Universidad de San Andrés

Departamento de Economía

Maestría en Economía

The Influence of Political Leaders on Policy Preferences

Maria Constanza ABUIN

DNI 37143312

Mentor: Lorena MOSCOVICH

Victoria, Buenos Aires

16 de octubre, 2019

Tesis de Maestría en Economía de

Maria Constanza ABUIN

"La Influencia de los Líderes Políticos en el Apoyo a Políticas Públicas"

Resumen

La opinión pública sobre propuestas de política es sensible a la forma específica en la que estas propuestas se manifiestan en la práctica. A través de un experimento en un contexto social polarizado, este trabajo explora cómo el origen partidario de una propuesta incide en su aceptación pública. Encontramos que el respaldo de líderes y partidos afecta las preferencias públicas sobre políticas, sin importar la naturaleza de la propuesta analizada. Esta influencia es suficientemente fuerte como para generar polarización en temas en los que ex-ante existía consenso. Además, algunos líderes y partidos son más influyentes que otros, tanto para quienes los apoyan como para sus detractores. A su vez, analizamos cómo la incidencia del respaldo partidario puede afectar la posibilidad de llevar a cabo reformas relevantes. Encontramos que el efecto neto del respaldo político es negativo: cuando un líder o su partido respalda una propuesta genera un rechazo más fuerte de parte de sus detractores que el apoyo que obtiene de parte de sus votantes. Por último, este trabajo discute la existencia de límites a la depolarización y documenta la inefectividad del respaldo bipartidario y el apoyo "contra natura" en aumentar la aceptación pública de una política.

Palabras clave: Preferencias políticas, influencia de líderes, polarización, etiquetas partidarias

"The Influence of Political Leaders on Policy Preferences"

Abstract

Public opinion is sensitive to the way policy proposals are framed and elite policy endorsement can be thought as a powerful form of framing. Using original data from a survey experiment in a polarized political setting, this work explores the role of leader and party sponsorship in shaping public opinion over policies. Both leader and party cues are found to affect policy preferences, regardless of the intrinsic nature of the policy. The influence of sponsorship is strong enough to introduce opinion polarization in ex-ante non-divisive issues. Furthermore, some leaders and parties appear to be more influential than others, both for their supporters and their detractors. In view of these findings, this work assesses how endorsement effects alter policymakers' ability to undertake relevant reforms. The net effect of endorsement is found to be largely negative: the increase in policy approval in party and leader's supporters is outweighed by the growth in rejection from detractors. Finally, this paper provides evidence on the limits to de-polarization, documenting the ineffectiveness of bipartisan sponsorship and "against-type" endorsement to broaden policy support.

Keywords: Policy preferences, Elite influence, polarization, party labels

Códigos JEL: D91, Z18, Y40

1. Introduction

A prolific line of research in political science has found that individual views on policies are more based on ideological or partisan considerations than in their intrinsic merits. People's stances on policies shift to align with the politicians they support (Barber and Pope, 2019) and issue preferences are often motivated by the aim to cheerlead politicians (Bullock et al, 2015). Indeed, the explicit endorsement of policies by parties or leaders can be thought as a form of framing: an alternative conceptualization of an issue that causes individuals to focus primarily on a given aspect (the source of the policy) when constructing their own opinion (Druckman et al., 2013).

Building upon this research tradition, this work explores how partisan cues shape policy support in Argentina, a presidential system with high levels of personalization (Gervasoni, 2017; ODonnell, 1999) and a lack of clear ideological divisions across parties (Catterberg Braun, 1989; Lodola, 2013; Lupu, 2016).

Prior studies have tackled different characteristics of partisan endorsements as frames: the relative influence of parties' and leaders' cues (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Nicholson, 2011), the weight of negative and positive identification (Bullock et al., 2015; Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010) and the ability of cross-party and bipartisan endorsement to diminish polarization (Bolsen et al., 2014; Harbridge et al., 2014) have all been considered. These themes have been studied through a variety of research designs, across different political contexts and focusing on different policy questions.

This work contributes to the extant literature on partisan cues in two ways. First, it evaluates some of its main hypotheses under a common experimental framework. More precisely, a survey experiment is used to measure how public support for a specific policy changes when the party or leader that is allegedly sponsoring the policy is altered. The experiment shows that the endorsement effect, namely, the relation between parties and policy support, is replicated in this context to the point that the effect of partisan cues on opinion can be strong enough to introduce opinion polarization on ex-ante non-divisive issues. It also shows that the endorsement effect remains present when leaders endorse policies instead of parties. Further, it provides evidence on the existence of "polarizing leaders", leaders with a significantly larger incidence on the opinion of all voter groups.

Second, this paper provides evidence on the limits to consensus building and depolarization. We study the net effect of policy endorsement on policy approval and find that it tends to be negative: a leader loses more policy support than it gains by endorsing the policy. Further, we find that an endorsement against-type (for example, a conservative leader backing a typical liberal proposal) does little to garner support from its own constituency.

Instead, this additional support is more than offset by the rejection it generates among the opposition (in the example, it adds less conservative support than the liberal votes it loses). In addition, common (bipartisan) endorsement helps narrow partisan differences but it does so through downward revisions (as respondents reject issues also supported by the other party), so that total support for the issue ultimately declines.

The paper continues as follows. Section 2 presents a more detailed discussion on the effect of elite influence in policy preferences and summarizes this work's main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the merits of Argentina as a background in which to test these hypotheses. Section 4 explains the experiment and section 5 presents our main results. Section 6 provides a brief discussion of these results and their implications for policymaking.

2. Elite influence on policy preferences

2.1. The effect of partisan cues on public policy support and the role of leaders

The framing literature has provided evidence on a key fact: public opinion about policies is not independent from the parties and leaders that sponsor them. In general, people react favorably to the endorsement of their parties and leaders of choice (Bullock, 2011; Druckman et al, 2013) and negatively to the endorsement of those they oppose (Nicholson, 2011; Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). This leads to the first hypothesis of this paper: in-party cues will increase support for public policy proposals, while out-party will decrease it (h1). Because leaders are the visible faces of parties, the endorsement effect will remain significant when leaders provide the endorsement (h2).

Why do endorsement cues affect opinion? At least two possible types of information processing can be behind this effect. On one hand, the heuristics approach emphasizes the fact that gathering and processing information to arrive to a fully-informed opinion can be costly. Because of this, parties' stance might provide citizens' a shortcut (Lau and Redlawsk, 2006) and help them save time in the context of competing information (Druckman and Lupia, 2016)[1]. On the other hand, the systematic processing approach assumes that people are able to focus on message content. In this scenario, endorsement cues can still affect opinion if people engage in partisan motivated reasoning, primed to prioritize being consistent with their own parties (Bolsen et al., 2014). Individuals might choose to support a

[1] Considering parties' stand toward policies helps mitigate risk in decision making under uncertainty (Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998), since decision-makers may not have the time or interest needed to appreciate the consequences of policy choices and/or assess their results.

policy because they are taking into consideration the aspects of the policy that would benefit their party in the eyes of the public (Bullock et al., 2015; Zaller, 1992) or because agreeing with a policy is a way to present themselves publicly as supporters of a given party (Bullock et al., 2015).

2.2. Asymmetric cues and the existence of polarizing leaders

Are some leaders more influential than others? According to Nicholson (2011), the influence of partisan cues does not depend on the characteristics of a specific leader. Instead, what matters is the nature of an individuals' link to the source of the endorsement: out-party cues are always more influential than in-party cues. Interestingly, Barber and Pope (2019) find the opposite: Republicans react to a Donald Trump policy endorsement cue by following his opinion, while Democrats and Independents do not react as strongly (or at all) to the treatment. In contrast to both these findings, we hypothesize that when "polarizing leaders" exist their influence can be greater among both supporters and detractors (h3). This hypothesis is built on previous findings that show that some leaders have a greater influence on the issue preferences of their followers than others (Lenz, 2012).

2.3. Can elite endorsement help build policy support?

Is there any way to exploit the relationship between partisan endorsement and public opinion to promote policy support? In other words, can partisan endorsement act as a frame that increases the likelihood of policy approval? In light of the challenges that the policymaking process faces in polarized environments, this work explores three additional research questions.

Even if an endorsement cue promotes opinion polarization, partisan endorsement could still be an effective strategy to raise average policy approval if the increase in approval among party supporters outweighs the decline among detractors. We examine the net effect of endorsement in our setting[2]. In line with Goren et al. (2009), which shows that Republicans react more vigorously than Democrats when presented with a Democratic endorsement, the additional rejection generated by the endorsement is expected to outweigh the growth in support (RQ1).

It is also interesting to consider whether consensus bipartisan policy initiatives can help gain support for a policy proposal. Previous works on this matter are inconclusive. Bolsen

[2] Of course, average policy approval is not only affected by the relative strength of the reaction of supporters and detractors to a given endorsement but also by the weight of each partisan constituency in the overall population. We abstract from this consideration to study what would happen in a scenario with a 50/50 share of supporters from each party.

et al. (2014) finds that bipartisan consensus endorsement raises policy approval, while Harbridge et al. (2014) shows that bipartisan consensus endorsement is not as strong as unilateral in-party endorsement and posits that partisan goal-seeking may counteract people's abstract preferences for bipartisan legislative processes. In line with Harbridge et al. (2014), consensus bipartisan endorsement is not expected to increase support for a given policy vis--vis a benchmark without policy endorsement (RQ2).

A related question is whether a leader's against character endorsement (a conservative supporting a liberal position, or vice versa) helps narrow the divide over ex-ante polarized issues, those issues in which the supporters of both parties have opposite opinions in the absence of any endorsement. We hypothesize that against-character endorsement can succeed at this task (RQ3), building on the strand of works that show successful liberalization policies in developing countries were many times driven by the same political forces that had previously championed the expansion of workers' rights (Murillo, 2001, 2005).

3. Parties, leaders and polarization in Argentina

Most hypotheses regarding the effect of party endorsement on policy preferences have been tested in the context of US politics[3]. Is partisan endorsement as effective under a system where an emerging polarization is driven by strong personalistic leaders (Ayta and ni, 2014; O'Donnell, 1999) with weak partisan labels (Lupu, 2016) and unclear ideological identities (Lupu, 2015)? We address this question by setting our analysis in a new democracy: Argentina. Interestingly, the case of Argentina may have become particularly relevant for democracies like the US, where increasingly "leaders hold non-ideological and ever-changing issue positions [...] issue content and party are in conflict"(Barber and Pope, 2018).

Like the US, Argentina is a presidential federal republic. Since its return to democracy in 1983, Argentina developed a two-party system dynamic with Peronism at one pole and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) at the other. Both Peronism and the UCR appeared as cross-ideological parties, gathering voters with different ideological attachments. Third parties, while present, tended to generate alliances with one of the two major forces for legislative and presidential elections (Gervasoni, 2017; Torre, 2003, 2017).

Today, the UCR is in decline. Instead, its place has been taken by the new center-right force Cambiemos. Cambiemos is a local force that became competitive nationwide when its candidate, Mauricio Macri, won the presidency in 2015 with the vote of the richest and most

[3] Among the works that have studied the effect of partisan cues outside the US, notable examples are Slothuus and de Vreese (2010), which assesses the effect of policy endorsement in Denmark, and Samuels and Zucco (2014), the first study to apply this framework in Latin America.

populated provinces and through an alliance with the declining UCR, which gave Cambiemos its territorial network (Murillo et al., 2016). Meanwhile, Peronism is currently fragmented and has run split in all elections since 2002.

As with Trump's ideological flexibility in the US (Barber and Pope, 2018), the lack of a clear ideological identity within Argentine parties and the current fragmentation of Peronism have not prevented the deepening of political polarization in electoral politics. Public discourse follows a divide between supporters and opponents of former President Cristina Kirchner and her force, FPV. Political polarization has been used as a tactic by both leaders. Kirchner first appealed to a polarizing discourse to retain support in the midst of the opposition many of her economic policies were generating (Lupu, 2015). Meanwhile, Mauricio Macri sought to amalgamate a very heterogeneous electorate by presenting himself as the only one able to defeat Kirchner in elections (Casullo, 2016).

4. The Experiment

In order to analyze the influence of endorsement cues on public opinion, telephone surveys were conducted in the Province of Buenos Aires, which gathers around 40% of Argentina's voter base. In total, 4,584 respondents were contacted through these surveys[4].

Survey respondents were initially asked to state whether they would vote for current President Mauricio Macri, former President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner or another candidate in a hypothetical Presidential election. Regardless of their answer, respondents were next randomly assigned to different treatments. The first group of respondents was asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a policy proposal. The second group of respondents was asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the same proposal, this time allegedly sponsored by Cambiemos, Mauricio Macri's party. The third group of respondents faced the same policy proposal, now allegedly sponsored by Frente para la Victoria, Kirchner's party.

5 sets of surveys were conducted in total, featuring small variations of this common experimental design. The first source of variation across survey sets were the policies used: each set of surveys repeated the experiment using different policies with varying degrees of complexity. Further, one of the sets included a fourth treatment: respondents were asked about their opinion about a policy that was being co-sponsored by Cambiemos and Frente para la Victoria. Finally, the fifth set of surveys changed the endorsement source from parties to leaders: instead of having Cambiemos and Frente para la Victoria sponsor the policies,

[4]Surveys were conducted between October 2016 and July 2017. Individuals from several districts were contacted (1st, 2nd and 3rd sections of Great Buenos Aires, Bahía Blanca, La Plata, Mar del Plata, Campana, San Nicolás, Tres Arroyos and Tandil). A stratified random sampling design was used to ensure the weight of each district in the calling list was proportional to its weight in the total population of Buenos Aires.

respondents were told Mauricio Macri and Cristina Kirchner were endorsing them.

Table 1 provides an overview of the policies and treatments used in each set of surveys and the timeframe in which they took place. Table 2 describes the characteristics of our surveys' participants in terms of gender, age, education and occupation. Table 3 shows a count of observations per treatment and policy question. The following subsections provide further detail regarding different aspects of the experimental design.

4.1. Endorsement manipulation

As was discussed at the beginning of this section, respondents were exposed to different treatments, each one altering the source of endorsement of a given policy proposal. In the control treatment, respondents were asked about a policy without being told the source of the proposal. For example, regarding the establishment of a Universal Basic Income, respondents were asked:

> *Do you agree with the proposal to guarantee all citizens a Minimum Income afforded through taxes? Options: (1) I agree very strongly (2) I agree (3) I disagree (4) I disagree very strongly (5) I don't know*

Respondents' answers were translated into a policy approval index that ranged from 0 (Disagrees very strongly) to 4 (Agrees very strongly)[5]. Respondents assigned to one of the treatment conditions were asked a slightly different question. For example, those in the Cambiemos proposal treatment were asked:

> *Do you agree with **Cambiemos'** proposal to guarantee all citizens a Minimum Income afforded through taxes?*

Meanwhile, those in the FPV proposal treatment were told that the same policy had been proposed by the FPV. Likewise, participants in the Bipartisan endorsement treatment were told that the policy had been proposed by FPV and Cambiemos. In the fifth set of surveys participants were randomly assigned to one of the following three versions of the policy question: (1) unsponsored proposal (2) proposal sponsored by Cristina Kirchner (3) proposal sponsored by Mauricio Macri. The diagram below provides an overview of the basic experimental design for both party and leader experiments.

[5] In the main specification, Don't know answers were used as the mid-point of the opinion index to avoid post-treatment bias (Montgomery et al., 2018). Equivalent results were obtained using two different versions of the opinion index: (1) a dichotomic measure were the index equals 1 if the respondent is very much in favor or in favor of the policy and 0 otherwise; (2) a four-level index removing don't know answers.

Party endorsement experiment



Leader endorsement experiment



4.2. Policy preferences

Overall, respondents were asked their opinion about 7 policies: (1) Establishing a Universal Basic Income (UBI), (2) Guaranteeing minimum non-contributive Retirement Benefits for all citizens (MRB), (3) Protecting local production from competing imports, (4) Establishing an ARS 3000 Minimum Retirement Pension, (5) Establishing an ARS 6000 Minimum Retirement Pension, (6) Implementing an income tax exemption for all workers, and (7) Deporting illegal immigrants.

Measuring opinion about a wide spectrum of issues is key to determine that the results are not dependent on the intrinsic characteristics of any given policy. The proposals that were used differed in their level of complexity[6] and ubiquity[7]. Moreover, respondents were deliberately inquired about polarizing and non-polarizing issues. A policy proposal is deemed to be polarizing if, in the absence of an open endorsement, it elicits support from one of the group of voters (e.g. Macri voters) while being rejected by the other (e.g. Kirchner voters). This was the case, for example, with the proposal to deport all illegal immigrants, which garnered support among Macri voters and rejection among Kirchner voters. However, most policies showed no gap in opinion between Macri and Kirchner voters in the absence of endorsement (e.g. implementing an income tax exemption for all workers). The degree of ex-ante polarization for each policy can be inferred from Table 4, which shows the average opinion regarding each policy by voting group and treatment condition.

4.3. Political affiliation

Survey participants were asked to state which candidate they would vote for in Presidential elections (Mauricio Macri, Cristina Kirchner, Sergio Massa or another candidate). The sample was later limited to those participants who stated they would vote for either Macri or Kirchner, the main polarizing forces in Argentina's current political scenario. Following Slothuus (2016), vote intention is used as the preferred proxy for respondents' support of both leaders and parties. In Argentina, it is hard for voters to anticipate the ideological position of parties, not only because parties include ideologically diverse factions but also due to the fluidity of electoral alliances between parties and leaders. As a result, a respondent's self-assessed closeness to a party/leader might be an inaccurate proxy of how likely she is to

[6] Taking the percentage of don't know answers as a rough proxy for complexity, the establishment of a Universal Basic Income and Trade Protectionism were the most complex proposals for respondents (15% and 11% don't know answers respectively). Meanwhile, providing a Minimum Retirement Pension showed the lowest degree of complexity (6% of don't know answers).

[7] While the implementation of an income tax exemption for workers was being discussed in Congress at the time the surveys took place, the desirability of trade protectionism was not a topic that had been receiving any media attention. None of the policies was clearly owned by any party or candidate.

be influenced by its/her endorsement. Instead, vote intention condenses both respondent's preferences for leaders and parties at the time of the interview. Nonetheless, participants were also asked to state how much they liked Kirchner and Macri on a scale of 1 to 5 and these answers are also used as an alternative proxy of political affiliation. Results did not differ using this specification.

5. Results

5.1. Parties and leaders' endorsement influences policy support

Subjects' attitudes towards policy proposals are first examined using a 2 (participant voting intention: Macri or Kirchner) x 3 (policy endorsement: Cambiemos, no endorsement or FPV) analysis of variance (ANOVA). Our goal is to establish whether in and out-party endorsement significantly influences opinion among Macri and Kirchner voters. This analysis is next replicated using the leader-sponsored questions.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship between policy endorsement, political affiliation and policy approval. Statistical results, robust to the inclusion of standard covariates (gender, age, education, employment status), are reported in Tables 5 and 6. As predicted, both parties' endorsements affect respondents' issue position. The relevant interaction involving participants' political affiliation and party endorsement proves highly significant to explain attitude towards all proposals analyzed. Regardless the intrinsic nature of the policy, Macri (Kirchner) supporters are more likely to show approval towards a policy if told that Cambiemos (FPV) has proposed it, and less likely to support it if told that FPV (Cambiemos) has proposed it[8]. As an example, Macri supporters increase their approval of the establishment of a Universal Basic Income by 16% when they are told Cambiemos proposes it, instead showing a 41% decrease in approval when told the policy proposal comes from Kirchner (compared to the baseline no endorsement treatment). Meanwhile, Kirchner supporters react with a 24% increase in approval regarding the same policy when their party endorses it, showing a 19% decline in policy approval when told it is a Cambiemos proposal.

Figure 1 shows that supporters of Macri and Kirchner agree in their average opinion in five of the six policy issues presented to them. As a result, the endorsement cues generate a polarization in opinion among voter groups even when there was previously none. When

[8] As a robustness check, the same ANOVA tests were performed using each person's image of Cristina Kirchner as a substitute for vote intention, grouping those that had a very good or good image of Kirchner as in favor, those that had a regular image as neither in favor nor against her, and those with a very bad or bad image as against her). We repeated this exercise using the image of Mauricio Macri instead. In both cases, results did not significantly differ from those obtained in the main specification.

prior polarization does exist (as in the case of the Establishment of a Minimum Retirement Pension), endorsement cues contribute to widen the gap in average opinions.

The endorsement effect remains significant when leaders sponsor the policies instead of parties. Figure 2 shows evidence on the influence of leaders' endorsement on policy preferences. When asked if they are in favor of protecting local industries from foreign competition, for example, Kirchner supporters show a 38% increase in our approval index if Kirchner is sponsoring the policy and a 28% decrease if Macri is the one endorsing this proposal (again, compared to the no endorsement version of the question). This trend reverses for Macri voters, who post a 16% increase in approval with an endorsement from Macri and a 51% decline when Kirchner sponsors the policy. As with partisan endorsements, polarization among voter groups widens with leader endorsement cues.

Sloothuus (2016) cautions that studies assessing the influence of political parties on public opinion should be wary of pretreatment effects – participant's real-world exposure to political debate. Pretreatments of this sort might act as moderator of the endorsement effect: if a participant is already aware of her party's position regarding a policy issue she might be less sensitive to an endorsement cue. It can be argued that the existence of large pretreatment effects is not likely in this scenario. The lack of clear ideological identities across parties and the flexibility of electoral alliances contribute to policy issues' not being clearly owned by neither parties or candidates. The fact that ex-ante polarization is inexistent in most of the policies used supports this view. Still, the cases in which ex-ante polarization is indeed present (as with the Establishment of a Minimum Retirement Pension or the Deportation of Illegal Immigrants) could be examples of policies for which participants are pretreated. The endorsement effect seems to be large enough that a significant impact of cues is visible even for these policies, were the effect is likely moderated.



Fig. 1. Average policy approval by voting intention. Party endorsement



Fig. 2. Average policy approval by voting intention. Leader endorsement

5.2. The relative strength of endorsement cues

Having determined that both parties and leaders significantly influence policy support, the nuances of the endorsement effect can be further assessed. A specific source of assymetry becomes relevant: the relative influence of each leader on her own voters and her detractors. Are Kirchner supporters more likely to be influenced by Kirchner herself than by Macri? What about Macri supporters?

Three possibilities are considered. First, as in Nicholson (2011), it is possible that the negative-identification caused by out-party endorsement is stronger than the positive identification generated by in-party endorsement. If this were the case, we would expect Kirchner voters to exhibit a larger swing in average opinion (relative to the baseline condition) when Macri or his party is endorsing a policy than when Kirchner or hers is proposing it. Likewise, Macri voters should react strongly to a Kirchner or FPV endorsement than to a Macri or Cambiemos endorsement. Second, the opposite could happen: as in Barber and Pope (2019), in-party endorsement could be stronger than out-party endorsement. However, it is also possible to imagine a scenario where "polarizing leaders" exist, namely, where both group of voters react more to one leaders sponsorship than the others. If this were the case, we would expect Kirchner (or Macri) to generate larger swings in average opinion than her opponent in both groups.

In order to explore this question, the following linear regression is performed for each policy question and each group of voters (Macri and Kirchner supporters separately):

$$opinion_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1\{Endorsement_i = Macri\} + \beta_2\{Endorsement_i = Kirchner\} + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i$$

The dependent variable is the preferred policy opinion index, ranging from 0 (very much disapproves) to 4 (very much approves). *Endorsement* is an indicator variable with three levels: it equals 0 when the respondent hears a Macri (or Cambiemos) endorsement of the policy, 1 when no endorsement is specified, and 2 when Kirchner (or FPV) is providing the endorsement. The no endorsement level is used as the baseline. For each group of voters, β_1 and β_2 represent the change in group average opinion that is caused by an endorsement of Macri (Cambiemos) and Kirchner (FPV) respectively, everything else held equal. A comparison test between these two coefficients shows which of the endorsements exerts a larger influence in each group of voters. For instance, if Kirchner was more influential than Macri for Macri voters, then we would expect β_2 to be negative but larger than β_1 in absolute terms for the majority of policy questions.

Results are summarized in Test 1 of Tables 7 and 8. In the leader endorsement version of the experiment (Table 8), every policy question shows that Kirchners negative influence on

Macri's voters significantly exceeds Macri's own positive impact on his voters. Meanwhile, Kirchner's influence in her own voters also appears to be larger than Macri's, although the effect is significant in only one of the analyzed policies. In none of the policies Macri's influence is significantly larger than Kirchner's for any group of voters. As a result, in 3 out of 4 cases the political divide widens significantly more under Kirchners sponsorship.

Kirchner's polarizing nature is translated, to some degree, to her party. Test 1 of Table 7 shows that FPV is significantly more influential on Macri's voters than Cambiemos in 5 out of 6 policies, while also being significantly more influential on Kirchner's voters in one of the policies. Meanwhile, the effect of Cambiemos' endorsement on average policy proposal is never larger than FPV's. In 2 out of the 6 policies, the political divide widens significantly more under FPV's sponsorship.

Overall, both experiments indicate that Kirchner (and her party) exerts a significantly stronger influence on policy approval than Macri. This finding supports the hypothesis that certain leaders have larger polarizing effects on opinion than others, instead of suggesting that either out-party or in-party endorsement are stronger than the other. In the context of present-day Argentina, this phenomenon could be linked to Cambiemos' emergence as a coalition party that agglomerates those in opposition to the prior governing party.

5.3. How can we succeed at gaining policy approval?

Can the existence of an endorsement effect curtail a policy-maker's ability to undertake relevant policy reforms? This section provides evidence on the net effect of policy endorsement. Further, two alternatives are explored to determine if the framing effects of policy endorsement can be extrapolated to reverse polarization and promote policy support: consensus bipartisan endorsement and against-character sponsorship.

5.3.1. The net effect of endorsement cues is negative

Is a leader's positive influence on her own constituency significantly stronger or weaker than her negative influence on the opposing constituency? Answering this question is relevant to assess the net effect of endorsements (do we gain more than we lose by explicitly sponsoring a policy?).

To address this question, the linear specification presented in section 5.2. is used to test for the relative influence of leaders and parties across voter groups. For a given policy, in order to assess if Macri (or Cambiemos) is more influential on his voters than on Kirchner voters we simply compare the absolute value of the β_1 coefficient that was obtained performing the regression on Macri voters to the β_1 of the regression on the group of Kirchner voters.

Results are reported in tests 2 and 3 of Tables 7 and 8. In the case of Kirchner's endorsement (see Test 3 - Table 8), the negative effect on the average opinion of detractors is significantly stronger than the positive effect on supporters for 2 out of the 4 policies (Test 2 - Table 8), resulting in a negative net effect. Meanwhile, the negative effect of Macri's endorsement on Kirchner supporters is significantly larger than the positive effect on his supporters in one of the 4 policies. None of the leaders are more influential on their supporters than on their detractors for none of the policies. Analyzing party endorsement, we find 5 cases (two related to Cambiemos' endorsement, 3 to FPV's) in which negative identification is significantly stronger than positive identification, while there is no evidence that the opposite is ever true. Overall the net effect of policy endorsement on policy support appears to be negative.

5.3.2. Consensus bipartisan endorsement: partisan cues cancel each other

The Universal Basic Income, Minimum Retirement Pension and Trade Protectionism questions can be used to evaluate the role of bipartisan endorsement in shaping public opinion toward policies. Recall that, for these questions, a further treatment was included: respondents were asked about their opinion on a policy sponsored by both Cambiemos and FPV.

Previous studies have shown contradictory results when it comes to the effect of consensus bipartisan endorsement. Bolsen et al. (2014) finds that bipartisan consensus increases the public's support for a policy, with an effect that is similar to same-party endorsement but in both groups of voters. On the contrary, Harbridge et al. (2014) finds that, even though most individuals express a preference for bipartisan consensus in Congress, they support a policy proposal less when it comes from bipartisan consensus than when it is put forward exclusively by their own party[9].

Findings in this setting support Harbridge et al. (2014). Table 9 and Figure 3 show that there are no significant differences in average opinion when comparing the no endorsement treatment with the bipartisan endorsement treatment for both groups of voters[10]. Why does bipartisan consensus decrease support vis-a-vis same-party endorsement? It is possible for partisan cues to cancel each other when negative identification with the opposing party is as strong as positive identification. Thus, bipartisan endorsement can be equal to no

[9] The difference between both findings could be explained by the fact that in the latter's experiment participants are explicitly told their own party has had to compromise to arrive to the consensus proposal, and this compromise might be interpreted as a loss for the party.

[10] In the only instance in which average policy approval significantly differs across the bipartisan and no endorsement treatments (Macri voters asked about trade protectionism), bipartisan endorsement actually decreases support relative to no policy endorsement at all.

endorsement at all when society is sufficiently polarized.



Fig. 3. Consensus bipartisan endorsement

5.3.3. Against-character endorsement de-polarizes, but does not raise average approval

In this experimental setting, most policies did not feature a significant degree of divisiveness or ex-ante polarization (measured as the difference in the average opinion of Macri and Kirchner voters when they answer the unendorsed version of a policy question). These policies were useful to determine that partisan cues tend to increase polarization when the public's opinion regarding an issue is homogenous across supporters of different parties prior to any endorsement.

A related question is whether certain forms of partisan endorsement can succeed at depolarizing policy approval in the cases of divisive policies, those for which ex-ante polarization does exist. We hypothesize that against-character endorsement could succeed at this task, building on the strand of works that show successful liberalization policies in developing countries were many times driven by the same political forces that had previously led the

expansion of workers' rights (Murillo, 2001, 2005).

Among the experiment's policies, establishing a Universal Minimum Retirement Pension and deporting all illegal immigrants were the ones that generated the largest degree of ex-ante polarization across groups of voters, with Kirchner's voters favoring the establishment of a Universal Minimum Retirement Pension significantly more than Macri's, and Macri's voters favoring the deportation of illegal immigrants significantly more than Kirchner's.

Can leaders (or parties) succeed at depolarizing opinion by endorsing a policy that their own supporters dislike and their opponents like? In the case of the establishment of a Universal Minimum Retirement Pension, against-character endorsement is represented by Cambiemos. As shown in Table 10, while the opinion gap between Macri and Kirchner voters increases when the policy is endorsed by FPV, Cambiemos endorsement closes the gap between the average opinion of Macri and Kirchner voters to the point that this difference disappears. Meanwhile, a similar result is obtained when analyzing the proposal to deport all illegal immigrants. In this case, claiming the policy is supported by Cristina Kirchner (the source of against-character endorsement in this case) does not completely eradicate the gap in policy support among Kirchner and Macri voters. However, it reduces the difference in average opinions by 65% and 70% compared to the No endorsement and Macri treatments, respectively.

Unlike the works that have shown that against-character endorsement can help build support for unpopular policies, and even though against-character endorsement does bridge opinion gaps in our experiment, we find that the way in which this consensus is reached might not be conducive to gaining support towards policies among the public. While against-character endorsement does raise approval among those that previously disliked the policy the most, this effect is outweighed by the disapproval it generates among those that favored the policy sans endorsement. In the case of the Universal Minimum Retirement Pension, approval among Macri voters increases by 11% when Macri endorses this policy. However, the decline in approval among Kirchner voters is more than double (24%). This pattern is even more visible in the deportation of immigrants question. The opinion of Kirchner voters remains almost unchanged when it is their leader who sponsors this policy. Instead, Macri voters show a decline in average policy approval of 29%. Overall, it appears that those that the endorsement persuades through positive identification are outweighed by those the endorsement dissuades through negative identification.

6. Discussion

Framing influences the subset of information that individuals consider when forming an opinion. When the frame is given by the explicit elite endorsement of a policy, people tend to focus on the source of the proposal instead of its intrinsic values. This work tests various hypotheses from the prolific literature on the influence of elites on policy preferences using a common experimental design. It aims to identify when and how elite influence affects policy preferences and to explore the depolarization potential of these mechanisms. These questions are answered using survey data from Argentina, a new democracy only recently experiencing political polarization. Both parties and leaders are found to influence policy approval through their explicit endorsement. This effect is independent from intrinsic characteristics of the policy proposals, such as their complexity, divisiveness or salience. Compared to a baseline treatment where respondents are asked about a policy proposal without being told which party or politician is behind it, respondents express higher levels of agreement when the proposal is endorsed by their leader or party of preference and lower levels of approval when it is endorsed by a leader or party they reject. In this scenario, Macri (Kirchner) supporters are more likely to show approval towards a policy if told that Cambiemos (FPV) has proposed it, and less likely to support it if told that FPV (Cambiemos) has proposed it. This finding suggests that polarization might be built around political choices (Barber and Pope, 2018) rather than around policy issues (Mason, 2018).

Overall, results show that Kirchner and the party associated to this leader exerts a significantly stronger influence on policy approval than Macri. This finding supports the hypothesis that certain leaders have larger polarizing effects on opinion than others, instead of suggesting that out-party endorsement is always more influential than in-party endorsement (or that the converse is true). Specific features of Argentina's political system may be partly behind this result. Argentine electoral politics are traditionally built around candidates' positioning in relation to Peronism and its leaders. This phenomenon could also be linked to Cambiemos' recent emergence as a coalition that agglomerated all political forces that were against the prior governing party.

An important implication of these results has to do with the ability of parties and leaders to garner support for policy reforms. On one hand this research shows that elite endorsement can polarize public opinions when no prior polarization exists. Meanwhile, partisan and leader cues prove of little use in bridging opinion gaps and building policy support when ex-ante opinion polarization is indeed present. Further, we find an overall negative net effect of endorsement on policy approval the positive effect that an endorsement generates in a party or leader's supporters is largely outweighed by the additional disapproval fostered

in detractors. Lastly, neither bipartisan cues nor against-character endorsements (leaders backing initiatives their supporters do not agree with) are effective strategies when it comes to depolarizing society and increasing support for policies. In a nut shell, polarization is easy to create but difficult to undo.

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Table 1: Survey sets description

Set	Policies	Treatments	Survey period
1	Universal Basic Income Minimum Retirement Benefits for All Trade protectionism	No endorsement Cambiemos FPV Bipartisan	10/25/16 - 11/20/16
2	Minimum Retirement Benefits of ARS3000	No endorsement	11/20/16 - 12/27/16
3	Minimum Retirement Benefits of ARS6000	Cambiemos	
4	Income Tax Exemption for Employees	FPV	
5	Universal Basic Income Trade protectionism Income Tax Exemption for Employees Deporting Illegal Immigrants	No endorsement Macri Kirchner	7/24/17 - 7/31/17

Note: Sets 2, 3 and 4 share the same treatments.

Table 2: Sample Descriptive statistics

Variable	Values	N	%
Gender	Male	1,209	41
	Female	1,764	59
Age	16-30 years old	308	10
	31-50 years old	927	31
	51-65 years old	1,080	37
	71 years old	658	22
Level of education	Secondary - incomplete	486	16
	Secondary - complete	737	25
	Tertiary or university - incomplete	839	28
	University - complete	911	31
Employment status	Active worker	820	28
	Other	2,153	72
Vote intention∗	Macri	1,706	57
	Kirchner	1,267	43
	Total	2,973	100

Note: The category "Other employment status" includes participants who identify as homemakers, students, retired employees or unemployed. We restricted our sample to voters of Mauricio Macri and Cristina Kirchner. Due to this, 1,578 observations were removed.

Table 3: Observations per policy, treatment and endorsement type

Policy and treatment	Party N	Leader N
Universal Basic Income		
Cambiemos/Macri	218	164
No endorsement	198	176
Bipartisan endorsement	183	-
FPV/Kirchner	206	186
Total	805	526
Minimum Retirement Benefits for All		
Cambiemos/Macri	220	-
No endorsement	201	-
Bipartisan endorsement	185	-
FPV/Kirchner	208	-
Total	814	-
Trade Protectionism		
Cambiemos/Macri	208	186
No endorsement	201	176
Bipartisan endorsement	185	-
FPV/Kirchner	220	164
Total	814	526
Income Tax Exemption for Employees		
Cambiemos/Macri	177	164
No endorsement	350	176
FPV/Kirchner	153	186
Total	680	526
Minimum Retirement Benefits of ARS3000		
Cambiemos/Macri	168	-
No endorsement	172	-
FPV/Kirchner	185	-
Total	525	-
Minimum Retirement Benefits of ARS6000		
Cambiemos/Macri	105	-
No endorsement	144	-
FPV/Kirchner	179	-
Total	428	-
Deporting Illegal Immigrants		
Cambiemos/Macri	-	186
No endorsement	-	171
FPV/Kirchner	-	160
Total	-	517

Table 4: Average opinion by policy, endorsement type and voter group

Party experiments

	UBI	MRB	Trade Protection	Tax Exemption	ARS 3000 MRB	ARS 6000 MRB
No endorsement						
Kirchner voter	2.552	3.112	2.326	2.870	2.149	2.821
	(0.133)	(0.121)	(0.175)	(0.094)	(0.191)	(0.165)
Macri voter	2.234	2.357	2.607	3.011	2.076	2.523
	(0.118)	(0.125)	(0.105)	(0.075)	(0.119)	(0.140)
Cambiemos end.						
Kirchner voter	2.076	2.376	2.101	2.189	1.478	2.429
	(0.139)	(0.143)	(0.169)	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.184)
Macri voter	2.595	2.606	2.899	3.194	2.495	2.857
	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.100)	(0.092)	(0.142)	(0.181)
FPV end.						
Kirchner voter	3.169	3.360	3.333	3.076	2.973	3.243
	(0.113)	(0.103)	(0.119)	(0.130)	(0.152)	(0.094)
Macri voter	1.316	1.529	1.638	1.954	1.580	1.590
	(0.111)	(0.122)	(0.109)	(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.126)

Leader experiment

	UBI	Trade Protection	Tax Exemption	Deporting Immigrants
No endorsement				
Kirchner voter	1.931	2.552	2.908	1.647
	(0.145)	(0.172)	(0.139)	(0.168)
Macri voter	2.393	2.551	3.157	3.116
	(0.118)	(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.123)
Macri end.				
Kirchner voter	1.141	1.828	2.208	1.688
	(0.137)	(0.187)	(0.152)	(0.185)
Macri voter	2.880	2.970	3.468	3.394
	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.085)	(0.094)
Kirchner end.				
Kirchner voter	3.338	3.532	3.406	1.705
	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.174)
Macri voter	0.963	1.239	1.860	2.212
	(0.097)	(0.106)	(0.137)	(0.139)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 5: Effect of party endorsement on attitude towards policies

	Trade Protection				**UBI**				**MRB**			
	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)
Model	209.321	13	9.530	0.000***	213.864	13	10.801	0.000***	226.587	13	11.066	0.000***
Vote	4.843	1	2.866	0.091*	48.673	1	31.957	0.000***	94.877	1	60.237	0.000***
Endorsement	0.119	2	0.035	0.965	2.876	2	0.944	0.400	8.879	2	2.819	0.061*
Vote#Endorsement	178.396	2	52.795	0.000***	142.337	2	46.726	0.000***	102.994	2	32.695	0.000***
Residual	1039.051	615			926.046	608			968.66	615		
Controls	Yes				Yes				Yes			
Number of obs.	629				622				629			
Adj. R-Squared	0.15				0.17				0.172			

	Tax Exemption				**ARS 3000 MRB**				**ARS 6000 MRB**			
	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)
Model	132.607	13	8.054	0.000***	163.934	13	7.149	0.000***	159.106	13	8.201	0.000***
Vote	0.001	1	0.000	0.982	0.502	1	0.285	0.594	19.022	1	12.746	0.000***
Endorsement	19.758	2	7.800	0.000***	7.089	2	2.01	0.135	6.037	2	2.023	0.134
Vote#Endorsement	87.277	2	34.456	0.000***	119.917	2	33.994	0.000***	73.659	2	24.678	0.000***
Residual	843.474	666			901.304	511			617.856	414		
Controls	Yes				Yes				Yes			
Number of obs.	680				525				428			
Adj. R-Squared	0.119				0.132				0.18			

Note: ANOVA results. Dependent variables: opinion regarding policies (0 to 4 scale, where 0=Very much disagrees, 4=Very much agrees). Covariates (gender, age, education, occupation) included as controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Effect of leader endorsement on attitude towards policies

	UBI				**Tax Exemption**			
	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)
Model	400.51	13	25.18	0.000***	203.42	13	11.41	0.000***
Vote	0.18	1	0.15	0.70	0.12	1	0.08	0.773
Endorsement	2.15	2	0.88	0.42	13.16	2	4.80	0.009**
Vote#Endorsement	358.70	2	146.61	0.000***	162.45	2	59.20	0.000***
Residual	626.35	512			702.49	512		
Controls	Yes				Yes			
Number of obs.	526				526			
Adj. R-Squared	0.38				0.21			

	Trade Protection				**Deporting Immigrants**			
	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)	Sum Sq	Df	F	Pr(>F)
Model	346.86	13	17.77	0.000***	312.96	13	13.87	0.000***
Vote	12.24	1	8.15	0.005**	173.04	1	99.71	0.000***
Endorsement	3.40	2	1.13	0.32	32.19	2	9.27	0.000***
Vote#Endorsement	252.83	2	84.19	0.000***	35.92	2	10.35	0.000***
Residual	768.79	512			872.97	503		
Controls	Yes				Yes			
Number of obs.	526				517			
Adj. R-Squared	0.29				0.25			

Note: ANOVA results. Dependent variables: opinion regarding policies (0 to 4 scale, where 0=Very much disagrees, 4=Very much agrees). Covariates (gender, age, education, occupation) included as controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7: Relative strength and net effect of endorsement cues - Parties

Policy	**Tax Exemption**		**UBI**		**MRB**	
Vote intention	Macri	Kirchner	Macri	Kirchner	Macri	Kirchner
Cambiemos endorsement ($\beta1$)	0.182	-0.634***	0.361**	-0.493***	0.269	-0.703***
	(0.131)	(0.170)	(0.162)	(0.184)	(0.169)	(0.173)
FPV endorsement ($\beta2$)	-1.081***	0.218	-0.887***	0.613***	-0.803***	0.250
	(0.140)	(0.175)	(0.165)	(0.186)	(0.172)	(0.175)
Constant	2.966***	2.859***	2.098***	2.783***	2.075***	3.170***
	(0.171)	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.224)	(0.217)	(0.211)
Observations	379	301	459	346	464	350
R-squared	0.183	0.114	0.177	0.145	0.117	0.124
Sum of coefficients test						
Test 1: F (h0: $\beta1+\beta2=0$)	16.546***	2.230	3.385*	0.141	3.223*	2.252
Test 2: χ^2 (h0: $\beta1_{Macri}+\beta1_{Kirchner}=0$)	4.22**		0.28		3.08*	
Test 3: χ^2 (h0: $\beta2_{Macri}+\beta2_{Kirchner}=0$)	15.65***		1.34		5.56**	

Policy	**ARS 6000 MRB**		**ARS 3000 MRB**		**Trade Protection**	
Vote intention	Macri	Kirchner	Macri	Kirchner	Macri	Kirchner
Cambiemos endorsement ($\beta1$)	0.221	-0.415*	0.371**	-0.701***	0.334**	-0.245
	(0.224)	(0.221)	(0.184)	(0.237)	(0.154)	(0.222)
FPV endorsement ($\beta2$)	-0.982***	0.426**	-0.506***	0.750***	-0.930***	0.996***
	(0.187)	(0.203)	(0.180)	(0.235)	(0.151)	(0.220)
Constant	2.100***	2.900***	2.064***	2.057***	2.298***	2.682***
	(0.243)	(0.270)	(0.242)	(0.303)	(0.194)	(0.268)
Observations	249	179	316	209	464	350
R-squared	0.222	0.103	0.114	0.238	0.170	0.153
Sum of coefficients test						
Test 1: F (h0: $\beta1+\beta2=0$)	4.680**	0.001	0.182	0.014	4.999**	3.843*
Test 2: χ^2 (h0: $\beta1_{Macri}+\beta1_{Kirchner}=0$)	0.35		1.21		0.10	
Test 3: χ^2 (h0: $\beta2_{Macri}+\beta2_{Kirchner}=0$)	4.75**		0.70		0.07	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the level of policy approval. Sex, education, age and employment status included as controls. For each policy and voter group, Test 1 compares the relative strength of Cambiemos and FPV endorsements. Test 2 (Test 3) compares the absolute size of the effect of a Cambiemos (FPV) endorsement across voter groups.

Table 8: Relative strength and net effect of endorsement cues - Leaders

Policy	**Tax Exemption**		**Deporting Immigrants**	
Vote intention	Macri	Kirchner	Macri	Kirchner
Macri endorsement ($\beta 1$)	0.279*	-0.724***	0.329*	0.0311
	(0.168)	(0.196)	(0.176)	(0.236)
Kirchner endorsement ($\beta 2$)	-1.289***	0.468**	-0.931***	0.0174
	(0.166)	(0.208)	(0.175)	(0.254)
Constant	3.042***	3.274***	3.266***	1.665***
	(0.202)	(0.254)	(0.211)	(0.306)
Observations	298	228	294	223
R-squared	0.296	0.151	0.190	0.094
Sum of coefficients tests				
Test 1: F (h0: $\beta 1+\beta 2=0$)	11.840***	0.554	3.804*	0.013
Test 2: χ^2 (h0: $\beta 1_{Macri}+\beta 1_{Kirchner}=0$)	3.07*		1.59	
Test 3: χ^2 (h0: $\beta 2_{Macri}+\beta 2_{Kirchner}=0$)	10.35**		9.24**	

Policy	**UBI**		**Trade Protection**	
Vote intention	Macri	Kirchner	Macri	Kirchner
Macri endorsement ($\beta 1$)	0.502***	-0.771***	0.378**	-0.593***
	(0.157)	(0.194)	(0.165)	(0.227)
Kirchner endorsement ($\beta 2$)	-1.396***	1.380***	-1.308***	1.034***
	(0.158)	(0.184)	(0.166)	(0.214)
Constant	2.409***	1.852***	2.451***	2.075***
	(0.191)	(0.238)	(0.200)	(0.277)
Observations	298	228	298	228
R-squared	0.401	0.402	0.350	0.267
Sum of coefficients tests				
Test 1: F (h0: $\beta 1+\beta 2=0$)	10.451***	3.557*	10.241***	1.374
Test 2: χ^2 (h0: $\beta 1_{Macri}+\beta 1_{Kirchner}=0$)	1.13		0.54	
Test 3: χ^2 (h0: $\beta 2_{Macri}+\beta 2_{Kirchner}=0$)	0.00		1.10	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the level of approval toward a policy. Sex, education, age and employment status included as controls. For each policy and voter group, Test 1 compares the relative strength of endorsements: the absolute effect of a Macri endorsement vs. a Kirchner endorsement. Test 2 compares the absolute size of the effect of a Macri endorsement on Macri and Kirchner voters. As in Test 2, Test 3 compares the absolute effect of Kirchners endorsement between both voter groups.

Table 9: Consensus Bipartisan Endorsement

Policy	Vote Intention	N	Avg. opinion Bipartisan end.	Avg. opinion No endorsement	Difference
UBI	Macri	216	2.229	2.234	-0.006
			(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.175)
	Kirchner	165	2.538	2.552	-0.013
			(0.149)	(0.133)	(0.199)
MRB	Macri	218	2.472	2.357	0.115
			(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.176)
	Kirchner	168	2.987	3.112	-0.125
			(0.127)	(0.121)	(0.175)
Trade Protectionism	Macri	218	2.292	2.607	-0.315**
			(0.119)	(0.105)	(0.158)
	Kirchner	168	2.215	2.326	-0.111
			(0.177)	(0.175)	(0.250)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1..

Table 10: Ex-ante polarization and against-character policy endorsement

Policy Endorsement	N	Avg. opinion Macri voter	Avg. opinion Kirchner voter	Difference
MRB				
Cambiemos	220	2.606	2.376	0.230
		(0.113)	(0.143)	(0.180)
No endorsement	201	2.357	3.112	-0.755***
		(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.177)
FPV	208	1.529	3.360	-1.830***
		(0.122)	(0.103)	(0.166)
Deporting Illegal Immigrants				
Macri	186	3.394	1.688	1.706***
		(0.094)	(0.185)	(0.192)
No endorsement	171	3.116	1.647	1.469***
		(0.123)	(0.168)	(0.208)
Kirchner	160	2.212	1.705	0.507***
		(0.139)	(0.174)	(0.223)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.