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Horizontal Accountability and Preference Formation: The Spanish Constitutional Court and Catalonia

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"Control horizontal y formación de preferencias: El tribunal constitucional y Catalunia"

Resumen

Los canales institucionales de "horizontal accountability", como las cortes supremas, restringen las acciones del legislativo y ejecutivo para proteger los derechos de los ciudadanos. De todos modos, estos "checks-and-balances" pueden resultan en decisiones contra mayoritarias que erosionan la confianza en las instituciones y exacerban las preferencias sobre las que se juzgó. En particular, estudiamos el caso del tribunal constitucional español y la relación de su sentencia sobre el Estatut Catalan con el independentismo Catalan, que se duplicó entre 2010 y 2015.

Palabras clave: Instituciones, checks and balances, corte suprema, independentismo

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Abstract

Institutional channels of horizontal accountability, like Supreme Courts, constrain the actions of legislative and executive branches and protect citizens' rights. However, these checks-and-balances may result in counter-majoritarian decisions that may erode the trust in those institutions and exacerbate the preferences on the topic ruled upon. We study how the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Catalan Constitution affected the preferences of Catalans towards secession, which doubled in the 2010-2015 period. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the ruling took place amidst a survey of public opinion. We find that the ruling leads to an increase of 20\% in the support for Catalan independence from Spain in 2010. We show that the increased support of the secessionist cause cannot be explained neither by the economic crises nor the political parties' strategies. Although cultural factors are a mediating mechanism, the diminished trust in institutional channels of accountability represents the main mechanism behind our result.

Keywords: Institutions, Checks and Balances, Supreme Court, Nation-Building

Códigos JEL: D02, O12, O17, K4

1 Introduction

In democracy politicians are kept (vertically) accountable through elections. Simultaneously, they are also (horizontally) accountable to the other branches of government.[1] While there is agreement that citizens support for the first form of accountability, their support for the latter is under scrutiny (Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik, 2013; Gratton and Morelli, 2018).

One example of horizontal accountability is the Supreme Court's overruling of legislative and executive decisions. Legal scholars show that the Court's rulings do not only depend on public opinion but they also are a source of preference formation. Specially so in the case of counter-majoritarian decisions, the preference formation aspect is severe. It may lead citizens not only to take more polarizing views but also to question the institutional setting of horizontal accountability and separation of powers.[2]

In this paper we analyze a ruling that has not only created its share of discontent but also led to the distrust of judiciary checks and balances up to the point of fostering a secessionist movement. In particular, we study the case of Catalonia in Spain, where the support for Catalan independence more than doubled between 2010 and 2015, with a record high of 48,5% in November 2013 (see Figure 1). In 2006, the Catalan and the Spanish parliaments approved a reform of the Catalan Constitution (the *Estatut*) which included – among other fiscal benefits– a higher degree of decentralization. The text of the new Constitution, endorsed by a referendum in Catalonia where almost eighty percent of the voting population voted yes, was partially ruled unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010.

Besides cultural issues, economic and institutional arrangements may affect the prevalence of secession movements. For instance, Alesina and Spolaore (1997) argue that democratization may cause an inefficiently large number of secessions. Similarly, trade and market integration may result in the demand for "increased regional independence" (Feinstein and Casella, 2002). On the same lines, decentralization is usually thought as a mechanism to prevent secessions. Spolaore (2010) argue that decentralization reduces the net benefit of secession due to the transfer of economic and political power to the regional governments. Nonetheless, the greater availability of resources may also increase its probability of success (if attempted). [3] More generally, the economy may affect the existence and prevalence secessionist movements (Collier and Hoeffler, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). We shed light on this issue by analyzing whether this ruling – which prevented a greater degree of decentralization in Catalonia amidst a severe economic crises– affected the support for independence in Catalonia.

Moreover, the Catalan independence movement is concurrent with other nationalist

[1] The classic approach can be found in The Federalist Papers James Madison (1787). O'Donnell (1998) provides a broader and more "modern" interpretation.

[2] See Mondak and Smithey (1997).

[3] As argued in (Sorens, 2005) there is very few systematic empirical analysis of cross-country determinants of secessions.

and secessionist movements in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, whether the mechanism that caused its support is the lack of decentralization or a renewed stress of the regional and cultural identity should also be explored empirically.

In order to identify the effect of the ruling on the citizens' preferences we exploit the design of a survey. The timing of the verdict of the Constitutional Court, amid the survey, allows us to exploit the quasi-random assignment of respondents to the treatment group (i.e., after the decision was released). Hence, we not only quantify the effect of the ruling but also we explore the mechanisms behind it.

Following this strategy, we investigate whether the Court's decision affected the preferences of Catalans and we explore the economic, institutional and identity mechanisms. We show that the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court regarding the contents of the Catalan Constitution created or ignited an otherwise dormant support for the Catalan Independence. As a result of the verdict, support for independence increased by around 20%, specially so among those who were already strongly attached to Catalan culture. The effect for those born from a Catalan father or those who speak Catalan socially is twice as much as the average.

Moreover, we show that there are two potential channels through which the ruling affected the support for independence: the "identity" mechanism and the "accountability" one. Regarding the former, after the ruling, Catalans are more likely to feel only Catalan and more Catalan than Spanish. Regarding the latter, the trust of the institutions of horizontal accountability, in particularly the Constitutional Court, decreased in ten percentage points. Additionally, the satisfaction with democracy experienced a similar decrease.

While previous literature argues that the support for independence could be caused by economic issues (decentralization, fiscal benefits, etc) we show that this channel cannot fully explain its growth. On the contrary, we find that the verdict crowded out the salience of the economic issues. Following the Great Recession, and amidst the Spanish greatest economic crises in democracy (reaching 27% of unemployment at its peak), "the economy" is 25% less likely to be mentioned as the biggest problem of Catalonia.

Additionally, we show that the effect of the ruling in 2010 has a long-lasting association with greater support for the political parties supporting the Catalan independence. For instance, even in 2015, in the districts that experienced an "independence shock" the pro-independence parties obtained a 10% electoral bonus in the Catalan elections.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the institutional background in detail and Section 3 explains the econometric strategy. In Section 4 we show the main results, the mechanisms behind them, and the long-term effects of the ruling. Section A comments and provide evidence in favor of the identification assumptions. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

1.1 Literature Review

Besides the literature on decentralization and secessionists conflicts described in the introduction, this paper is also related to two different related but different phenomena: horizontal accountability and preference formation.

Horizontal accountability

Since James Madison and Montesquieu, the separation of powers is thought as a mechanism to restraint the person holding office. For instance, the tyranny of the majority can be avoided by a judge that rules an expropriating law or decree as unconstitutional. On the same lines, La Porta et al. (2004) use cross-country evidence to show that judiciary checks and balances (in the form of judiciary independence and constitutional review) are associated with greater freedom. Using cross-sectional data, Streb, Lema and Torrens (2009) show that checks and balances smooth political business cycles, and Keefer and Knack (2007) argue that limited checks and balances – among other things– result in greater public investment "as a vehicle to increase rent-seeking".

On the other side of the coin, political economists began to highlight trade-offs of this type of accountability. For instance, Acemoglu, Robinson and Torvik (2013) argue that these checks and balances decrease the politicians' rents, which makes things easier for lobbying: it is cheaper for the elite to "bribe" the politician. Hence, voters may want to eliminate them (or weaken them). Gratton and Morelli (2018) argues that this mechanism may slow down the implementation of reforms and, therefore, growth. While the former paper directly argues that voters may want to eliminate (or weaken) checks and balances

Finally, some scholars studied the interaction of the vertical and horizontal accountability. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) argue that checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches provides information to voters to exercise their vertical accountability. A more "negative" type of complementarity arises in Alesina and Rosenthal (2000), who argue that these two branches may interact to cause polarization of party policies.

Preference formation

There are two non-excludable channels that affect preference formation (and voting behavior) during electoral competitions. The demand-driven one emphasizes how office-motivated parties will adapt their platforms to exogenous changes in voters preferences. According to this view, voting behavior is determined by ideological proximity to political parties (which may have moved "closer" to the voter) as in the classical "spatial models" of voting (Downs, 1957). The supply-driven channel emphasizes the influence of the parties' discourse and campaigning to "affect" voters' preferences and partisan attachments. Sitting on behavioral and psychological models of voting, this view emphasizes affective and emotional attachments (Dinas, Hartman and van Spanje, 2016) without dismissing ideological components (Bisgaard and Slothuus, 2018).

The failure to take these non-exclusive views of voters' equilibrium behavior into account, simultaneously, poses a challenge for understanding to what extent the salience of some issues is driven by one or the other. Outside the scope of elections, there are few papers that address the direction of causality with event studies, c.f., Depetris-Chauvin, Durante and Campante (2018), Jakiela and Ozier (2019) and Aksoy et al. (2020). The latter shows that when same-sex relationship policies (as wedding, adoption, etc) obtain legal recognition in European countries – through parliamentary or judiciary decisions – the attitudes toward sexual minorities improve. On these lines, there is a large body of literature that studies the relationship between court rulings and preferences.

Among other links between institutional design and preferences, Clots Figueras and Masella (2013) study the case of an educational reform in Catalonia. This paper is close to ours as they find that the switch in mandatory schooling from Spanish to Catalan language had an effect on self-identification as Catalan, but also on political preferences. For instance, those educated in Catalan are more likely to report voting for "Catalanist" parties and to support Catalan independence.

Effect of Supreme Courts' verdicts on Preferences. The literature on the relationship between preferences and the Supreme Court decisions looks into both directions – how the public opinion affects court decisions and the opposite– and it is mostly focused on the U.S. Mishler and Sheehan (1993) show some evidence of the effect of public opinion on the Court's decision. The opposite channel, more closely related to our paper, studies how verdicts shape preference formation. The legitimacy theory (Ura (2014), Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel and Allen (2006)) argues that preferences shift toward the position taken by the court. Hoekstra (2000) argues that, to have any influence on public opinion, salience is a requisite (either due to media coverage or being locally affected). The opposite theory (called "thermostatic") implies that preferences backlash against the one taken by the Supreme Court. Overall, these papers show a positive correlation between preferences and the supreme court decisions. [4] Mondak and Smithey (1997) summarize the literature arguing that supreme court's decisions are mostly congruent with public opinion, that influence the support of the institution, specially so the ones that are incongruent. Finally, they argue that the trust in the institution "regenerates" over time.

2 Institutional Background

2.1 Form of Government

After thirty nine years of dictatorship under Francisco Franco's rule, a new Constitution was signed in Spain after three year's of the dictator's death. This Constitution, signed in 1978, establishes that the political form of the of the Kingdom of Spain is a "parliamentary

[4] When discussed, the identification strategies in this literature are generally based on lagged preferences in public opinion or first differences. This approach could be problematic under the presence of omitted variables that cause the change in opinions, for instance.

monarchy". According to the Constitution, Spain is divided into seventeen autonomous regions (called *Comunidades Autonomas*) and two autonomous cities. Within each region there are provinces and sub-provinces, also known as *comarcas*. [5]

The monarch is the head of state but, in practical terms, his duties are only ceremonial and the president is in charge of the executive power. Regarding the legislative branch, Spain is a bicameral parliamentary system composed by the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. Deputies and Senators are elected by universal suffrage for a maximum of four years, in representation of the provinces. The deputies elect the president for the duration of their mandate. [6] The maximum authority of the judiciary branch is the Supreme Court, except for the cases that refer to the national and regional constitutions, which are handled by the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court is the supreme interpreter of the Spanish Constitution and it is competent to hear appeals against the alleged unconstitutionality of laws or legal conflicts between the Central and the Autonomous Communities governments or between the governments of two or more Autonomous Communities. No appeal may be brought against the rulings of the Constitutional Court. When the judgment declares a law unconstitutional, the ruling affects only the part of the law affected by unconstitutionality and the part not affected remains in force. The Constitutional Court is composed by twelve members. Formally they are all appointed by the King but four of them are nominated by the Congress by a majority of three-fifths, four more are nominated by the Senate with the same qualified majority, two of them are nominated by the Government and the last two are nominated by the General Council of Judicial Power. They are appointed for a period of nine years and should be renewed by thirds every three years.

Since the return of democracy, the Spanish Government alternated between two main national parties. While both parties are moderate in economic and social terms, the Socialist Party (or *PSOE*) is center left while the Popular Party (or *PP*) is center right. From 1978 until 2010, these two parties dominated the Congress of Deputies and the Senate almost exclusively. After the 2008 Great Depression, which hit Spain greatly, two other parties emerged: *Podemos* and *Ciudadanos*. While the former is a left-wing party since its creation, the latter is usually placed between PSOE and PP – according to the placement of political parties' surveys (CIS). Besides national parties, regional parties have also enjoyed of a sizable presence in both chambers that have allowed them to lean the majority of the congress towards one of the main national parties.

The regions. Similarly to the fifty states in the U.S., each region or "Autonomous Communities" in Spain has its own regional constitution or "Statute of Autonomy". Each of these Statutes regulates the internal organization of the region (i.e. the regional Par-

[5] While provinces are a political unit formed of many municipalities, comarcas are just a geographical aggregation of municipalities. Many comarcas form a province.

[6] The names and attributes of the elected politicians do not coincide with other democracies: Deputies in Spain have similar attributes to Senators in other countries (i.e., the U.S.), and the president is typically named Prime Minister in most parliamentary democracies.

liament and Government) as well as the relationship with the national State. Differently to the U.S., Spain is not a "confederation" and so the Autonomous Communities have less independence than the American states. Thus, the extent of decentralization depends of the agreement through National and Regional institutional channels, which results in different regions having different responsibilities in the provision of public goods, tax collection and spending (which otherwise are in charge of the National State). In the case of Catalonia, the form of government mirrors closely the national one. The president of Catalonia is elected by the Catalan Parliament, whose members are elected in representation of the provinces with a mandate of four years.

The process of reform of the regional constitutions differ across regions. In the case of Catalonia, the reform requires a qualified majority of two thirds of the Catalan Parliament, an absolute majority in the Spanish Congress and Senate and the ratification of a majority of Catalan voters in a referendum. In addition to this process, as any other Spanish law, the reform is subject to the rulings of the Constitutional Court regarding its constitutionality.[7]

2.2 The rise of secessionism and the conflict

The Catalan Constitution (2006-2010)

The process of reform of Catalan Constitution or "Statute of Autonomy" traces back to the Catalan elections of 2003 where all parties but the centralist PP promised to reform the Statute of Autonomy which dated from 1979. In September 2005, the Catalan Parliament approved by 89% of the votes a reform that included fiscal benefits for the Catalan government. [8] The approved proposal was sent for review to the Spain's Parliament and, after several amendments, the Spanish Parliament and the Spanish Senate approved the reform. The final version of the text was approved in a referendum in Catalonia on June 18, 2006. The referendum resulted in 78.1% of voters supporting the reform with a turnout of 48.9%.

The approved regional Constitution was challenged by deputies of the PP, and the case arrived to the Constitutional Court. The ruling of the Constitutional Court of Spain – which took place four years after the referendum– affected forty one of the two hundred twenty-three articles of the Statute. The court struck down seventeen articles and curtailed another twenty seven. Among other things, the ruling interpreted that the references to "Catalonia as a nation" in the preamble had no legal effect, rolled back the attempt to place the distinctive Catalan language above Spanish in the region and ruled as unconstitutional regional powers over courts and judges[9].

[7] According to the Spanish Constitution, the following subjects can lodge an appeal of unconstitutionality: the President of the Government, the Defender of the People, fifty Members of Congress, fifty Senators, the Executive body of a Self-governing Community and, where applicable, its Assembly.

[8] These benefits amounted to more transfers from the national state to the regional one. National taxes are collected by the regions to form a common pool which is later divided into the regions.

[9] Other articles affected by the ruling center around decentralization of bank regulations, fiscal capacity. The full ruling can be found here: https://boe.es/boe/dias/2010/07/16/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-11409.pdf.

The rise of secessionism (2010-2015)

Since the Great Recession, Spain was immersed in a severe economic recession. The unemployment rate, which was below 10% at the beginning of 2008, reached 26.3% in 2013. This figure was 55.3% among the youth, more than twice of the European average. The ruling party (PP) imposed austerity measures and the accompanying political discontent was manifested nationally by the Indignados movement – also known as 15M (Barreiro and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012). Amidst the Spanish economic crises, the growth of the support for independence (see Figure 1) shows a massive and sudden increase, which coincides with the ruling of the Constitutional Court.

After this ruling, the majority of Catalan Parliamentary Parties, trade unions and social organizations called for mobilization across the region and a massive demonstration took place on July 10, 2010. Among the organizers of the demonstration there was Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), a party that has unambiguously supported the Catalan independence since 1989 (Serrano and Bonillo, 2017).[10] This demonstration was led by a banner with the slogan "We are a nation. We decide".

On September 11, 2012, during Catalonia's national day, a massive secessionist demonstration under the slogan "Catalonia, new state in Europe" took place. Until that year, the national day was characterized by some institutional events and minority demonstrations[11]. After the demonstration, Artur Mas (the president of Catalonia) called for snap elections with the promise of holding a self-determination referendum in the following term.

Mas belonged to CiU, a right-wing Catalan nationalist coalition that governed the region from 1980 to 2003, whose main faction (CDC) only formally transitioned to support independence in March, 2012. He was re-elected and a non-binding referendum was held in November 9th 2014. Although the referendum was "prohibited" according to the Constitutional Court, it took place without incidents with an 80% support for independence.[12]

In spite that during this period (2010-2015) the support for independence increased from 24,3% in June 2010 to 45,3% in October 2014 (see figure 1) [13], none of the political parties of the government coalition had promised a secession attempt in their respective electoral manifestos.

[10] ERC, a left-wing party, step down from the Catalan government because they considered that the amendments in the Spanish Parliament left the Statute insufficient and, ironically, campaigned against the reform of the Statute in the Referendum together with the Popular Party (the traditional right).

[11] According the the Municipal Police of Barcelona, the number of participants increased from 8.000 in 2011 to 1.500.000 in 2012

[12] 2,3 millions of Catalans participated and near 80% of the participants voted for independence. However, there was no official census in the referendum and, thus there is not an official number of eligible voters.

[13] The Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) has a question on the territorial preferences of Spanish citizens and while the choice of secession is presented differently "A state where autonomous communities could become independent states", the results show similar patterns. Support for that option increased from 22,9% in October 2010 to 46,6% in August 2015.

The conflict (2015-2019)

Given the impossibility of holding a legal and binding self-determination referendum, Mas announced that the 2015 regional elections would be a *de facto* plebiscite for independence. Parties announced their position for/against secession and a pro-independence candidate, Carles Puigdemont, was elected president.

Months later, given the difficulty to pass relevant laws and the regional budget, Puigdemont obtained a confidence vote conditional on celebrating an unilateral and binding referendum of self-determination during that term. Contrary to the referendum of 2014, the preparation of this referendum included laws to ensure that the result of the referendum would be implemented and a proper census. Both these laws and the referendum itself were declared illegal by the Spanish Constitutional Court. The referendum was finally held in October 1st 2017 in an extremely polarized environment.

This time police did intervene and there were acts of repression and violence before and during the election. According to the Catalan Government, 43% of eligible voters participated in the vote and more than 90% of them voted in favor of independence, hence one month after the celebration of the referendum, the majority of members of the Parliament of Catalonia declared the independence of Catalonia. The Spanish Congress and Senate intervened Catalonia, suspending its autonomy through the article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, the Spanish government appointed an interim Catalan government and called for elections in December 2017. Several members of the Catalan Government as well as the two main leaders of the secessionist movement were accused of rebellion among other charges and those who stay in the country were provisionally imprisoned.

[INSERT FIGURE 1]

3 Empirical strategy and data

3.1 Data

The main data source of this paper is a computer-assisted telephone survey run by the "Public Opinion Center" (the `Baròmetre d'Opinió Política` of the `Catalan Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió`), fielded between June 28th and July 10th 2010 [14]. The order of the interviews is random: the computers' assistance during the surveys consists in randomly selecting a number from a database and making the call after each interview is finished.

Out of inhabitants in Catalonia who are at least 18 years old, the respondents are sampled randomly in two stages: the first stratification is by province and size of the municipality and the second is by gender and age, in order to keep the sample representative according the 2009 population census (`Padró de Població`). Additionally, each province

[14] For a falsification test and for the long-run results we use all the waves of the same survey between 2009 and 2012. For the electoral consequences of the ruling we use data from the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Public Administrations of Spain.

is weighted such that the sample is representative of Catalonia.

From each of the two thousand respondents, we have data about the time of the interview, individual socio-demographic characteristics (education, income, age, gender, etc), cultural identity (language spoken, national self-identification, etc) and political attitudes (past voting behavior, intention to vote, preferences for centralization), among other characteristics.

The main outcome variable of interest is the question regarding the preferred relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish central administration. The possible answers (besides "no answer" and "don't know") are coded into four categories. Ordered from less to more decentralization, the respondents choose between Catalonia being a region with less powers, an autonomous community (the status quo), a state within a federal state or an independent country.[15] In our survey, the support for independence is 26%. Summary statistics for the independent variables and other dependent variables are discussed in the following paragraphs. [16]

3.2 Econometric strategy

We are interested in estimating the effect of the ruling on the individual political attitudes (Y_i).[17] With that aim, we define the variable $Ruling_i$, which takes value one for all the individuals interviewed after the sentence was released, and 0 for all the people interviewed before. More precisely, the ruling of the Constitutional Court was released at 7pm on June 28th 2010. Therefore, those who were interviewed before the ruling was made public are assigned to the control group and those who were interviewed after the ruling are assigned to the treatment group. Let X_i be a vector of observable socio-demographic characteristics,[18] GEO_i dummies for respondents' city population and geographical (comarcas) fixed effects,[19] and ϵ_i the residual. Let's define the potential outcomes as $Y_i(0)$ and $Y_i(1)$, for the control and treated groups, respectively. We estimate the following Model 1:

$$Y_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 Ruling_i + \gamma_1 X_i + GEO_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

[15] The original wording for the first option is *regió* – which corresponds to the regional organization during the Franco regime that assigned less powers to the regions than the current one. Since we are using region to refer to Catalonia, we translated differently to avoid confusions.

[16] The full summary statistics can be found in tables A.1 and A.3.

[17] We use different dependent variables: preferences for the institutional relationship between Catalonia and Spain, trust in political institutions, intention to vote, cultural feelings and problems which are considered important.

[18] The controls included are: whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; and dummies for respondent's employment situation.

[19] We use the smallest available geographical unit observation, that is comarcas. Catalonia is divided into four provinces and each province is divided in different comarcas, which includes different municipalities. There are 42 comarcas in Catalonia. On average a comarca has 179,000 inhabitants and a size of 764 squared km

Our identification assumption is that the moment at which each respondent is interviewed is independent from the time when the ruling of the Constitutional Court occurred. That is, we treat the timing at which respondents were interviewed as-if random. In particular, we assume that the potential outcomes are independent from the moment of the interview. Possible imbalances in observable characteristics due to the structure of the field work can possibly bias our results. We limit these concerns adding different controls and restricting our sample.

Moreover, even though the order of interviews is random, in order to avoid the possibility that people interviewed in the mornings or afternoons are different, we restrict our sample uniquely to people interviewed before 7pm. Similarly, in order to control for potential imbalances in the characteristics of the people interviewed at different stages of the field work, we restrict our sample to the first seven days of interviews.[20] This leaves us with 227 observations that are in the control group and 1,050 observations in the treatment group (out of the 1,773 observations interviewed after the ruling took place).

In addition, we also control for GEO_i and a battery of different controls potentially related to how the fieldwork was organized. This implies that for our estimations we assume that conditional on socio-economic and geographical characteristics the treatment status is orthogonal to the potential outcomes, $Y_i(0), Y_i(1) \perp\!\!\!\perp Ruling_i | X_i, GEO_i$. The inclusion of comarcas fixed effect and socio-economic characteristics allows to compare different potential outcomes of people with similar characteristics inside the same geographical unit interviewed before and after the ruling of the Constitutional Court.

Because similar people can potentially be interviewed in the same day, the errors ϵ_i can be correlated. This could cause problem of the inference of our estimates. In order to limit this inference problem we cluster standard errors at the level of the day of the interview.

Moreover, we also examine heterogeneous effects of the ruling on the political attitudes. With that aim, we explore the interactions of $Ruling_i$ with other socio-demographic variables. Section 4 reports separate estimation of Model 1 when each control, an element of vector X, is interacted with the variable $Ruling$.

3.3 Robustness and potential threats to identification

While the use of sudden events amidst a survey to identify exogenous changes on individual attitudes has become a standard identification strategy in even studies, some concerns about the identification strategy and robustness of the results may arise, even with a random treatment. A recent methodological paper (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2018)) reviews the literature in which this strategy is used and typifies all the potential threats. Additional, the authors highlight different practices to ensure the credibility of estimates, addressing each of the identification issues. In this Section A we go through the list of threats (and we consider additional ones) and provide several

[20] The survey was collected from June 28th 2010 to July 8th 2010. No interviews took place on July 4th 2010. We restrict our attention from June 28th to July 6th.

evidence in favour of our identification assumption. In particular we tackle several possible threats to identification: balancing, non-compliance, confounding and anticipating events. Moreover, in Appendix A.7 we address the possible problems associated with our econometric misspecification.

4 Results

In this section we present all the results of the weighted OLS estimates of $Ruling_i$ on the main variables of interest. All models are run with clustered standard errors (at the day of the interview), with all the interviews that took place between 9am and 7pm during the first seven days of the survey. Except when indicated, all regressions include "Comarca FE".

Baseline effects: The unconditional baseline effect of the variable $Ruling_i$ on the support for independence is shown in column 1 of Table 1. It shows an average increase in support for independence in Catalonia of 4.5 percentage points. That is, an increase from 26% to 31% approximately. In columns 2 to 5 of the same table we show the conditional effect of the ruling on the preferred form of government for Catalonia. Ordered from less to more centralization, figure 2a shows that there seems to be a cascade effect in which "Region" loses support to all other possibilities, increasing the support for independence by 6.5 percentage points. Moreover, figure 2b summarizes the results from column 2. Notably, besides the ruling, the only variables with a significant effect on the support for independence are related to cultural factors, i.e., whether they respondents speak Catalan socially (at home or with friends).

Additionally, figure 3 shows that the estimated effect is robust to the sampling of the treated group. While the immediate effect (the day after, which is the "recommended" window in Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2018)) is as large as 12 percentage points, enlarging the window decreases the average effect but it converges to 5 percentage points.

We can grasp an idea of the magnitude of this increase if we compare the estimate with the yearly increase of support for secession during these years. In the whole previous year, support for secession only increased by 0,6 percentage points, that is, the increase in support for secession after the ruling is almost 10 times higher than the previous yearly increase.

[INSERT TABLE 1]
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
[INSERT FIGURE 3]

Heterogeneous effects: Based on the previous results, we explore heterogenous effects of the ruling, depending on identity signs like the use of the Catalan language socially,

family heritage and past voting patterns, among other socio-demographic characteristics. The results are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4.

While the region of birth of the respondent and his/her mother's do not affect the reaction to $Ruling_i$, the father's place of birth seems relevant. If the father was born in Catalonia, the support for independence increases in 11 percentage points as a result of the sentence, while if he was born in the rest of Spain, the ruling has no effect on the respondents' allegiance with secessionism. The effect of $Ruling_i$ among those speaking Catalan socially is 13 percentage points larger than among those who do not.

While cultural and political identities are a large determinant of the change in preferences toward independence, sociodemographic characteristics are less relevant. There is a differential effect for older individuals (more than 50 years old) whose support for independence changes by 18 pp more than the youth and for married people (13 pp). Additionally, the effect of the $Ruling_i$ also depends on income and education, but not on employment status. For instance, those earning less than 1000 euros and those without secondary education changed their attitudes toward independence the most: around 20 percentage points. Interestingly, whether the respondent is unemployed, self-employed or employed does not introduce any heterogeneity in the effect of $Ruling_i$.

[INTRO FIGURE 4]

Polarization: While table 2a suggests that the territorial preferences of Catalan citizens did not become more polarized after the ruling, it does not rule out other possible polarization mechanisms. In particular, table 3 shows that the ruling had heterogeneous effects among voters of different parties and these heterogeneous effects increased the difference between the territorial preferences of voters of different parties. In column 1 we see that the ruling did not increase support for secession among voters of the Popular Party[21]. Moreover, column (4) shows that, after the ruling, voters of the Popular Party became more likely to support the most centralized option (region).

[INSERT TABLE 2] [INSERT TABLE 3]

4.1 Potential Mechanisms

In this section we examine the channels that could explain the effect of the ruling on the change in preferences. There are four types of mechanism: Economic, Cultural and Regional Identities (Serrano, 2013), Electoral and Partisan, and finally, we consider the Institutional channel, which is mostly related to checks and balances.[22]

[21] Recall that before the ruling the Popular Party was already the party with less support for decentralization. If we regress support for region on having voter the Popular Party in the last Catalan election in the previous wave of the survey, we obtain a coefficient of 0,18 (0,015 (s.e.) which means that Popular Party voters were 18% more likely than the rest of voters to support the region choice.

[22] For an in-depth literature review on each of the possible causes and for a similar classification of mechanisms, see Cuadras-Morató and Rodon (2018).

Economic. Pundits and scholars alike argue that the Spanish economic crisis is one of the main culprits of the secessionist movement in Catalonia (Rico and Liñeira (2014) and references therein). The Spanish crisis, initially caused by the Great Recession and a local real state bubble, peaked in the early 2010 with the "Indignados" movement. With an average of unemployment of 25% and a recession, it is claimed that Catalonia (among the richest region in Spain) seek fiscal independence due to the crises. This idea is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson (2001)'s theory of institutional transitions who argue that revolts prompting institutional change are likely to take place during recessions.

We test this channel indirectly using an open question about the "current problems of Catalonia". We coded the issues reported by the respondents into: the relationship between Spain and Catalonia (within this category there is a sub-category that specifically refers to the "Estatut"), the fiscal federalism [23] and the economy. [24] Then, we analyze whether economic problems are reported to be the main problem or a problem at all. In the appendix we show that the economy is unlikely to be a cause of the change in preferences, as its importance decreases after the Constitutional Court ruling. Moreover, the reported problems with the greatest effect are political: the relationship with Spain and the Catalan Constitution.

[INSERT TABLE 4]

It is not only that we can discard the economic channel but also we can argue that the Constitutional Court's ruling on the Catalan constitution has decreased the salience of economic issues in times of a large recession. Table 4 shows that $Ruling_i$ reduces the probability of reporting the economy as a problem in 9 percentage points and reduces it to be the main problem in 12 percentage points. [25]

Electoral and Partisan. The electoral and partisan channel implies a change in voters' preferences either due to the action of political parties (c.f., Richez and Bodet (2012),Dinas, Hartman and van Spanje (2016)), or the same ruling affecting the citizens' intention to vote. The former channel (supply-driven) can be discarded because political parties could not homogeneously change and communicate their strategy from one day to the other.[26] Besides this argument, if parties were suddenly changing their behavior, as we take longer windows around the ruling, we should observe a larger effect due to more exposure to the new strategies. Figure 3 rules out this hypothesis. Additionally, in Table 5 we examine the effect of $Ruling_i$ on intention to vote, past vote and proximity to the two main Catalan parties, ERC and CiU. None of the coefficients is economically

[23] The survey administrators code references to the centralized taxes into this category. The results corresponding to this sub-category must be interpreted responsibly since there are only sixty six individuals who reported it as a problem

[24] Into the economics problems it is included unemployment and low quality employment, low wages, functioning of the economy.

[25] Fiscal federalism is reported more often as a problem as a consequence of the ruling as well, but the intensity of reporting this issue does not change, that is, it does not increase the likelihood of reporting fiscal federalism as the most important problem.

[26] Vidal (2019) offers an interesting insight of the change of CiU toward secessionism in their 2011 Convention.

or statistically significant at the 90% level, hence we can discard the electoral/partisan channel.

[INSERT TABLE 5]

Cultural and Regional Identities. The literature on secessions argues that identity is one if not the main determinant for "intention to secede". [27] Hence, we investigate whether the self-identification with Spain, Catalonia, or both changes after the sentence. The respondents have to choose one among the following categories: they feel (i) only Spanish, (ii) more Spanish than Catalan, (iii) Spanish and Catalan alike, (iv) more Catalan and (v) only Catalan. Coded from 1 to 5, we build the variable "Feels Catalan"'. The the average effect of $Ruling_i$ on this variable is 7 percentage points, as reported in column 1 of table 6. Figure 5 shows the predicted values for the effect of the decision of the Constitutional Court, depending on the respondents self-identification. Notably, the effect of the ruling is to increase the "feelings" for Catalonia, i.e., the categories (i) to (iii) decrease in favor of (iv) and specially (v). That is, there is an increase in 2 percentage points of the self-identification of "only Catalan".[28] These results are also in line with our previous findings regarding the use of Catalan language socially and its heterogeneous effects. Hence, there seems to be support for an identity or cultural channel, by which the ruling exacerbated the Catalan feelings.

[INSERT TABLE 6]

[INSERT FIGURE 5]

Institutional. The effect of the Constitutional Court on the preferences for the Catalan independence does not seem to be mediated through economic or electoral channels. Although the regional and cultural identities are a possible mechanism, its effects are relatively small to be the sole one. Hence, we explore the institutional channel, which we divide into two non-exclusive ones: first, the "will" of a majority of Catalans and their representatives (as well as the representatives of other regions in the national congress), is bound by the checks and balances of the "diputados" from PP who appealed and the court. This situation may erode the institutional mechanisms of accountability. Second, the functioning of democracy as a whole may be questioned. That is, while the reform of the "Estatut" followed all the procedural rules and was democratically approved by large majorities in the Spanish and Catalan parliaments and in the referendum, it was "amended" only due to its contents.

Table 7 shows the effect of the ruling on the trust on national and regional democratic institutions. Trust is measured with an index which takes value 10 when there is maximum

[27] For instance, Sorens (2005) studies a cross-section of established democracies with secessionist parties and finds that "identity' variables are the most determinant for their vote share. Additionally, he finds that affluence is another relevant factor, in line with our previous explored mechanism.

[28] It is important to highlight that since the reported self identification is partly caused by the ruling, then it is an endogenous variable. So it should not be used as a explanatory variable for the support of independence. This comment is just a clarifying (and cautionary) note.

trust (respectively, 0 for no trust). Columns 1 to 3 show that the sentence caused distrust in the Court and the Spanish parliament, which were the active players in charge of the checks and balances. Notably, the executive branch is not affected. Moreover, Columns 4 and 5 show that Catalan institutions were not affected either, confirming that the institutional accountability across branches of the government may be a relevant channel.

[INSERT TABLE 7]

On the same lines, it could be argued that satisfaction with democracy – as a whole– is affected. After all, most coefficients in the table go in the same direction (diminished trust) and the trust in political parties and the satisfaction with democracy are also negative and significant.

However, there are two pieces of evidence that leads to argue that the first institutional mechanism may be more relevant. First, the significance of the coefficients associated with trust in political parties and satisfaction with democracy is relatively small (economically and statistically) with respect to the those linked to the "checks and balances" argument. Second, the largest effect is the diminished trust in the main institutional channel for checks and balances (its ruling reduced the level of trust by 10% approximately) while trust in the executive branch is unaffected by the ruling.[29]

Hence, the analysis in this section allows us to conclude that the economic and partisan channels do not explain the effect of the Court's ruling on independence. Similarly, we find evidence of the positive effect of the ruling on the Catalan feelings and on the distrust on the institutional channels of horizontal accountability across branches. One would like to categorically answer which one was more determinant of the final effect on the independence support.

Constrained by the limitations of our case study, we can argue that the institutional channel may have been the dominant one. Table 8 provides suggestive correlational evidence: while the effect of $Ruling_i$ on trust on the court is unaffected when controlling for the index of Catalan feelings, the opposite is not true. That is, the effect of $Ruling_i$ on Catalan feelings disappears when the trust on the court is taking into account. Suppose that there is no correlation between Catalan feelings and the error term in columns 1 and 5, then we could say that the trust in this institution affects the way that Catalans feel about their identity and so there would not be a direct effect of $Ruling_i$.[30]

[INSERT TABLE 8]

[29] This finding is consistent with previous literature. For instance, Ura and Wohlfarth (2010) show that the voters' support for checks and balances (and the separation of powers more generally) is reflected with simultaneous movements of trust in the legislative and judiciary branches. These results are independent of the alignment of preferences between these branches, but more generally depends on trust in these institutions.

[30] You can find additional analysis of the relative importance of each of the mechanisms in appendix C.

5 Persistence and voting outcomes

The previous results show the impact that the Ruling of the Constitutional Court had on the political attitudes of Catalan citizens in the aftermath of the Ruling. Given the attention that the Catalan case has attracted, one might also be interested in whether this change in preferences was intense and lasting enough to have any impact on the political events that occurred in Catalonia since then. Despite the fact that our identification strategy does not allow us to study long run effects because all Catalan citizens were treated by the Ruling, we can analyze if the citizens in areas who reacted more to the Ruling, were also more likely to exhibit different voting behavior later. This exercise will help us understanding how changes in preference for independence transform in voting outcomes in favour of parties campaigning on that issue.

Given that there has never been an official referendum on independence, we can only use the 2015 Catalan regional election as our voting outcome of interest. In this election, the two main secessionist parties (CiU and ERC) present a common list called "Junts pel Sí" and promised to declare the independence of Catalonia within 18 months if they obtained the majority of seats in the Parliament. Unsurprisingly, the stance for independence became the main cleavage of the electoral campaign. Turnout at the election hit a record high (74,95%), more than 7 points higher than the previous election showing that citizens considered that stakes were high. Appendix F shows that the change in preferences for independence was persistent even after 2010. Given this evidence that the Ruling had permanent effects on political preferences of Catalan citizens, we explore how this affected the result of 2015 elections.

We want to test whether municipalities where citizens were more likely to have increased their support for secession with the Ruling, experienced an increase of votes for secessionist parties in the Catalan regional election of 2015. Firstly, we estimate heterogeneity of our main effect at aggregate level. The objective of this exercise is to predict which areas in Catalonia changed the most their preferences after the Ruling. Our survey is representative at the level of specific city population categories in each province,[31] therefore we can predict the different marginal effect of the Ruling for each of these areas (let's define ps as the suffix for each province-size of the municipality combination). We perform this by estimating Model 2, where $PROVI$ and $SizeMun$ are province and size of the municipality fixed effects.

$$Y_i = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 Ruling_i + \gamma_2 X_i + PROVI \times SizeMun + \lambda_2 Ruling_i \times PROV_i \times SizeMun + u_i, \tag{2}$$

We predict how each area changed their preferences estimating the marginal effect of the Ruling in each province-size of the municipality combination ($\widehat{ME_{ps}} = \widehat{\beta_2} + \widehat{\lambda_2} \times$

[31] City population is divided in six categories: less than 2,000, from 2,001 to 10,000, from 10,001 to 50,000, from 50,001 to 150,000, from 150,001 to 1,000,000, and more than 1,000,000 inhabitants.

$PROVI_{i(p)} \times SizeMun_{i(s)}$).[32] We estimate the correlation between voting behavior in the 2015 election and changes in preferences due to the Ruling by estimating Model 3:

$$Vot_{ce} = \alpha_3 + \tau_c + \psi_t Post2010_e + \phi_3 \widehat{ME_{ps}} \times Post2010_e + v_{ce}, \quad (3)$$

That is, we estimate a Diff-in-Diff model to understand how the vote share for pro-independence parties (Vot_{ce})[33] changed differently after the Ruling ($Post2010$) between places that were more or less affected by the change in preferences. Model 3 includes fixed effects at city level (τ_c) and consider as pre-treatment election periods (e) the elections in 1999, 2003 and 2006. Our post-treatment period is the 2015 election. We report results for this regression in Table 9.

Column 1 of Table 9 shows that municipalities where the effect of the Ruling was higher, also exhibit higher share of votes for secessionist parties in 2015, but not in a statistically significant way. The correlation, as we can see in column 2, is driven only by the municipalities were secessionism had more support before the Ruling.[34]. Despite the significance of the coefficient, notice however that its magnitude is small. In those places, a city that changed preferences for independence as in our baseline estimate, 5.7 percentage points, increased the vote share for independent parties by 0.35 percentage points more than a city with no change in preferences due to the Ruling.[35]

[INSERT TABLE 9]

One possible explanation for the limited translation of changes in preferences in changes in voting is that the positive effect of the Ruling on support for independence was partially offset by an increase of the turnout of Catalan citizens against secession. This explanation is consistent with the results of columns 4 and 5: turnout increased more in the municipalities where the effect of the Ruling is predicted to be lower and were not previously supporting seccionism. An alternative explanation which is consistent with the results in columns 6 and 7 is that the change in preferences translates into voting flows between independentist parties. In fact, we see that ERC lost more votes and CiU gained more votes in cities where the Ruling increased preferences for independence.[36]

Finally, column 8 and 9 provide evidence against the possibility that our results are driven by differential pre-trends in the vote shares of independentist parties.

[32] The results with the geographical heterogeneity of the effect can be found in section E of the appendix.

[33] We compute the share of votes for independence parties as the sum of the vote share of ERC, CiU and CUP.

[34] We use the votes for ERC in 1999 as a proxy for support for secession before the Ruling because it was the only secessionist party with parliamentary representation.

[35] Column 3 shows that this positive effect is importantly concentrated to votes to CUP. Considering only the sum of ERC and CiU, this effect becomes 0.2 percentage points

[36] We cannot perform this analysis using 2015 as post-treatment period since these two parties presented a common list at that election. Columns 6 and 7 use 2012 elections as post-treatment period.

6 Concluding remarks

We have shown that judicial review of laws supported by a majority of citizens - the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the Catalan Estatut- can reduce public support for courts and reinforce the political attitudes that made them supporting the law - support for further decentralization and secession in particular-. A ruling that was meant to contain an attempt of decentralization in Spain eroded Catalans' trust in Spanish institutions which, in turn, boosted their desire for secession that culminated in the Spanish Constitutional Crisis of 2017.

Judicial review has always been a source of controversy since it confronts the will of the majority of citizens and the judgment of the -few- members of a court. In the case of the ruling of the Estatut, this controversy was even higher for two reasons.

On the one hand, the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court was already under scrutiny because its composition was irregular: out of the twelve judges of the court, four were out of term, one was recused and another one died and was not replaced. The irregularity of the composition of the Constitutional Court and, in particular, the recusal of one of its members created a shadow of doubt and suspicions about the bias of the court.

On the other hand, the legitimacy of the Estatut was strengthened with a referendum with a low turnout but a 74% of votes in favour. The ruling only arrived after all this democratic process took place. Actually, the Constitutional Court rejected to review the case before the referendum took place because they alleged that they could not rule against a law that was not approved yet. The constraint of the Constitutional Court to rule only after the approval increased the legitimacy of the law they needed to rule upon probably magnified the backlash effect of the ruling.

While the estimated effects we found are sizable - the ruling increased support for secession by 20% - and robust to different specifications, we want to acknowledge the limitations of our results. First, our identification strategy only allow us to account for relatively short term effects. Second, we can't analyze what were the effects in the rest of Spain. This last question is particularly interesting because support for Estatut in Spain was presumably lower than in Catalonia: the Estatut was approved by the Spanish Congress with 189 favorable votes and 154 against and, if we exclude the 47 Catalan deputies we are left with a tighter 152 favorable votes versus 144 against.

Finally, our findings are relevant because previous empirical articles studying the relationship between judicial review and political attitudes lack of a convincing identification strategy. Moreover, albeit context specific, our findings suggest the potential of judicial reviewing at shaping political attitudes in issues as relevant as the secession from a country.

6.1 Figures and Tables

6.1.1 Figures



Figure 1: Support for Independence, CEO data



(a) This figure plots the coefficient of *Ruling* on the four dependent variables in columns (2) to (5) in Table 1.



(b) This figure plots all the coefficients of the controls included in column 2 in Table 1. The dependent variable is *Independence*.

Figure 2: Main result: preference for relationship between Spain and Catalonia

Both panels plot the outcomes of Table 1. Panel 2a refers to the coefficient of *Ruling* regressed on all the controls and comarca fixed effects. Panel 2b refers to the coefficient of each control when *Ruling* is regressed on all the controls and comarca fixed effects. *Independence*: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to become an independent state. *Federal state*: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to be be part of Spain as a federal state. *Autonomous community*: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to be part of Spain as an autonomous community (status quo). *Region*: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to be part of Spain as a region (lower autonomy than status quo). *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. *Educ.*: years of education. *City pop.*: city population. *Income*: net monthly income in Euros. Probability weights used. Sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interviews.Standard errors are clustered at the day of the interview.



Figure 3: Robustness for sample interviewed in different days

For each X day, coefficient obtained regressing dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to become an independent state on controls and comarcas fixed effects for the people interviewed during the first X days of interview. Controls: dummy reflecting whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; dummies for respondent's employment situation; dummies for respondent's city population. *Lower-Upper Bound CI 90*: lower and upper bounds of 90% confidence interval.



Figure 4: Heterogeneity

The figure reports the coefficients in Table 2 and refer to the coefficient corresponding to the interaction of *Ruling* and all the variables, with comarca fixed effects. Panel 2b refers to the coefficient of each control when *Ruling* is regressed on all the controls and comarca fixed effects.



Figure 5: Cultural results

Blue dots and lines represents the estimated coefficient in Table 6 between the lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence interval. The marginal effects has been found after regressing by Ordered Probit the variable reflecting the cultural identity on *Ruling*, whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; dummies for respondent's employment situation; dummies for respondent's city population; and comarcas fixed effects. *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. Sample of respondents interviewed in the first seven days of interviews and before 19:00. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level.

6.1.2 Tables

Table 1: Main result: preference for relationship between Spain and Catalonia

VARIABLES	(1) Independence	(2) Independence	(3) Federal state	(4) Autonomous community	(5) Region
Ruling	0.0447***	0.0518**	-0.00833	-0.00548	-0.0380**
	(0.0103)	(0.0200)	(0.0236)	(0.0155)	(0.0109)
Female		-0.00352	-0.107**	0.0909**	0.0192
		(0.0211)	(0.0395)	(0.0255)	(0.0252)
Married		-0.0188	-0.0398	0.0576	0.00100
		(0.0431)	(0.0382)	(0.0419)	(0.0271)
Educ. lower ESO (7th grade)		0.0119	-0.0845	-0.0190	0.0917
		(0.0377)	(0.0664)	(0.0863)	(0.0563)
Educ. ESO (10th grade)		0.0466	-0.0653	-0.0308	0.0494
		(0.0364)	(0.0614)	(0.0482)	(0.0338)
Educ. Bachillerato (12th grade)		0.0226	-0.00849	-0.0281	0.0140
		(0.0402)	(0.0488)	(0.0502)	(0.0216)
Income lower than 1k		0.0750*	-0.161**	0.0973	-0.0113
		(0.0332)	(0.0539)	(0.0962)	(0.0585)
Income 1k-2k		0.0343	-0.0840	0.0979	-0.0482
		(0.0515)	(0.0583)	(0.0682)	(0.0281)
Income 2k-3k		-0.0331	0.0471	0.0174	-0.0314
		(0.0380)	(0.0802)	(0.0836)	(0.0183)
Self-employed		-0.109	0.0278	0.0546	0.0269
		(0.0746)	(0.0498)	(0.105)	(0.0331)
Employed		-0.0337	-0.0566	0.0520	0.0384
		(0.0398)	(0.0513)	(0.0763)	(0.0320)
Speak catalan at home		0.00989	-0.0249	0.000418	0.0146
		(0.0406)	(0.0509)	(0.0612)	(0.0234)
Speak catalan at work		-0.0248	0.108**	-0.0708	-0.0129
		(0.0366)	(0.0334)	(0.0797)	(0.0405)
Speak catalan with friends		0.190**	0.00414	-0.151*	-0.0433
		(0.0587)	(0.0450)	(0.0667)	(0.0362)
Interview in catalan		0.0295	0.150**	-0.142***	-0.0377
		(0.0447)	(0.0449)	(0.0247)	(0.0348)
Born in rest of Spain		0.0218	-0.0637	0.0559	-0.0140
		(0.0367)	(0.0347)	(0.0392)	(0.0297)
Foreign born		-0.203*	0.0479	0.0266	0.129
		(0.0843)	(0.192)	(0.133)	(0.159)
Father born in rest of Spain		-0.0869	-0.0112	0.0584	0.0397*
		(0.0630)	(0.0430)	(0.0387)	(0.0188)
Father foreign born		-0.107	-0.0890	0.151	0.0452
		(0.167)	(0.271)	(0.171)	(0.0962)
Mother born in rest of Spain		-0.152***	0.0142	0.130***	0.00719
		(0.0366)	(0.0547)	(0.0322)	(0.0272)
Mother foreign born		0.0177	0.0252	-0.0180	-0.0249
		(0.0956)	(0.157)	(0.137)	(0.0991)
Age 18-34		0.152	-0.147**	0.0679	-0.0728
		(0.0791)	(0.0454)	(0.0655)	(0.0460)
Age 35-49		0.126	-0.115	0.00453	-0.0150
		(0.0843)	(0.0712)	(0.0595)	(0.0445)
Age 50-64		0.0710	-0.00140	0.00888	-0.0784
		(0.0490)	(0.0752)	(0.0321)	(0.0485)
City pop. lower than 2k		-0.0843	0.106	0.0569	-0.0786
		(0.0742)	(0.139)	(0.185)	(0.0507)
City pop. 2k-10k		-0.114	0.146	0.0433	-0.0752
		(0.0870)	(0.0776)	(0.107)	(0.0459)
City pop. 10k-50k		-0.0947	0.138	0.0372	-0.0806
		(0.0957)	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.0458)
City pop. 50k-150k		-0.0870	0.0541	0.0445	-0.0116
		(0.0797)	(0.125)	(0.112)	(0.0372)
City pop. 150k-1million		-0.0387	-0.00190	0.0970	-0.0564
		(0.0685)	(0.0847)	(0.0672)	(0.0611)
Observations	1,199	960	960	960	960
R-squared	0.002	0.241	0.134	0.232	0.125
Comarca FE	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Average y	0.26	0.26	0.33	0.35	0.06

Independence: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to become an independent state. *Federal state*: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to be be part of Spain as a federal state. *Autonomous community*: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to be part of Spain as an autonomous community (status quo). *Region*: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to be part of Spain as a region (lower autonomy than status quo). *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. *Educ.*: years of education. *City pop.*: city population. *Income*: net monthly income in Euros. *Comarca FE*: comarca fixed effects. *Average y*: mean of dependent variable. Probability weights used. Sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interviews. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Main results: heterogeneities

VARIABLES	(1) Indep.	(2) Indep.	(3) Indep.	(4) Indep.	(5) Indep.	(6) Indep.	(7) Indep.	(8) Indep.	(9) Indep.	(10) Indep.	(11) Indep.
Ruling	0.0608*	0.111**	0.0597	0.0182	0.00102	0.0384*	-0.0953	-0.0276	0.210***	0.201***	0.0489***
	(0.0295)	(0.0403)	(0.0345)	(0.0204)	(0.00762)	(0.0189)	(0.0555)	(0.0393)	(0.0461)	(0.0316)	(0.0101)
Ruling x born in rest of Spain	-0.0336										
	(0.0567)										
Ruling x foreign born	-0.0359										
	(0.0402)										
Ruling x father born in rest of Spain		-0.120**									
		(0.0486)									
Ruling x father foreign born		0.0827									
		(0.110)									
Ruling x mother born in rest of Spain			-0.0133								
			(0.0340)								
Ruling x mother foreign born			-0.0351								
			(0.0352)								
Ruling x speak catalan at home				0.0637							
				(0.0407)							
Ruling x speak catalan with friends					0.126*						
					(0.0523)						
Ruling x female						0.0243					
						(0.0235)					
Ruling x age 3549							0.134				
							(0.0756)				
Ruling x age 50-64							0.198**				
							(0.0700)				
Ruling x age 64 or more							0.212***				
							(0.0411)				
Ruling x married								0.132*			
								(0.0650)			
Ruling x educ. ESO (10th grade)									-0.217***		
									(0.0564)		
Ruling x educ. Bachillerato (12th grade)									-0.163**		
									(0.0579)		
Ruling x educ. university									-0.139**		
									(0.0390)		
Ruling x income 1k-2k										-0.265***	
										(0.0425)	
Ruling x income 2k-3k										-0.0711	
										(0.0511)	
Ruling x income 3k or more										-0.0810	
										(0.0651)	
Ruling x self-employed											0.127
											(0.0863)
Ruling x employed											-0.0125
											(0.0482)
Observations	960	960	960	960	960	960	960	960	960	960	960
R-squared	0.242	0.244	0.241	0.242	0.244	0.241	0.246	0.244	0.244	0.249	0.242
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Omitted	Born Cat	Born Cat	Born Cat	.	.	.	18-34	.	lower ESO	1k or lower	Unempl.
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3: Main results: heterogeneities according to past vote

VARIABLES	(1) Independence	(2) Federal State	(3) Autonomous Community	(4) Region
Ruling	0.0731***	0.0426	-0.0531	-0.0626***
	(0.0196)	(0.0406)	(0.0399)	(0.0167)
Past vote PPC	0.0116	0.200*	-0.0396	-0.172***
	(0.102)	(0.0827)	(0.0953)	(0.0425)
Ruling X Past vote PPC	-0.0921	-0.426**	0.193	0.325***
	(0.189)	(0.149)	(0.126)	(0.0765)
Observations	640	640	640	640
R-squared	0.295	0.202	0.335	0.204
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Average y	0.26	0.33	0.35	0.06
Average y PPC	0.04	0.11	0.60	0.25
M.E. Ruling PPC	-0.019	-0.383	0.140	0.262
s.e.	0.194	0.156	0.100	0.074

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4: Problem results

VARIABLES	(1) Probl: Cat-Esp	(2) Probl: estatut	(3) Probl: financing	(4) Probl: eco-lab	(5) Most: Cat-Esp	(6) Most: estatut	(7) Most: financing	(8) Most: eco-lab
Ruling	0.129***	0.107***	0.0185**	-0.0877***	0.0814***	0.0660***	0.00962	-0.122***
	(0.0198)	(0.0205)	(0.00756)	(0.0187)	(0.0194)	(0.0134)	(0.00586)	(0.0294)
Observations	970	970	970	970	970	970	970	970
R-squared	0.170	0.163	0.107	0.093	0.113	0.127	0.098	0.101
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Average y	0.22	0.16	0.04	0.80	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.64

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Voting results

VARIABLES	(1) Vote: CiU	(2) Vote: ERC	(3) Past vote: CiU	(4) Past vote: ERC	(5) Proximity: CiU	(6) Proximity: ERC
Ruling	0.0475	0.0132	0.0348	0.00799	0.0336	0.0145
	(0.0310)	(0.0193)	(0.0346)	(0.0298)	(0.0954)	(0.0859)
Observations	595	595	672	672	995	991
R-squared	0.210	0.188	0.161	0.174	0.084	0.182
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Average y	0.44	0.10	0.32	0.15	2.90	2.41

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Cultural results

VARIABLES	(1) Feeling Catalan	(2) Feeling Catalan
Ruling	0.0767*	0.101**
	(0.0374)	(0.0436)
Observations	987	987
R-squared	0.420	
Comarca FE	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	O-Probit
Average y	3.50	3.50
M.E. only Esp		-0.012
s.e. only Esp		0.005
M.E. +Esp than Cat		-0.004
s.e. +Esp than Cat		0.002
M.E. as Esp as Cat		-0.012
s.e. as Esp as Cat		0.005
M.E. -Esp than Cat		0.008
s.e. -Esp than Cat		0.003
M.E. only Cat		0.020
s.e. only Cat		0.009

Esp: feel only Spanish, MoreEsp: feel more Spanish and Catalan, AsEspAsCat: feel as Spanish as Catalan, MoreCat: feel more Catalan than Spanish, cat: feel only Catalan.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Trust results

VARIABLES	(1) Trust: Courts	(2) Trust: Gvt Esp	(3) Trust: Parl Esp	(4) Trust: Gvt Cat	(5) Trust: Parl Cat	(6) Trust: Parties	(7) Insatisfaction democracy
Ruling	-0.327**	-0.218	-0.154**	0.0168	-0.00471	-0.248*	0.0658*
	(0.0993)	(0.135)	(0.0472)	(0.0980)	(0.0693)	(0.106)	(0.0329)
Observations	961	991	973	996	971	987	989
R-squared	0.088	0.096	0.090	0.080	0.084	0.067	0.091
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Average y	3.96	3.60	4.05	4.62	4.90	3.57	0.60

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Mechanisms and mediation: institutions and culture

VARIABLES	(1) Trust: Courts	(2) Trust: Parl Esp	(3) Trust: Parties	(4) Insatisf. demo.	(5) Feeling Cat.	(6) Feeling Cat.	(7) Feeling Cat.	(8) Feeling Cat.
Ruling	-0.287*	-0.131*	-0.228*	0.0737*	0.0455	0.0989**	0.0797**	0.0797*
	(0.119)	(0.0614)	(0.109)	(0.0322)	(0.0387)	(0.0358)	(0.0317)	(0.0362)
Feeling Catalan	0.0814	-0.103	0.0595	0.00451				
	(0.119)	(0.0902)	(0.132)	(0.0134)				
Trust courts					0.0101			
					(0.0149)			
Trust Spanish parliament						-0.0158		
						(0.0140)		
Trust political parties							0.00910	
							(0.0203)	
Insatisfaction democracy								0.0150
								(0.0442)
Observations	942	953	967	969	942	953	967	969
R-squared	0.093	0.088	0.080	0.087	0.422	0.419	0.421	0.417
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: Voting in 2015 results

VARIABLES	(1) Share Indep.	(2) Turnout	(3) Share Indep.	(4) Share Indep.
Post 2010	0.0472***	0.145***	0.0641***	0.0299***
	(0.00260)	(0.00171)	(0.00343)	(0.00375)
Post 2010 X M.E. Ruling	0.0197	-0.00779	0.0621***	-0.0347
	(0.0163)	(0.0106)	(0.0209)	(0.0244)
Observations	3,784	3,784	1,900	1,884
R-squared	0.887	0.825	0.765	0.904
City FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sample	All	All	ERC-99 P50+	ERC-99 P50-
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Standard errors clustered at election year level in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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APPENDIX

A Robustness and potential threats to identification

As discussed in Section 3, even though concerns about sampling are limited due to a random order of interviews, non-random non-responses could affect our estimates. Thus, in Sub Section A.1 we address these issues, beyond the standard practice of restricting the sample (as in Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2019).

Other issues that may threaten our identification strategy are non-compliance, confounding and anticipating events. We discuss these issues in detail below. Finally, Appendix A.7 tackles the possible problems associated with the econometric misspecification.

A.1 Balancing on observables

The structure of the fieldwork can create potential imbalances between the group of controls and treated. Table A.1 shows the summary statistics of the observed characteristics of the people interviewed (column 1), the summary statistics of the people in our sample (column 2), and the average preference for independence for the people with specific characteristics (column 3). Column (4) report a balancing test to show the difference in observed characteristics for our treated and control groups. People interviewed before and after the ruling of the Constitutional Court differs on several observable characteristics. Therefore, we include all these observable characteristics as controls in all our specifications. For our identification assumption we require that once controlling for all these variables, that are the one observed by both us and by the interviewers, it is as-if random whether a person was interviewed before or after the Ruling of the Constitutional Court.

[INSERT TABLE A.1]

If controls and treated are different according to some characteristics that can potentially explain the preference for independence, then our estimates are biased. That is, we require that the treatment status is orthogonal to the potential outcomes, conditional on observables. From Table A.1 column (3) there is no clear pattern that the categories of people over-represented in the interviews after the ruling of the Constitutional Court are more pro or against independence. We provide evidence in favor of the identification assumption in Figure A.1. We have predicted the preference for independence using observable characteristics for the people interviewed before and after the ruling. We find no statistically significant difference in the predicted preference for independence between the treatment and control groups. That is, we accrue the change in the preference for independence that we have find in Section 4 to the ruling of the Constitutional Court and not to difference in sampling characteristics between treatment and control group.

[INSERT FIGURE A.1]

In Section A.5 we conduct a falsification exercise assigning fake treatments to the first day of interviews in other waves of the same survey. We show that there is no systematic sampling of respondents that favor more independence during the first day of interviews.

A.2 Sample

One important concern with the use of survey data regards the way in which interviews were organized. In particular, different categories of people could potentially be interviewed after 19:00, which often corresponds to the end of the work day. Moreover, according to Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2019 the last days of the survey can be devoted to interview the people necessary to obtain the necessary quotas of groups with the highest non-response. In order to mitigate this concern we restrict our sample to people interviewed in the first seven days, omitting observations from the 3 days of

interviews, and before 19:00. Table A.1 column (2) shows the summary statistics of our restricted sample.

Table A.2 reports balancing tests of the observations interviewed in different days or at different time of the day. Column (2) shows the difference in observable characteristics of the control group with respect to the last 227 observations.[1] According to Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2019 on the first days the people that tend to be interviewed are older, less educated, not working, and more interested in topics. We also find that more educated people and unemployed are interviewed more in the last days. Column (3) shows difference in characteristics between people interviewed before and after 19:00. Male, more educated and self-employed seems to be interviewed more after 19:00

[INSERT TABLE A.2]

We provide robustness of our estimated results to the use of the different sample according to the day of interview or the time of the day at which they have interview in Figures 3 and A.2. Our main result is robust using different sample.

[INTRO FIGURE 3]

[INTRO FIGURE A.2]

A.3 Non-response

A possible problem for the causal interpretation of our results would arise if as a result of being exposed to ruling of the Constitutional Court some people might become more likely to respond more or less to particular survey questions. Figure A.3 reports non-response rates to questions (either not respond to a question or reply "I do not know") for people interviewed before and after the ruling took place. With the exception to the question about the level of trust in tribunals all the other questions report similar non-response rates in the treatment and control groups.

[INTRO FIGURE A.3]

To solve the non-responses in the question about trust on tribunals Table A.3 performs a robustness check using the entrophy balancing method developed by Hainmueller (2012). We assigns weight to each data unit such that the control group data is reweighted to match the covariate first moment of non-responses in the treatment group.[2] Column (1) reports the baseline result. Column (2) shows that applying entrophy balancing we obtain balanced treatment and control groups in non-response rates. Column (3) shows that our baseline result on trust in tribunals is robust to the entrophy balancing method.

[INTRO TABLE A.3]

A.4 Non-compliance

The estimated effect is downward biased in presence of non-compliance, that might happen if people in the treatment are unaware of the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The ruling of the Constitutional Court received an extensive news coverage and it was front news of newspapers and TV news. Figure A.4 report Google trends for the search of the word "Estatut". Google searches suffered two peaks in 2005 and 2006 in correspondence with the approval of the Statute by the Catalan Parliament and its referendum approval, respectively. Searches increased significantly again after the ruling. Moreover, we have shown in Section 4.1 the ruling caused a significant increase in the number of respondents that consider the Statute of Autonomy the most important problem in Catalonia.

[1] Not the same number of observations is interviewed every day. Since 227 observations are in the control group we compare them with the last 227 observations in the survey

[2] We also use comarca fixed effects, so the weights vary according to comarca.

[INTRO FIGURE A.4]

A.5 Anticipation and confounding events

Foreseeable events can produce potential biases if respondents that change their behaviour due to anticipation effects self-select into the treatment or control group. We argue that the exact day of the ruling of the Constitutional Court was unforeseeable. Partido Popular appealed against the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 2006 and only 4 years later the Constitutional Court published a final ruling. The first meeting of the Constitutional Court for the final ruling was celebrated on June 28. Despite respondents might have anticipated that in the coming weeks after the Constitutional Court first met a ruling would have been published, the exact day was unknown. As *La Vanguardia*, one of the main Catalan newspapers, reported in their front page on June 28 "the Constitutional Court meets today with the objetive of ruling during the week". Therefore, the fact that a ruling arrived at the end of June 28 was largely unpredicted. Google searches about the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, Figure A.4 in Section A.4, skyrocketed exactly after the ruling took place, confirming the absence of anticipation effects.

We cannot discard completely the presence of collateral events triggered by the Ruling of the Constitutional Court that can affect our treatment group. For example, after the final ruling political parties engaged in an active political propaganda. If political declarations or XXX were crucial in determining the estimated effect of the ruling we should expect that respondents would favor more the parties that engaged against the ruling. However, in Section 4.1 we show that respondents do not change their intention to vote or their political proximity towards more Catalan parties after the Ruling. Moreover, Figure A.2 in Section A.2 provide additional evidence against the importance of political declarations. In fact, political declarations increased in the days after the ruling of the Constitutional Court. To be important we should therefore expect the effect to increase when we use more days of interviews in our sample. However, the effect is strongest when we use interviews done close to the day of the ruling, the more days we add the weaker the effect becomes. A demonstration against the ruling was convoked on July 10th, which is after the period of interviews ended, and therefore cannot affect our estimates.[3] An active political propaganda was also present in the years between the appeal and the final ruling political parties. Since these previous propaganda affected both the treatment and control groups, this channel would not undermine the interpretation of the causes of the estimated effect, but would stress the importance of the political channel. Similarly, we rule out this potential mechanism as it is not reflected in changes in voting or sympathy toward parties.

The sudden increase in the preference for Catalan independence coincides with other important economic and political events: the financial and banking crisis that begin 2008, several corruption scandals in Spain, and the change of parties in government from PSOE to a more centralist party, such as PP. However, no important event happened during these days. Therefore, we can interpret our estimates as the effect of the ruling of the Constitutional Court, keeping fixed economic, political or social events.

The only important event that happened exactly at the time of the interview is the 2010 World Cup, which was won eventually won by Spain. The Spanish national team did not play on June 28.[4] The final of the World Cup took place on July 11th, that is after the interviews were conducted. Three matches of Spain happened during the

[3] The last day of interviews was July 8th

[4] On June 28, 2010, two following matches of Round of 16 took place: Netherlands-Slovakia 2-1, and Brazil-Chile 3-0

survey work: round of 16 (June 29th), quarter-finals (July 3rd), and semi-finals (July 7th). In our baseline estimate we only use the first seven days of interviews, therefore the semi-finals match is not included. Table A.4 Column (1) restimates our baseline effect excluding the days after a match played by Spain, and confirms the robustness of our results. Depetris-Chauvin, Durante and Campante (2018) argue that football victories can lead to less identification to ethnic groups in Africa. Columns (2) and (3) estimate the effect of the victories of the Spanish team at the 2010 world cup and do not find any significant effect on preference for independence nor feeling more Catalan.

[INTRO TABLE A.4]

We finally provide evidence that our estimated effect is not capturing any other unobserved confounding factor with a falsification test in which we randomly assign the date of the ruling inside the survey into consideration. Since 227 observations are in the control group, we divide our treated sample in six groups of 227 observations, we randomly assign the treatment to one of those groups, and consider control groups all remaining observations interviewed after the ruling of the Constitutional Court. Table A.5 Columns (1) to (6) find no statistically significant effect of these placebo treatment. We also conduct in Columns (7) and (8) another falsification exercise using the previous and posterior waves of the same survey, in which we assign the treatment on the first day of interviews.[5] We find no statistically significant effect of the first day of interviews in other surveys to preference for independence. This shows that there is nothing special in the first day of interview and that people who are more pro-independence are not systematically interviewed more in the first day of the survey. This placebo exercise provide additional evidence that the timing of the assignment to treatment and control group do not depend on the potential outcome of the preference for independence. An final falsification treatment we conduct to rule out any calendar effect is to assign the treatment to the fist Monday on the different waves of interviews of the same survey. Columns (8) and (9) rule out any calendar effect associated with Mondays.

[INTRO TABLE A.5]

A.6 Political influence on the sentence

[INSERT FIGURE A.5]

A.7 Mispecification

The variables we use as dependent variables are either dummies or variables that express a value over categories. In our baseline specifications we esitmate the effect of the ruling of the Constitutional Court using a Linear Probabilistic Model. However, Probit and Ordered Probit are more appropriate estimation method for the case of dummies or categorical variables, respectively. Tables A.7 to A.11 restimate all results present in the paper using Probit and Ordered Probit. Figures A.6 to A.8 report the marginal effects after estimating the Ordered Probit regressions. All the results in the paper are robust to the use of different econometric specifications.

[INSERT TABLE A.7]
[INSERT TABLE A.8]
[INSERT FIGURE A.6]
[INSERT TABLE A.9]
[INSERT FIGURE A.7]

[5] We are exploiting for our estimate the third wave of the the `Baròmetre d'Opinió Política`. The second wave was conducted in April 2010, while the fourth wave in October 2010.

[INSERT TABLE A.10]
[INSERT TABLE A.11]
[INSERT FIGURE A.8]

B Additional results on Polarization

B.1 Heterogeneity change in attitudes according to political voting

In figure A.9 we can see that the increase in support for secession comes precisely from voters of PSC, CIU and ICV, that is, from voters of parties who supported the Estatut in the referendum. Interestingly, voters of the Popular Party increased their support for more centralization (a state where Catalonia was not an autonomous community but a region). A plausible explanation is that they were disappointed with the ruling because the court only declared inconstitutional a small fraction of the articles that the Popular Party challenged. Finally, voters of ERC decrease their support for

[INSERT FIGURE A.9]

C Relative importance mechanisms

Table A.12 summarizes the suggestive correlational evidence that the institutional channel dominates the cultural and economic channels. Columns 1 shows that the ruling has a significant (at the 10% level) negative impact on trust in tribunals even if we control both for Catalan feeling and declaring that fiscal federalism is the problem. Columns 2 shows that the ruling has no significant effect on the likelihood of declaring that fiscal federalism[6] is the main problem if we also control for trust in tribunals and feeling Catalan. Finally, column 3 shows that the ruling has no significant effect on national identity if we also control for trust in tribunals and declaring that fiscal federalism.

[INSERT TABLE A.12]
[INSERT FIGURE A.10]

D Alternative mechanism: the role of the Catalan television

The primary public television channel (TV3) funded by the Catalan Government has played a controversial role in Catalan politics for its alleged support for the Catalan secessionist movement (Durán, 2018). Consistently with these concerns, it could be argued that the ruling had an effect on the political attitudes of Catalans through the information received by TV3. We can rule out this channel by analysing the interaction between the effect of the ruling and being informed by TV3. The second column of A.13 shows that Catalans who report to be informed by TV3 did not react to the ruling differently than the rest of Catalans[7].

[6] Figure A.10 gives further evidence that we can discard the economic channel because the ruling occured at a moment where fiscal federalism had little saliency.

[7] In column 1 of the same table we also find that, after the ruling, Catalans report to be more informed by TV3, in particular, the ruling increased by 5.80 percentage points the number of respondents who declare that they were informed through TV3 albeit the coefficient is only signficant at the 10% level. Without data of actual audience we can't disentangle whether this increase was due to an actual change in consumption or it was only a change in reporting. An actual increase in consumption could be plausible because TV3 informs more than other TV channels about Catalan politics and the ruling increased the interest of Catalans on Catalan politics (see table 5) but an increase in reporting could also be motivated by the change in national identity that we found in table 4.

[INSERT TABLE A.13]

E Geographical heterogeneity of the effect

F Persistence of political attitudes

In order to understand whether these citizens exhibit a different voting pattern years after the ruling, we want to see whether the change of preferences that the ruling caused is persistent. In particular we are interested at seeing if these citizens are also more likely to express more support to secession and less trust in tribunals in subsequent waves of the survey. To do so, we use the heterogeneous effects of the ruling by estimating Model 1 using the third wave of 2010 (when the ruling happened), to predict the marginal effect that the ruling had on a respondent of a subsequent wave of the survey.

$$Y_i = \alpha_4 + \beta_4 Ruling_i + \gamma_4 X_i + \lambda_4 Ruling_i \times X_i + GEO_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

We predict marginal effects (ME_i) of the Ruling for each category of respondents by estimating $\widehat{ME_i} = \widehat{\beta_4} + \widehat{\lambda_4} \times X_i$.

In order to discuss how support for independence and institutional trust evolved during the years after the Ruling, we explore how these preferences differs between people with higher level of individual marginal effects due to the Ruling (ME_i). In particular we estimate Model 2 where we look at the different evolution through waves ($Wave$) after the Ruling ($Post2010$) for categories of people that were affected differently by the ruling. We then estimate how preferences evolved through waves estimating the marginal effect of ($Wave$) evaluated the mean, 10th percentile and 90th percentile of the variable ME_i.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_5 + \tau\widehat{ME_i} + \delta_t Post2010_t \times Wave_t + \chi\widehat{ME_i} \times Post2010_t \times Wave_t + e_{it}, \quad (2)$$

As we can see in Figure A.11a, preference for independence increased after the Ruling took place and reach its peak in October 2012, immediately after the first big demonstration that took place on the National Day of Catalonia (11th September). Preferences for independence increased in a statistically significant way when the Ruling took place with respect to the period before 2010. Moreover, preferences for independence maintain statistically equal one year after the Ruling.[8] This shows that the effect of the Ruling might not be uniquely driven by its saliency component.

We estimate the individual marginal effect of the Ruling based on observable characteristics using Model 1, and Figure A.11a also reports the evolution of the preference for independence for people at 10th and 90th percentile of the marginal effect. Citizens more likely to have increased their support for secession because of the ruling, are also more likely to express higher support for secession two years after the ruling than citizens who were less.[9] Two years after the Ruling we find a statistically significant difference in the evolution of the preference for independence for people at the 10th and 90th percentile of the individual marginal effect of the Ruling. However, the Ruling cannot explain by itself the overall increase in support for secession that occurred during that period of time. In

[8] We do not reject the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficients showing the changes in preferences for independence in June 2010 and June 2011.

[9] We restrict our persistence analysis only to two years after because in 2013 the survey methodology changed.

particular, citizens who did react very little to the ruling also increased their support for secession during that period.

Analogously, Figure A.11b, shows that citizens more likely to have decreased their trust in tribunals because of the ruling, are also more likely to express lower trust in tribunals two years after the ruling[10]. Moreover, on average the change in trust in tribunals maintain constant between the period 2010 and 2012.

[INSERT FIGURE A.11]

[10]We do not have observations in the period between the Ruling and October 2012 because the CEO did not include that question in the survey.

G Additional Tables

Table A.1: Summary statistics and difference between pre-post Constitutional Court ruling of independent variables

Variable	Mean	Mean sample	Mean indep.	Pre-post
Interview in catalan	0.71	0.69	0.33	-0.06**
Speak catalan at home	0.48	0.47	0.40	-0.05**
Speak catalan at work	0.27	0.25	0.33	-0.01
Speak catalan with friends	0.41	0.40	0.44	0.00
Born in Catalonia	0.75	0.72	0.32	-0.02
Born in rest of Spain	0.22	0.26	0.10	0.02
Foreign born	0.03	0.02	0.13	0.00
Father born in Catalonia	0.47	0.44	0.40	-0.05***
Father born in rest of Spain	0.51	0.54	0.15	0.05***
Father foreign born	0.02	0.02	0.12	-0.01
Mother born in Catalonia	0.46	0.45	0.42	-0.02
Mother born in rest of Spain	0.51	0.53	0.13	0.02
Mother foreign born	0.03	0.02	0.11	0.00
Female	0.52	0.57	0.25	-0.04
Married	0.60	0.62	0.24	-0.05*
Educ. lower ESO	0.09	0.09	0.23	-0.02
Educ. ESO	0.29	0.34	0.26	-0.06*
Educ. bachillerato	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.06**
Educ. university	0.31	0.28	0.24	0.01
Income lower 1k	0.14	0.15	0.33	0.01
Income 1k-2k	0.37	0.39	0.27	-0.05***
Income 2k-3k	0.28	0.27	0.19	0.08***
Income 3k or more	0.21	0.19	0.27	-0.04
Self-employed	0.09	0.08	0.26	0.01
Employed	0.41	0.38	0.25	-0.03
Unemployed	0.50	0.54	0.27	0.02
Age 18-34	0.26	0.18	0.31	0.01
Age 35-49	0.28	0.30	0.25	0.07**
Age 50-64	0.23	0.28	0.23	-0.13***
Age 64 or more	0.23	0.24	0.27	0.05
City pop. 0-2000	0.05	0.05	0.40	0.00
City pop. 2001-10000	0.14	0.14	0.32	0.01
City pop. 10001-50000	0.26	0.26	0.28	-0.01
City pop. 50001-150000	0.20	0.22	0.27	0.04**
City pop. 1500001-1000000	0.12	0.12	0.20	-0.07***
City pop. 1000000 or more	0.22	0.21	0.19	0.04**

Mean: mean of the reported variable. *Mean sample*: mean of the reported variable in the sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interview. *Mean indep.*: proportion of people favouring Catalonia to become an independent state from Spain with the reported characteristic in the sample considered. *Pre-post*: difference in reported variable for respondents in the sample considered interviewed before and after the ruling of the Constitutional Court, obtained regressing the reported variable on the variable *Ruling* and comarcas fixed effects on the sample considered. *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. Average preference for secessionism: 0.26. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.2: Balancing tests for people interviewed in different days or different time of the day

Variable	**Pre-post (first-last obs.)**	**Before-after 19**
Interview in catalan	0.08**	0.07*
Speak catalan at home	0.13*	0.01
Speak catalan at work	0.02	0.14*
Speak catalan with friends	0.06*	0.00
Born in Catalonia	0.12**	0.10**
Born in rest of Spain	-0.11**	-0.11**
Foreign born	-0.00	0.01
Father born in Catalonia	0.04	0.03
Father born in rest of Spain	-0.05	-0.04
Father foreign born	0.01*	0.00
Mother born in Catalonia	0.03	0.06
Mother born in rest of Spain	-0.04	-0.08
Mother foreign born	0.00	0.03
Female	-0.03**	-0.26***
Married	-0.11**	-0.08
Educ. lower ESO	-0.07**	0.00
Educ. ESO	-0.14***	-0.17***
Educ. bachillerato	0.11**	0.03
Educ. university	0.11*	0.14**
Income lower 1k	-0.05	-0.06*
Income 1k-2k	-0.06	0.03
Income 2k-3k	0.10	-0.01
Income 3k or more	0.01	0.03
Self-employed	-0.01	0.09**
Employed	-0.02	0.13
Unemployed	0.03**	-0.21**
Age 18-34	0.37**	0.16*
Age 35-49	-0.09*	0.06
Age 50-64	-0.25**	-0.14*
Age 64 or more	-0.04	-0.08
City pop. 0-2000	0.12*	-0.02***
City pop. 2001-10000	-0.05	0.00
City pop. 10001-50000	-0.08**	0.03
City pop. 50001-150000	-0.04	-0.01
City pop. 1500001-1000000	0.04	-0.04*
City pop. 1000000 or more	0.02**	0.03**

Pre-post (first-last obs.): difference in reported variable for the first 227 and the last 227 respondents in the sample considered, obtained regressing the reported variable on the variable *Ruling* and comarcas fixed effects using only the first 227 and the last 227 respondents in the sample considered. *Before-after 19*: difference in reported variable for the respondents interviewed before and after 19:00, obtained regressing the reported variable on a dummy taking value 1 if the interview took place after 19:00 and comarcas fixed effects. *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.3: Trust in tribunals: robustness accounting for non-responses

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	Trust: tribunals	No answers on trust: tribunals	Trust: tribunals
Ruling	-0.327**	-9.78e-06	-0.150*
	(0.0993)	(0.00401)	(0.0662)
Observations	961	2,000	1,513
R-squared	0.088	0.000	0.083
Comarca FE	YES	NO	NO
Controls	YES	NO	NO
Weights	YES	E.B.	E.B.
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS

Ruling: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. *Trust: tribunals*: question on level of trust in tribunals (from 0 to 10). *No answer on trust: tribunals*: dummy whether the respondent did not answer or answer "I do not know" to question on trust in tribunals. *Comarca FE*: comarca fixed effects. *Controls*: dummy reflecting whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; dummies for respondent's employment situation; dummies for respondent's city population. *Weights YES*: probability weights used. *Weights E.B.*: entrophy balancing weights used such that the control group data inside a comarca is reweighted to match the non-responses first moment in the treatment group. Sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interviews. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.4: Preference for independence: robustness for 2010 football World Cup

VARIABLES	(1) Indep.	(2) Indep.	(3) Feeling Catalan
Ruling	0.0294*		
	(0.0121)		
Spain match World Cup		0.0240	-0.0610
		(0.0171)	(0.0565)
Observations	786	960	987
R-squared	0.228	0.240	0.420
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES
Sample	No World Cup	All	All
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS

Indep.: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to become an independent state. *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. *Spain match World Cup*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed on June 30th (day after round of 16 Spain-Portugal 1-0) or July 3rd (day after quarter-finals Paraguay-Spain 0-1), and 0 otherwise. *Comarca FE*: comarca fixed effects. *Controls*: dummy reflecting whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; dummies for respondent's employment situation; dummies for respondent's city population. For the waves 2 and 4 dummies for respondent's city population not present. *Sample: no World Cup*: Sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interviews but not during the day after a match played by Spain at the World Cup (June 30th and July 3rd). *Sample: All*: Sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interviews. Probability weights used. Sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interviews. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.5: Preference for independence: placebo distribution of the treatment

VARIABLES	(1) Indep.	(2) Indep.	(3) Indep.	(4) Indep.	(5) Indep.	(6) Indep.	(7) Indep.	(8) Indep.	(9) Indep.
Placebo: 2nd 227 obs wave3-2010	0.00681								
	(0.0338)								
Placebo: 3rd 227 obs wave3-2010		0.0461							
		(0.0356)							
Placebo: 4th 227 obs wave3-2010			0.000537						
			(0.0219)						
Placebo: 5th 227 obs wave3-2010				-0.0362					
				(0.0197)					
Placebo: 6th 227 obs wave3-2010					-0.0154				
					(0.0248)				
Placebo: 7th 227 obs wave3-2010						-0.00757			
						(0.0157)			
Placebo: 1st day wave2-2010							-0.0379		
							(0.0272)		
Placebo: 1st day (and Monday) wave4-2010								-0.0256	
								(0.0140)	
Placebo: 1st Monday wave2-2010									0.00823
									(0.0298)
Observations	999	999	999	999	999	999	419	461	419
R-squared	0.248	0.249	0.248	0.249	0.248	0.248	0.182	0.242	0.182
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sample	Wave 3	Wave 3	Wave 3	Wave 3	Wave 3	Wave 3	Wave 2	Wave 4	Wave 2
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS

Indep.: dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to become an independent state. *Placebo nth 227 obs wave3-2010*: divide sample in equal bins of 227 observations and assign observations in nth bin to treatment and others to control group. *Placebo 1st day waveX-2010*: assign observations in wave X interviewed during the first day of interviews to treatment and other to control group. *Placebo 1st Monday waveX-2010*: assign observations in wave X interviewed during the first Monday of interviews to treatment and other to control group. *Comarca FE*: comarca fixed effects. *Controls*: dummy reflecting whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; dummies for respondent's employment situation; dummies for respondent's city population. For the waves 2 and 4 dummies for respondent's city population not present. *Sample: wave 3*: observations from wave 3 of 2010 except people interviewed in the first day. *Sample: wave 2*: observations from wave 2 of 2010. *Sample: wave 4*: observations from wave 4 of 2010. Probability weights used. Sample of people interviewed before 19:00. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.6: Summary statistics dependent variables

Variable	Mean	Mean sample
Preference for independence	0.26	0.26
Preference for federal state	0.33	0.30
Preference for autonomous communities	0.35	0.37
Preference for regions	0.06	0.07
Trust in tribunals (0-10)	3.96	3.89
Trust in Spa. Gvt. (0-10)	3.60	3.66
Trust in Spa. parliament (0-10)	4.05	4.04
Trust in Cat. Gvt. (0-10)	4.62	4.70
Trust in Cat. parliament (0-10)	4.90	4.91
Trust in parties (0-10)	3.57	3.57
Few or no satisfaction with democracy	0.60	0.61
Intend to vote for ERC Cat. elections	0.10	0.10
Intend to vote for CiU Cat. elections	0.44	0.43
Voted for ERC Cat. elections	0.15	0.13
Voted for CiU Cat. elections	0.32	0.32
Proximity to ERC	2.41	2.40
Proximity to CiU	2.90	2.88
Feeling Catalan (1-5)	3.50	3.46
Feel only Esp.	0.07	0.08
Feel more Esp. than Cat.	0.05	0.05
Feel as Esp. as Cat.	0.40	0.41
Feel less Esp. than Cat.	0.29	0.27
Feel only Cat.	0.20	0.19
Think Cat-Esp relationship is a problem	0.22	0.22
Think Estatut is a problem	0.16	0.16
Think financing system is a problem	0.04	0.03
Think economic situations, working conditions or low wages are a problem	0.80	0.81
Think Cat-Esp relationship is most important problem	0.08	0.09
Think Estatut is most important problem	0.06	0.07
Think financing system is most important problem	0.01	0.01
Think economic situations, working conditions or low wages are most important problem	0.64	0.64

All variables are dummy variables that take value 1 when its name is true, unless the indexes, for which the minimum and maximum are stated in parenthesis. *Mean*: mean of the reported variable. *Mean sample*: mean of the reported variable in the sample of people interviewed before 19 and in the first seven days of interview.

Table A.7: Preference for independence: robustness using Probit regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Indep.	Federal state	Comunidad autonoma	Region
Estatut	0.185**	-0.00703	-0.0205	-0.243*
	(0.0790)	(0.0850)	(0.0322)	(0.138)
Observations	946	956	947	806
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weights	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hours	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19
Days	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7
Cluster s.e.	day	day	day	day
Estimation	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit
M.E. coeff.	0.05	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03
M.E. s.e.	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02

Comment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.8: Trust in institutions: robustness using Ordered Probit regressions

VARIABLES	(1) Trust: tribunals	(2) Trust: Gvt Esp	(3) Trust: Parl Esp	(4) Trust: Gov Cat	(5) Trust: Parl Cat.	(6) Trust: Parties	(7) Insatisfaction democracy
Estatut	-0.151***	-0.0950	-0.0894***	-0.00370	-0.0173	-0.132***	0.182**
	(0.0425)	(0.0614)	(0.0279)	(0.0470)	(0.0336)	(0.0471)	(0.0928)
Observations	961	991	973	996	971	987	964
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weights	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hours	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19
Days	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7
Interest no web	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Cluster s.e.	day	day	day	day	day	day	day
Estimation	O-Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit	Probit
M.E. coeff.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.06
M.E. s.e.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.03

Comment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.9: Voting: robustness using Probit regressions

VARIABLES	(1) Vote: CiU	(2) Vote: ERC	(3) Past vote: CiU	(4) Past vote: ERC	(5) Proximity: CiU	(6) Proximity: ERC
Estatut	0.131	0.0902	0.114	0.139	0.0678	-0.0118
	(0.105)	(0.191)	(0.102)	(0.173)	(0.0849)	(0.0846)
Observations	574	529	656	651	995	991
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Province FE	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weights	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hours	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19
Days	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7
Interest no web	All	All	All	All	All	All
Cluster s.e.	day	day	day	day	day	day
Estimation	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit
M.E. coeff.	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.02	.	.
M.E. s.e.	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	.	.

Comment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.10: Problems of Catalonia: robustness using Probit regressions

VARIABLES	(1) Probl: Cat-Esp	(2) Probl: Estatut	(3) Probl: Financing	(4) Probl: eco-lab
Estatut	0.626***	0.620***	0.498***	-0.408***
	(0.0773)	(0.0915)	(0.168)	(0.111)
Observations	967	967	696	951
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weights	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hours	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19
Days	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7
Cluster s.e.	day	day	day	day
Estimation	Probit	Probit	Probit	Probit
M.E. coeff.	0.15	0.13	0.03	-0.10
M.E. s.e.	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03

Comment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11: Mechanisms and Mediation: robustness using Ordered Probit regressions

VARIABLES	(1) Trust: tribunals	(2) Trust: Parl Esp	(3) Trust: Parties	(4) Insatisf. demo.	(5) Catalan Feel	(6) Catalan Feel	(7) Catalan Feel	(8) Catalan Feel
Estatut	-0.139***	-0.0849**	-0.126**	0.203**	0.0582	0.131***	0.0993**	0.101**
	(0.0486)	(0.0343)	(0.0496)	(0.0895)	(0.0467)	(0.0424)	(0.0388)	(0.0412)
Catalan feeling	0.0304	-0.0620	0.0227	0.00994				
	(0.0522)	(0.0398)	(0.0607)	(0.0349)				
Trust tribunals					0.00508			
					(0.0189)			
Trust Spanish parliament						-0.0317*		
						(0.0184)		
Trust political parties							0.00229	
							(0.0253)	
Insatisfaction democracy								0.0508
								(0.0554)
Observations	942	953	967	945	942	953	967	969
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Weights	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hours	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19	9-19
Days	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7	1-7
Cluster s.e.	day	day	day	day	day	day	day	day
Estimation	O-Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit	Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit	O-Probit
M.E. coeff.	.	.	.	0.07	.	.	.	.
M.E. s.e.	.	.	.	0.03	.	.	.	.

Comment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.12: Mechanism and mediation: institutions, culture and financing

VARIABLES	(1) Trust: tribunals	(2) Probl: financing	(3) Feeling Cat.
Ruling	-0.266*	0.0163	0.0607
	(0.130)	(0.0104)	(0.0418)
Problem financing	-0.181		0.358
	(0.504)		(0.217)
Catalan feeling	0.0821	0.0138	
	(0.117)	(0.00777)	
Trust tribunals		-0.000841	0.00989
		(0.00222)	(0.0141)
Observations	908	908	908
R-squared	0.097	0.105	0.436
Comarca FE	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES
Weights	YES	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS

Comment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.13: Alternative mechanism: the role of TV3

VARIABLES	(1) TV3	(2) Independence
Ruling	0.0580*	0.0767**
	(0.0265)	(0.0234)
Ruling x TV3		-0.0404
		(0.0347)
Watch TV3		0.115***
		(0.0281)
Observations	843	804
R-squared	0.410	0.254
Comarca FE	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES
Estimation	OLS	OLS

Comment *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

H Additional Figures



Figure A.1: Difference in predicted preference for independence before and after the ruling of the Constitutional Court

The predicted preference for independence has been found regressing the dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to become an independent state on whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; dummies for respondent's employment situation; dummies for respondent's city population; and comarcas fixed effects. *Mean predicted independence*: mean of the predicted preference for independence based on controls for people interviewed before and after the ruling of the Constitutional Court. *Lower-Upper 95% CI*: lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence interval. The regression for the prediction has been conducted on the sample of respondents interviewed in the first seven days of interviews and before 19:00. Regressing the predicted preference for independence on the variable *Ruling* provide an estimated constant of 0.2865 (clustered s.e. at day level 1.96e-17) and an estimated effect of *Ruling* of 0.0052 (clustered s.e. at day level 0.0092). *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise.



Figure A.2: Robustness for sample interviewed in different time of the day

For each X hour, coefficient obtained regressing dummy reflecting the respondent's preference for Catalonia to become an independent state on controls and comarcas fixed effects for the people interviewed before the hour X. Controls: dummy reflecting whether Catalan was the language of interview; the respondent spoke only Catalan with family, at work, with friends; the respondent was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's father was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; the respondent's mother was born in the rest of Spain or outside Spain; respondent's sex; the respondent is married; dummies for respondent's education; dummies for respondent's age; dummies for respondent's income; dummies for respondent's employment situation; dummies for respondent's city population. *Lower-Upper Bound CI 90*: lower and upper bounds of 90% confidence interval.



Figure A.3: Item non-responses

Each coefficient is obtained regressing a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent answered "I do not know" or did not answer to the question under analysis and the variable *Ruling* and comarcas fixed effects. *Ruling*: dummy taking 1 for all observations interviewed after June 28th 2010 at 19:00, and 0 otherwise. *Relationship Catalonia-Spain*: question on preference for the institutional relationship between Catalonia and Spain. *Feeling*: question on self-establishment of feeling Spanish or Catalan or mixed of both. *Problems*: question on what are the problems for Catalonia. *Trust*: questions on level of trust in tribunals, Spanish Parliament, Spanish Government, Catalan Parliament, Catalan Government, and political parties. *Trust tribunals*: question on level of trust in tribunals. *Trust others*: questions on level of trust in Spanish Parliament, Spanish Government, Catalan Parliament, Catalan Government, and political parties. *Voting*: questions on which party the respondent vote at the last regional elections, which party the respondent will vote at the next regional election, and on political proximity to parties present in Catalonia. Blue line: lower and upper bounds of 95% confidence interval. Sample of people interviewed before 19:00 and in the first seven days of interview. Standard errors clustered at day of the interview level.



Figure A.4: Google searches for the word "Estatut"

Source: Google Trends. Searches in Catalonia only. Red line: June 2010. Maximum value normalized to 100.

Name	Role	Position	Proposed by	Appointed in	Government at time of appointment	Situation
María Emilia Casas Baamonde	President	Progressist	Senate	1998	Aznar-PP	Active
Guillermo Jiménez Sánchez	Vice-President	Conservative	Senate	1998	Aznar-PP	Active
Ramón Rodríguez Arribas		Conservative	Consejo General del Poder Judicial	2004	Zapatero-PSOE	Active
Jorge Rodríguez-Zapata Pérez		Conservative	Senate	1998	Aznar-PP	Active
Vicente Conde Martín de Hijas		Conservative	Senate	1998	Aznar-PP	Active
Javier Delgado Barrio		Conservative	Congress	2001	Aznar-PP	Active
Pascual Sala Sánchez		Progressist	Consejo General del Poder Judicial	2004	Zapatero-PSOE	Active
Eugeni Gay Montalvo		Progressist	Congress	2001	Aznar-PP	Active
Elisa Pérez Vera		Progressist	Congress	2001	Aznar-PP	Active
Manuel Aragón Reyes		Progressist	Government	2004	Zapatero-PSOE	Active
Roberto García Calvo		Conservative	Congress	2001	Aznar-PP	Death
Pablo Pérez Tremps		Progressist	Government	2004	Zapatero-PSOE	Recusal

Figure A.5: Composition of the Constitutional Court in 2010

Comment



Figure A.6: Trust in institutions: marginal effects after using Ordered Probit regressions

Comment



Figure A.7: Voting: marginal effects after using Ordered Probit regressions

Comment



Figure A.8: Mechanisms and Mediation: marginal effects after using Ordered Probit regressions

Comment



(a) Preference for independence

(b) Preference for federal state



(c) Preference for autonomous community

(d) Preference for region

Figure A.9: Heterogeneity of the effect of Ruling on preference for relationship between Spain and Catalonia according to past vote

COMMENT



Figure A.10: Time series of respondents reporting financing between Spain and Catalonia as problem

Comment



(a) Preference for independence



(b) Trust in tribunals

Figure A.11: Evolution preference for independence and trust tribunals across waves

COMMENT

References

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