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Título : Veto players and policy trade-offs : an intertemporal approach to study the effects of political institutions on policy
Autor : Tommasi, Mariano
Scartascini, Carlos
Stein, Ernesto
Fecha de publicación : mar-2010
Editor: Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía
Relación : Documento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía);101
Resumen : The capacity to sustain policies over time and the capacity to adjust policies in the face of changing circumstances are two desirable properties of policymaking systems. The veto player approach has suggested that polities with more veto players will have the capacity to sustain policies at the expense of the ability to change policy when necessary. This paper disputes that assertion from an intertemporal perspective, drawing from transaction cost economics and repeated game theory and showing that some countries might have both more credibility and more adaptability than others. More generally, the paper argues that when studying the effects of political institutions on policy outcomes, a perspective of intertemporal politics might lead to predictions different from those emanating from more a-temporal approaches.
Descripción : Fil: Tommasi, Mariano. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Scartascini, Carlos. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
Fil: Stein, Ernesto. Universidad de San Andrés. Departamento de Economía; Argentina.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10908/11925
Aparece en las colecciones: Documentos de Trabajo del Departamento de Economía

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