start with, consider the histograms for the behavior of (LTD/TD) for large firms in high inflation and after stabilization takes place in Argentina. I start with the one corresponding to large firms operating in high inflation.



Notice from the histogram presented above that 1 out of 5 large firms have (LTD/TD) < 10% during high inflation. Moreover, almost 50% (exactly 48.8%) of firms display a ratio (LTD/TD) < 30%, clear evidence in support of the hypothesis that corporate debt tend to be short-term in high inflation environments.

⁹ Probably the best way to infer how is that inflation affects firms' debt maturity is by interacting the dummy variable stab with the vector of corporate finance determinants included in the regressions.

Consider now the histogram for large firms operating in low inflation environments (after stabilization occurred):



After stabilization occurred, only 10% of large firms have (LTD/TD) < 10% and the fraction of firms with ratios (LTD/TD) below 30% is only 17%.

Indeed, the regression results show that the effect of inflation on firms' debt maturity is due to the effect that inflation has on *large* firms. Table 10 below shows the Two Ways Fixed Effect estimation procedure applied to large firms¹⁰.

TABLE 10: EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION ON LARGE FIRMS

i.year	Iyear_1-7	(naturally coded; Iyear_1 omitted)		
Fixed-effects (within) regression			Number of obs	= 260
Group variable (i) : id			Number of groups	= 58

However, as a first step, I decided to split the sample in this discrete, two dimensional way to get some intuition as of what was going on.

¹⁰ The Random Effects estimation and the Hausman test (chi2 = 48.18) are not reported for space considerations, but are available upon request from the author. Anyways, according to the Hausman test, the Fixed Effect is the correct specification in the present case.

R-sq: within = 0.3200
 between = 0.0456
 overall = 0.0014

Obs per group: min = 1
 avg = 4.5
 max = 7

corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.7716

F(15,187) = 5.87
 Prob > F = 0.0000

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lnfa	.8983104	.5806382	1.547	0.124	-.2471327	2.043753
nfata	-.3415427	.1864293	-1.832	0.069	-.7093176	.0262321
nsnfa	-.0000727	.0233805	-0.003	0.998	-.0461962	.0460508
pta	-.3861706	.2247795	-1.718	0.087	-.8296001	.0572589
access	-.0049633	.051998	-0.095	0.924	-.1075413	.0976147
access2	-.0894445	.1143214	-0.782	0.435	-.3149698	.1360808
findev	-.9183345	.5799096	-1.584	0.115	-2.06234	.225671
lib	-.6072963	.2158572	-2.813	0.005	-1.033124	-.1814681
stab	.257595	.0981641	2.624	0.009	.0639437	.4512463
Iyear_2	.0074857	.0297569	0.252	0.802	-.0512166	.0661879
Iyear_3	.0132157	.0363357	0.364	0.716	-.0584649	.0848962
Iyear_4	-.1339382	.0547477	-2.446	0.015	-.2419406	-.0259358
Iyear_5	-.0774358	.0434061	-1.784	0.076	-.1630644	.0081929
Iyear_6	-.000096	.0803946	-0.001	0.999	-.1586929	.1585009
Iyear_7	-.0031782	.0918702	-0.035	0.972	-.1844134	.1780571
_cons	1.041552	.1804018	5.774	0.000	.6856673	1.397436
sigma_u	.38473655					
sigma_e	.13710878					
rho	.88731147	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u_i=0: F(57,187) = 6.05 Prob > F = 0.0000

Instead, when the effect of inflation stabilization on small firms is considered, the results are not so neat: the coefficient on stab is very large, displays the correct sign, but it is not statistically significant. Table 11 reports the results.

TABLE 11: EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION ON SMALL FIRMS

Fixed-effects (within) regression
 Group variable (i) : id
 Number of obs = 253
 Number of groups = 67
 R-sq: within = 0.0903
 between = 0.0996
 overall = 0.0056
 Obs per group: min = 1
 avg = 3.8
 max = 7
 corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.3746
 F(14,172) = 1.22
 Prob > F = 0.2648

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lnfa	-.343781	1.108531	-0.310	0.757	-2.531856	1.844294

nfata		.2792556	.167318	1.669	0.097	-.0510053	.6095165
nsnfa		-.0006012	.0026871	-0.224	0.823	-.0059051	.0047026
pta		.1112451	.1331972	0.835	0.405	-.1516665	.3741567
access		.0430723	.0602974	0.714	0.476	-.0759459	.1620904
access2		.2160269	.1591726	1.357	0.177	-.0981563	.5302101
findev		-3.7954670	7.133732	-0.532	0.595	-17.8764	10.28546
lib		.0630832	.7398072	0.085	0.932	-1.397187	1.523353
stab		.6507176	1.3619999	0.478	0.633	-2.037668	3.339103
Iyear_2		-.0074122	.2301837	-0.032	0.974	-.4617607	.4469363
Iyear_3		.0824923	.2944216	0.280	0.780	-.4986524	.6636371
Iyear_4		.2879072	.6255642	0.460	0.646	-.946864	1.522678
Iyear_5		.5359671	1.043803	0.513	0.608	-1.524345	2.596279
Iyear_6		.6756174	1.307618	0.517	0.606	-1.905428	3.256663
Iyear_7		.6507216	1.361999	0.478	0.633	-2.037663	3.339107
_cons		.6844093	2.302178	0.297	0.767	-3.859749	5.228567

sigma_u		.23587782					
sigma_e		.13833427					
rho		.74407966	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u_i=0:		F(66,172) =	6.15			Prob > F =	0.0000

When I splitted the sample according to the sample median value of the ratio of tangible assets to total assets (a proxy for the stock of physical capital), I found that the effects of inflation stabilization were not very different for firms holding a relatively high fraction of human capital in the production process than for firms using a relatively low fraction of human capital in production. Tables 12 and 13 below report those results¹¹.

TABLE 12: EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION ON FIRMS WITH A LOW NFATA

i.year	Iyear_1-7	(naturally coded; Iyear_1 omitted)
Fixed-effects (within) regression		Number of obs = 269
Group variable (i) : id		Number of groups = 80
R-sq: within = 0.2144		Obs per group: min = 1
between = 0.0456		avg = 3.4
overall = 0.0023		max = 7
		F(15,174) = 3.17
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8653		Prob > F = 0.0001

¹¹ Again, the Random Effects specifications and the Hausman tests will not be included for space considerations, but are available upon request from the author. In both cases, the Fixed Effect specification turned out to be the correct one, anyways.

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lnfa	-1.603625	.8265242	-1.940	0.054	-3.234929 .0276785
nfata	.1717093	.1905661	0.901	0.369	-.2044093 .5478279
nsnfa	-.0047122	.0037508	-1.256	0.211	-.0121152 .0026907
pta	-.1526772	.1299051	-1.175	0.241	-.4090699 .1037154
access	.0424737	.0504881	0.841	0.401	-.0571741 .1421216
access2	.8498416	.5064701	1.678	0.095	-.149774 1.849457
findev	-.9784336	.6906118	-1.417	0.158	-2.341488 .3846211
lib	.3143389	.1941894	1.619	0.107	-.0689311 .6976088
stab	.1803008	.095522	1.888	0.061	-.0082302 .3688318
Iyear_2	.0485532	.0423352	1.147	0.253	-.0350035 .1321099
Iyear_3	.0908793	.0513599	1.769	0.079	-.0104893 .1922479
Iyear_4	.0008823	.0815998	0.011	0.991	-.1601705 .1619352
Iyear_5	.0911543	.060924	1.496	0.136	-.0290909 .2113994
Iyear_6	.1342845	.0610076	2.201	0.029	.0138744 .2546947
Iyear_7	.0821962	.0680105	1.209	0.228	-.0520355 .2164278
_cons	.5195018	.170127	3.054	0.003	.1837236 .8552801
sigma_u	.472248				
sigma_e	.12902672				
rho	.93053712	(fraction of variance due to u_i)			

F test that all u_i=0: F(79,174) = 6.78 Prob > F = 0.0000

Notice that stab is not significant at the 5% conventional level to explain how inflation stabilization affects the debt maturity of firms holding a low fraction of physical capital to produce output. However, it is marginally significant at the 6% level, and the sign is positive, as expected.

TABLE 13: EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION ON FIRMS WITH A HIGH NFATA

i.year	Iyear_1-7	(naturally coded; Iyear_1 omitted)
Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	= 244
Group variable (i) : id	Number of groups	= 69
R-sq: within = 0.2559	Obs per group: min =	1
between = 0.0806	avg =	3.5
overall = 0.1080	max =	7
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.5110	F(15,160)	= 3.67
	Prob > F	= 0.0000

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
lnfa	.428081	.6275344	0.682	0.496	-.8112376 1.6674
nfata	-.2267613	.2580003	-0.879	0.381	-.7362864 .2827639
nsnfa	-.0952037	.0502619	-1.894	0.060	-.194466 .0040586


pta		-.008797	.2781564	-0.032	0.975	-.5581284	.5405344
access		.0468578	.0515507	0.909	0.365	-.0549497	.1486653
access2		-.1052252	.0946413	-1.112	0.268	-.2921325	.0816821
findev		-.9961849	.5894228	-1.690	0.093	-2.160237	.167867
lib		-.3417862	.1906134	-1.793	0.075	-.7182289	.0346566
stab		.175124	.0891296	1.965	0.051	-.0008981	.3511462
Iyear_2		-.0098285	.0339385	-0.290	0.773	-.0768537	.0571968
Iyear_3		.010998	.0420601	0.261	0.794	-.0720665	.0940624
Iyear_4		-.1235426	.0615621	-2.007	0.046	-.2451217	-.0019634
Iyear_5		-.0804026	.0471584	-1.705	0.090	-.1735359	.0127306
Iyear_6		.0049588	.0611402	0.081	0.935	-.1157871	.1257046
Iyear_7		.0554817	.0745647	0.744	0.458	-.0917763	.2027396
_cons		1.111957	.2375821	4.680	0.000	.6427558	1.581158

sigma_u		.24707044					
sigma_e		.13808834					
rho		.76197892	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u_i=0:		F(68,160) =	5.39			Prob > F =	0.0000


Notice that the coefficient on stab is very similar than the one reported in Table 12. The only (very slight) difference is that now stab is marginally significant at the 5% level.

The next step was to split the sample according to the sample median value of the rate of profit over assets. Before presenting the regression results, it pays to take a glance at the histograms for profits in high inflation and after stabilization takes place.



Notice from the chart presented above that less than 5 % of firms (actually 4.87 %) have a rate of profit over assets that is less than 5 % in a high inflation environment.

When we take a glance at the histogram for profits in a stable environment, the picture changes completely:



Now, exactly 20 % of firms have a rate of profit below 5 %. This evidence is consistent with the finding that the number of bankruptcies increased dramatically after the 1985 Israeli stabilization (reported by Bruno and Meridar, 1991). The previous finding is consistent with the hypothesis, first formulated in an analytical model by Tommasi (1994), that resources are poorly allocated in a high inflation regime and the low rates of profit (or even bankruptcies) are the result to be expected after inflation is stabilized. Both histograms suggest what to expect from the regression results: the effects of inflation stabilization should be stronger for firms with high profits (i.e. the ones that were probably not able to get long-term financing in a high inflation environment, even when their solvency was not in question, but the ones that will be able to get it when inflation is stabilized). Tables 14 and 15 below show exactly this result.

TABLE 14: EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION ON FIRMS WITH LOW PROFITS

i.year Iyear_1-7 (naturally coded; Iyear_1 omitted)

Fixed-effects (within) regression
 Group variable (i) : id

Number of obs = 268
 Number of groups = 94

R-sq: within = 0.2411
 between = 0.0390
 overall = 0.0934

Obs per group: min = 1
 avg = 2.9
 max = 7

corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.1831

F(15,159) = 3.37
 Prob > F = 0.0001

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lnfa	-.301418	.808601	-0.373	0.710	-1.898402	1.295566
nfata	.2578932	.2008629	1.284	0.201	-.1388103	.6545967
nsnfa	-.0147181	.0229265	-0.642	0.522	-.0599978	.0305616
pta	.4929788	.2010084	2.453	0.015	.0959879	.8899696
access	-.0406882	.069587	-0.585	0.560	-.1781223	.096746
access2	.289075	.2233083	1.295	0.197	-.1519579	.730108
findev	.2454484	.7028875	0.349	0.727	-1.142752	1.633649
lib	-.2963764	.2193039	-1.351	0.178	-.7295008	.1367479
stab	.0713481	.1101344	0.648	0.518	-.146167	.2888632
Iyear_2	-.0302089	.0399335	-0.756	0.450	-.1090775	.0486597
Iyear_3	.1215368	.048386	2.512	0.013	.0259748	.2170989
Iyear_4	.0334094	.088876	0.376	0.707	-.1421204	.2089391
Iyear_5	.0450038	.0682999	0.659	0.511	-.0898883	.1798959
Iyear_6	.0589805	.0702002	0.840	0.402	-.0796646	.1976257
Iyear_7	-.0262777	.0856418	-0.307	0.759	-.19542	.1428645
_cons	.8589739	.187879	4.572	0.000	.4879136	1.230034
sigma_u	.23937165					
sigma_e	.14181395					
rho	.74019891	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u_i=0: F(93,159) = 6.04 Prob > F = 0.0000

As Table 14 shows, it seems that stabilization does not affect the ratio LTD/TD for firms with low profits.

However, this is not the case for firms with higher than sample median profits, as Table 15 makes clear.

TABLE 15 : EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION ON FIRMS WITH HIGH PROFITS

i.year Iyear_1-7 (naturally coded; Iyear_1 omitted)

Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 245

overall = 0.0000

max = 7

corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8002 F(15,165) = 2.31
 Prob > F = 0.0051

ltdtd	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
lnfa	-.9936359	.7022687	-1.415	0.159	-2.380227	.3929554
nfata	.1694896	.1447047	1.171	0.243	-.116222	.4552012
nsnfa	-.0031034	.0031999	-0.970	0.334	-.0094214	.0032145
pta	-.0678502	.1232483	-0.551	0.583	-.3111972	.1754968
access	.0543306	.0520695	1.043	0.298	-.0484779	.1571391
access2	.6632692	.4362504	1.520	0.130	-.1980835	1.524622
findev	-.4822439	.5223587	-0.923	0.357	-1.513613	.5491249
lib	.1421082	.1830969	0.776	0.439	-.2194066	.503623
stab	.1041638	.0814146	1.279	0.203	-.056585	.2649126
Iyear_2	.0403091	.0314152	1.283	0.201	-.0217184	.1023366
Iyear_3	.0843435	.0431981	1.952	0.053	-.0009487	.1696358
Iyear_4	.0547457	.0667593	0.820	0.413	-.077067	.1865584
Iyear_5	.084024	.0492188	1.707	0.090	-.0131559	.1812039
Iyear_6	.1169825	.0508329	2.301	0.023	.0166158	.2173492
Iyear_7	.0428843	.0574907	0.746	0.457	-.070628	.1563966
_cons	.4072395	.1438357	2.831	0.005	.1232438	.6912353
sigma_u	.30998127					
sigma_e	.10937338					
rho	.88928797	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

F test that all u_i=0: F(71,165) = 6.06 Prob > F = 0.0000

Again, there is no statistically significant (at the 5 % level) effect of stabilization on the ratio LTD/TD for firms with higher than sample median values for revenues from sales.

6. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The main results can be summarized as follows. First, there is a clear positive effect of a permanent stabilization on the lengthening of Argentine firms' debt, after controlling for both a vector of standard corporate finance determinants and a set of macroeconomic developments that took place more or less simultaneously with the stabilization of inflation. Second, the stabilization of inflation seems to have affected particularly large firms and high profits/low cost firms' (LTD/TD) in Argentina.

A rather natural question may arise at this point: why is the shortening of debt maturity under high inflation conditions (or its reciprocal, the lengthening of debt maturity after permanent inflation stabilization takes place) a relevant issue?

First, the shortening of the term structure of nominal contracts in high inflation conditions has been a major financial development in economies displaying high rates of inflation during the 1980s. In fact, the issue is receiving attention in the monetary economics literature¹². Second, the issue is potentially relevant for economic growth. Recent studies in this area (Barro, 1995, 1997; De Gregorio 1992, 1993) found, using *aggregate data* for a cross-section of countries, that investment is the main link between inflation and growth (i.e. inflation reduces investment and, hence, growth is adversely affected). Endogeneity is a big problem, however. Using firm level data can help to deal with the endogeneity problem (it is difficult to make the point that the rate of inflation is affected at the firm level). If one finds support for the idea that inflation shortens the maturity structure of nominal contracts, then a second natural step would be to investigate how investment is affected. The hypothesis is that both the level and the efficiency of investment are decreased by high inflation. This constitutes the second part of my PhD dissertation agenda. Finally, recent studies in the area of applied corporate finance (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2000, for instance) have found that a measure of financial liberalization tends to shorten the maturity structure of firms' corporate debt, in a subset of emerging economies. They did not control for inflation stabilization, however. Therefore, applying the same methodology used in this paper to their data set, I will be able to test the robustness of their finding to the inclusion of inflation stabilization considerations.

¹² See the recent paper by Neumeyer in the *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* (1999), for instance.

APPENDIX: Definition of Variables in the DATA SET

All the corporate data is taken from the IFC (World Bank) database, or the Worldscope database.

LTD/TD: Ratio of debt obligations due more than one year and total liabilities.

LNFA: Natural logarithm of Net Fixed Assets.

NFATA: Ratio of Net Fixed Assets and Total Assets.

NSNFA: Ratio of Net Sales and Net Fixed Assets

PTA: Ratio of firms' Profits and Total Assets.

I have borrowed all the "macro" data from Sergio Schmukler, at The World Bank.

FINDEV: Average of an index of Market Capitalization and an index of the degree of monetization of the economy. The index of Financial Development was constructed by A. Demirguc-Kunt, Research Department, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. The index is used in Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000).

ACCESS: Index of the access of firms to international Bonds markets. Constructed by Schmukler and Vesperoni (Research Department, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.). The index is used in Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000).

ACCESS2: Index of the access of firms to international equity markets. Constructed by Schmukler and Vesperoni (Research Department, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.). The index is used in Schmukler and Vesperoni (2000).

LIB: Multidimensional index of Financial Liberalization. It is a weighted average of measures of interest rates (both credit and deposit rates) liberalization, credit control deregulation, reserve requirements liberalization on bank deposits, liberalization on restrictions on deposits in foreign currency in the domestic financial system and liberalization on borrowing abroad restrictions both by corporations and commercial banks.

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