



Universidad de
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Echoes of the Founding Fathers

Autor: María Agustina Oliveri
Legajo: 25049
Mentor: KhatchikDerGhougassian

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To my dad,
who has Hamilton's strength
and Jefferson's idealism
all mixed into one.
Thank you



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
Index

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Introduction | 5 |
| Theoretical Framework | 15 |
| Chapter I: Alexander Hamilton & the Pursuit of Power | 24 |
| Chapter II: Thomas Jefferson & the Pursuit of Happiness | 34 |
| Chapter III: Woodrow Wilson | 44 |
| Chapter IV: Harry Truman | 51 |
| Chapter V: George H.W Bush | 58 |
| Conclusion | 65 |
| Bibliography | 68 |
| Annex | 76 |



Abstract

American Foreign Policy studies have always been dictated by two clear approaches: isolationism and interventionism. Thus, presidents have been characterized according to their beliefs on where their office stood in this said spectrum. The spectrum, however, has an underlying ‘system of beliefs’ which can be traced back to America’s foundation and early years. Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson represent, in a simplistic way, the debates surrounding the divergent and contrasting paths leading to the ideologies now used to define American Foreign Policy. Their political impact was such that their opinions and beliefs are still current today. This thesis attempts to observe and trace possible continuities and ruptures between an Alexander Hamilton and a Woodrow Wilson, a Harry Truman and a Thomas Jefferson, or a James Madison and a George H.W Bush.



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Introduction

*“We honour Thomas Jefferson,
but live in Alexander Hamilton’s country”
- George Will*

American Foreign Policy has been, since its creation during the times of the Union, one of the most controversial aspects of American studies, both within and outside of its own territory. In a pendular manner, the United States have oscillated between complete isolationism and interventionism, visiting all the points in between of said spectrum. This constant movement has not only shaped the way the United States view the world, and how the International Concert views the country, but how the International Community behaves as a whole. This has been such starting with the Confederation in 1776 and the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, followed by the attitude of the different governments towards unrest in Europe, both World Wars and during the Cold War, and finally reaching today’s agenda, with the war against terrorism and drugs. Several international pivotal moments, if not all, have had some sort of intervention or have been affected by US foreign policy. It seems unrealistic or oversimplified, then, to merely describe its foreign policy in ‘isolationist’ or ‘interventionist’ momentums.

Due to the political unrest and the obstreperous end of relations with their former colonizer Great Britain, brought upon by the battle of Yorktown, the United States (or the Confederation of 13 Colonies as they called themselves in 1776) were forced to establish their foreign policy strategy early in their development; British and French pressures arising from political and financial entanglements in 1778, the ‘Moroccan-American Treaty of Friendship’ in 1786 are only some of the events that further pushed the newborn nation into delimiting an early stance on their role in the ever changing international community. The response to these demands would be first addressed by the Articles of the Confederation, which would be later replaced by the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1789, created under George Washington’s presidency (1789 - 1797). This Department would, later on and with Washington’s blessing and complete approval, give the first few tentative steps towards settling a cohesive international relations programme which would serve as guide for the

following centuries in the United States. This department would be headed by two of the most important, if not the two most significant and opposing characters of the time, Founding Fathers Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson (Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State, respectively). These men would change irrevocably the future of the United States both domestically and internationally. Differing not only in their backgrounds and upbringing, the men would clash due to contrasting ideas in almost every political and current issue of their time. But it would be through these debates and quarrels that both men would help shape the ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of America’s early Foreign Policy, setting a precedent for the future ‘isolationist’ and ‘interventionist’ approaches that had yet to appear.

“According to Jefferson, Hamilton was a man whose history, from the moment at which history can stoop to notice him, is a tissue of machinations against the liberty of the country which has not only received him and given him bread, but heaped its honours on his head” (Holloway, 2015, 1).

“According to Hamilton, Jefferson, who had taken such pains to present himself as the quiet modest, retiring philosopher was in reality an intriguing incendiary, an aspiring turbulent competitor and a man who is continually scheming against the public happiness” (Holloway, 2015, 1).

Hamilton, a bastard immigrant from the Caribbean, will use his personal experience to shape both his views and his policies, relating to a more ‘realistic’ approach, based on Machiavellian principles and a distant position in terms of friendship towards the old continent. The founder of the National Bank will not only act as the Secretary of the Treasury, but will control international relations as Washington’s right hand man. Jefferson, coming from a nurtured childhood and his early love for literature and European culture, would find himself more inclined to an idealistic view of foreign affairs, followed by the need to create economic relations between States in order to create a mutual relationship of trust. The French liaison will move on to his brief stint as the Secretary of State, where his ideals will clash notoriously and publicly with his counterpart’s, forcing him to resign and finally run for President in 1801. Thus, realism faced idealism, the beginnings of isolationism contrasting with the commencements of interventionism, intertwining both ideas indefinitely to create the American foreign policy we know today.

As ends of a contrasting continuum, we can state that no President has been completely pro interventionism, or completely pro isolationism. This remark stands especially true with every President after the 19th century, starting with Woodrow Wilson's shifting views and finishing today, with Donald Trump's ambiguous plan for a foreign policy that still does not find a concrete path. Presidents along this time have jumped the line dividing the different approaches constantly, changing sides whenever the situation called for it. Some, of course, will tend to one end of the spectrum or the other, but none will stand at the extremes. President Harry Truman will partake in an active interventionism, with his approach towards World War II inherited from his predecessor Theodore Roosevelt, but will adopt a policy that will tend more to an isolationist point of view by keeping the conflict with the USSR as 'cold' was possible, that is, avoiding direct confrontation for as long as it was politically and military possible. President George H.W Bush will invade Kuwait during the Gulf War, but will attempt to first solve international issues through certain sanctions, as well as through the bureaucracy of the United Nations.

These Presidents will, in some way or another, identify with one of the traditions that form the nation's foreign policy. They might use their ideals as setting stones for their course of action, they might quote their beliefs on speeches and essays, or they might even base their agenda on how history has reacted previously. Presidents can pay tribute to former predecessors by celebrating events, dinners and memorials in their honor, but they can just as well diminish their historical presence by disregarding their good doings and attributing their successes to other members of the government at the time. This thesis intends to study just that: if, and if so how, Presidents base themselves on a previous course of action. How a certain group of Presidents was influenced by, in this case, the Founding Father's beliefs and debates, by their proclamations and bills. How a President might lean more towards a Monroe Doctrine, and why, and how his successor might approach the Federalist Papers with an eager eye, whilst disregarding the 1823 setting stone. Thus, this thesis sets to study how the echoes of the Founding Fathers affected a certain group of Presidents, in this case three predominant 20th century Presidents, its main goal being to identify to what extent the Founding Fathers' era impregnated the United States' Foreign Policy during the 20th century specially. How these building blocks sustained time passage, and adapted to different

contexts in order to alter the beliefs of people two centuries after every last of their representatives was gone.

Furthermore, this thesis intends to research and search for ruptures and continuities between the two epochs, that is to say, elements that may have remained the same or shifted throughout the years. Are these men prioritizing the same agenda? Will they point out the same countries as adversaries or possible allies? Will they continue with the line of previously stated Foreign Policy, or will they break with the mold and introduce revolutionary ideas? The study will also try to find parallelisms in these leaders' point of view and way of thinking. Will they agree on what a balance of power is and its effectiveness? Will they use the words 'international relations' with the same intent? Will they think of war the same way? Finally, enclosing these previous concepts, the thesis will attempt to observe if the privileged issues remain constant during the years: will the Founding Fathers privilege commercial relations as much as their modern counterparts will? Will diplomacy play the same role during the different years? Through an analytical exercise utilizing both international relations theory and history, this thesis will attempt to answer the set of questions found above, in order to shed some sort of clarity to the subject. These possible answers will depend on the context and the analytical measurements used to describe them, thus relying always on their context.

America's Foreign Policy has been narrowed to the two extremes of a continuum, without further explanation than Doctrines created during the 1800's. The 'America for the Americans' Doctrine has led many a President in the United States to a cold and decisive isolationism, but the precepts behind this concept are usually obliterated into the past. Washington's last words in his Farewell Address are often cited to support the 'entangling alliances with none' posture the United States has adopted through different periods of their times, ignoring the real meaning that lies behind these words, a meaning that can only be comprehended once the context is analyzed. 'Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness' is constantly heard throughout luncheons and White House halls, defending the epitome of freedom the United States has become, ignoring the fact that 'Liberty', in the 1800s, was attached to the idea of an Empire, thus distancing the historical meaning to the modern use of

the phrase. Context, Goldthorpe (1968) will agree, is of the utmost importance when trying to observe connections that are historically distanced. If the context is foregone, the real meaning of the uttered words are lost, and we are left with the interpretation of men who can very easily turn the phrases on their heads, and use them to their advantage, sinking the system of beliefs that surround them further down into oblivion.

State of the Art Review \ Literary Review

The Founding Fathers' era has been studied and pulled apart by authors ranging from not only different points of views, but different nationalities, goals and opinions. According to their set of beliefs, authors 'sided' with a Founding Fathers' view of what America meant, and what America's future was supposed to be. Simplistically speaking, these views can be divided into three groups, exemplified by Martin Wight (1994). The British author believes in three historic traditions which stand for different ideals and objectives. These are, of course, ideals placed on the far end of the ideological continuum they are situated in, and can never be allocated 100% to real historical figures. The *international anarchy* tradition corresponds, according to Wight, to "a multiplicity of independent sovereign states acknowledging no political superior, whose relationships are ultimately regulated by warfare" (Wight, 1994, 6), and will find its historical example in Machiavelli, or the realist school due to its highlighting of the importance of the world balance of power and warfare "They are those who emphasize in International Relations the element of anarchy, of power politics and of warfare (...) It is the doctrine that conflict is inherent in relations between states" (Wight, 1994, 16). The *diplomatic and commercial* tradition, based international and institutionalized intercourse between the sovereign states during peacetime, will find roots in the Grotian ideals and within the Rationalist school. These will concentrate and believe in the value of the international intercourse, but will not diverge from the rational view that men are inherently drawn to power. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum we can find the *society of states* tradition, based on no political superior commanding the international orchestra, which will lead to a multiplicity of sovereign states enjoying moral and cultural links, avoiding conflict and war through their set of ideals and political\legal obligations. This final school will find

refuge in Kantian ideals, and identify with the international school of the Revolutionists. These are, according to Wight “those who believe so passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or international society that they define themselves with it, and therefore they both claim to speak in the name of this unity” (Wight, 1994, 18). These divisions will, saving certain differences due to context and the inherent contradictions that come with studying social sciences, help identify the traditions which each political figure feels more drawn to: an Alexander Hamilton might feel more inclined to identify with a Realist point of view, whilst a Thomas Jefferson might fall in the Revolutionist spectrum.

This clear difference between both men has been exemplified and explained by various authors in different ways and approaches, though most if not all agree on the fact that “The differences between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, and the confrontations that accompanied them, did much to shape the early American Republic” (Cunningham Jr, 2000, vii). Koch (1961) will use the men’s aspirations and personal journey in order to mark a clear divide. Thus, Thomas Jefferson will represent ‘the pursuit of happiness’, and ideals such as life and liberty, which with he is still recognized and addressed to nowadays, “Epitomizing the ideal of American democratic government, Jefferson referred to it as an Empire for liberty” (Koch, 1961, 48). Hamilton, on the other hand, will be more coldly described, earning him the ‘pursuit of power’ subtitle. The author will take both men’s driving force in order to explain their course of action: while Jefferson was led by his idealism and the concepts he had incorporated during his stay in pre-revolutionary France, Hamilton’s drive came directly from his struggles as a bastard son of a Scottish businessman in a remote Caribbean Island and his need and want to get out. His rational decisions and his realist point of view will win him a place of honor within realist historians such as Koch, who will enhance Hamilton’s greatness and sharpness in order to explain the view needed for an infant nation such as the United States. Above all, Koch will highlight the realism Hamilton preferred, and draw a link to modern events which seem, according to this argument, to give Hamilton the upper hand,

“In International Relations, the rise, first of Nazi Germany and then of the Soviet Union to domination of the world scene has led many observers to regard Hamilton as the most far sighted and seminal statesman in the American tradition, for the problems created by these aggressive modern totalitarian states have been an invitation to the kind of political realism in American Foreign Policy that Hamilton favored” (Koch, 1961, 51).

Harper (2004) will agree with this rationalist and ‘realistic’ depiction of Hamilton, naming him ‘America’s Machiavelli’ due to his approach to not only foreign policy but to domestic laws. The author will create links and bonds between Machiavelli’s writings on *The Prince* and Hamilton’s ideals, comparing both men on subjects such as war, decision making an persona, as well as attitude towards power and the ‘masses’. Nonetheless, Holloway (2015) will debate this extreme categorization, arguing that although both men contended that necessity could require ‘the breaking of faith’, they differed on the end subject. Whilst Machiavelli suggested a rather lax understanding of what ‘necessity’ meant for the government (declaring that it included whatever advanced the Prince’s power), Hamilton’s understanding suggested not a conscious decision to break this faith, but an inability of the government not to do so. Thus, “Hamilton, then, seems to occupy a position between Machiavelli and Hobbes” (Holloway, 2015, 19).

Authors such as Brookhiser (1999) will also base their studies on the importance of both men’s context, especially during his early years. Brookhiser will draw the different personalities, and explain their conflicts and clashes based on them. While Jefferson was characterized with a calm, tranquil and introspective countenance, Hamilton was described as an impulsive and erratic character, constantly writing and fighting for the ideals he deemed correct, earning him the dislike of most of the political members of the first political American society. The author pays special attention to each man’s place of origin: most Founding Fathers came from rich and well instructed environments and a life of luxury; Hamilton, an immigrant had to prove his way out of the Caribbean and into the most prominent society at the time. “Many of the leaders of the American Revolution were rich powerful men - Washington, Jefferson, Hancock, Madison. None had come from so far back as Hamilton” (Brookhiser, 1999, 3). This divide can be characterized very simply in where

these men preferred to live: whilst Jefferson preferred the calm and ease of his estate in Monticello, Virginia, Hamilton favored the bustle and hustle of a growing New York City.

The Nootka Sound Affair of 1789¹ was, as Cooke calls it, the episode that acted as “a symbolic storm cloud, forecasting the turbulence that would soon characterize their relationship” (Cooke, 1982, 110). Cooke, a realist, describes Hamilton as ‘a portrait in paradox’, identifying deciding moments in Alexander Hamilton’s life, and observing his bonds with the other members of the political elite. Madison, one of Hamilton’s allies during the Confederation government, rapidly turns into his opponent due to differing views regarding public credit. Aaron Burr, one of Hamilton’s closest friends during his stay at King’s College, becomes a rival due to a long standing personal fight for power between the two men. In contradistinction, Jefferson acts as Hamilton’s opposing view even before he set foot in the United States, challenging Hamilton’s radical views from his post as a diplomat for the Confederation in France. “But viewed in retrospect, an eventual clash between such two egocentric, strong-willed, and ambitious men was inevitable. They were divided not only by political philosophy, but also by divergent family backgrounds, social status, personality and manner” (Cooke, 1982, 109). According to Cunningham Jr (2000), no one could, after Hamilton’s death, confront and control Jefferson’s idealistic agenda as well as Hamilton. This author will center on their political views and the difficulties these caused on their relationship. The men agreed on the predominant place America deserved to have within the world order, but they disagreed on how. Both agreed that the United States needed its own bank and economic system, but could not reach a joint proposition. Their attitudes towards military capabilities, war, and taxation differed greatly, but their biggest difference laid on the President’s role. Jefferson believed on a strong Congress, with the ability to declare war, whilst Hamilton believed certain decisions had to remain within the President’s sphere of control.

¹ Diplomatic Clash between Spain and England where the Spanish seized the British vessels whose crews were attempting to establish a fur trading base at Nootka Sound near the Vancouver Islands. Hamilton’s point of view wins over Jefferson’s politic of silence on the issue.

“As the eighteenth century drew to a close, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, more clearly than any other two American statesmen, represented the diverging views and positions of the developing national and political parties coalescing under the banners of Federalist and Republican”
(Cunningham Jr, 2000, 126).

Realist authors, such as the ones referred to above, will be inclined to agree with Hamilton and his approach to a *real politik* and a strict sense of the balance of power. Thomas Jefferson, argues Nau (2013) will introduce a new internationalist way of portraying international relations, based on the ambition that the newborn country could not only alter domestic politics to shift from monarchy to republic, but to also change the war related agenda to one based on peaceable trade and diplomacy. Realists, declares the author, are fast to criticize Jefferson: “they resent his injection of moral purpose into foreign policy because such moralism is bound to fail and contrast his policies unfavorably with those of Alexander Hamilton and George Washington, who identified more easily with military power and the *realpolitik* traditions of Europe” (Nau, 2013, 81). For some Realists such as Hamilton, the fact that Thomas Jefferson did not fight in the Revolutionary War degraded his persona and, in a way, his credibility. For others, Jefferson’s time in France is the catalyzer of a new way of thinking internationally, the creation of the ideas that would shape the Nation; for others, this is a time cowardly spent, fraternizing with the French whilst the real Patriots were fighting the war in the trenches. Jefferson does, however, present a sort of paradox that Alexander Hamilton seems to avoid: Hamilton’s thought process and beliefs are easily identified, his personal views not stretching far from his writing, be them personal or political. Authors such as Cogliano (2014) debate on the different aspects of Jefferson’s personality taking both ends of the spectrum: as a realist (with his idealistic early beliefs being replaced by military action and a dominant presidency years later) and as an idealist (placing special importance on his rejection of traditional balance of power ideas in favor of a new diplomacy). Despite this internal debate, the author sided with Jefferson’s *avantgarde* diplomacy stating that “it might be said that Jefferson’s vision for a capacious American Empire outlived its author. It continues to shape the world we live in today” (Cogliano, 2014, 246). Kaplan agrees by pronouncing that “Jefferson’s idealism, tempered by pragmatic regard for practical realities, played a key role in defining a distinctively American position toward the external world” (Kaplan, 1987, 3). They take the cue from Jefferson’s behavior, as Nau

correctly describes it, “that the first and best government is self-government” (Nau, 2013, 18).

Fulbright (1961), will question not the evidence that the Founding Fathers have affected the United States’ foreign policy, but if this should be a desirable way to command a country with such power as the US. “The question we face is whether our basic institution machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century, is adequate for the formulation and conduct of the foreign policy of a 20th century nation” (Fulbright, 1961, 1). In doing so, the historian loses any divide between the two polarizing views of the time: he merely merges America’s newborn system of beliefs into one. The author does not care for the differences between ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ and the ‘pursuit of power’, the antagonizing factors between the two factions of the emerging power, his intent is to show how it, as a whole, has become obsolete to rule a foreign policy as important as the one from the United States. Fulbright signals out factors as the lack of clear institutionalization within the Secretary of State Office (which the Founding Fathers thought to be slightly obsolete, and which Jefferson headed during George Washington’s term), the lack of authority the President has regarding final and urgent decisions and the load of pre-established concepts and behaviors a new President is burdened with (such as Washington’s Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine). “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present” (Fulbright, 1961,8).

Theoretical Framework

American foreign policy is usually divided in two set and determining views: isolationism and interventionism, terms that, one might argue, were created due to the debates between the Founding Fathers during the start of the American government. An interventionist point of view would be advocated, for example, by actions such as defending the French Revolution, or attacking the Barbary pirates due to the unrest they were creating in Europe. An isolationist stance, on the other hand, would oppose compromising American strength if it was not of utmost necessity, if it did not directly affect America's national interests. Thus, an intrusive and a solitary America have battled for recognition since Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson's time. These men, unknowingly and without coining the terms, created the precedents for what would later become the ends of a continuum that an ever growing international relations theory would use during centuries to describe American foreign behavior. Interventionism is defined, loosely, as "the theory or practice of intervening (...) specifically in political affairs of another country" (<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interventionism> consulted on May 25, 2017). There are several types of interventionism: humanitarian, economical, political, and military, in between others. American interventionism will be mostly political and military, as authors such as Haass (1999) will declare. This interventionism will not focus on its rhetoric or reasons, which will be ever changing, but on how this action affects America's strength and future plans, as well as the rest of the world. It is true, though, that this posture will use a more 'charitable' perception of the world: it will introduce the United States to foreign affairs which their counterpart would avoid. What is important to notice, though, is that American foreign policy is usually never devoid of a reason pertaining its national interest. Isolationism, on the other end of the spectrum, will stand for the opposite concept. Presidents who fall under the isolationist category will not meddle with the world's affairs if possible, and will only chose to jump into action when forced by their context. Isolationism will be a "national policy of avoiding political or economic entanglements with other countries" (<https://www.britannica.com/topic/isolationism-foreign-policy> consulted on May 25, 2017) usually attributed to America's foreign policy in the XIX century, started off by the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and its 'America for the Americans' view of the world. Though

there will never be pure isolationism (the closest to this was the XIX century), there will be instances where Presidents will choose to adopt an isolationist stance regarding issues such as, for example, the French Revolution during the Founding Fathers' time. With the passage of time, the ends of the continuum have mixed, creating combinations such as Conservative Internationalism, a view favored by Nau (2013) which describes a strong diplomatic approach followed by what he calls an 'armed diplomacy', or International Institutionalism, which will be attributed to Woodrow Wilson's view of the world through an institution, in his case the League of Nations. This school of thought, which some call *Wilsonianism*, will be either greatly praised and declared as the new rule for American foreign policy, or it will be criticized and diminished, declaring that it was just a sort of interventionism used during critical times, and which, in the end, did not produce any immediate results.

Goldthorpe (1968), renowned sociologist, declares that the past can only be identified by how it has survived the passage of time physically: written documents, letters, day to day utensils, and other types of materials which might indicate how and why previous societies lead their lives. The author stresses the importance of addressing original sources as an attempt to marry history with modern events, using sociology as the link. Sociology, the author argues, represents an attempt to explain social human behavior with a scientific approach, it represents a new way of looking at the big picture of history and linking different changes and events that might have seemed isolated at the time. Sociology will, in this case, not only investigate the Founding Father's actions, but observe their context and behavior throughout their lives. As a result, it will not only study their actions, but any written document regarding their lives which might help to explain their decision making process: letters, speeches, essays, papers, etc. Stressing the importance of documents, Goldthorpe argues that if historians avoid the study of original documents and base research on secondary sources they will obtain a biased outlook on the issue at hand. Historians, the author argues, must adopt a constant search for new information and new sociological techniques, without foregoing original and primary sources which will, ultimately, guide their actual research.

Following this view, Zartman (2005) highlights the importance of tracing events to its origins introducing his 'past conditional' theory. The Founding Father's time is plagued with

‘past conditional’ hypothesis. “If Hamilton had not done his job so well, the United States might have become a maple republic (Brookhiser, 1999, 4), had Jefferson and his ideals not fought Hamilton’s aristocratic and realistic view of the government, the United States would not have become the epitome of freedom it is today, argues Harry Truman². As intriguing as these premises might sound, we must not fall in contra factual propositions that carry no guarantee of results argues Zartman, as “every action results from a choice of alternatives, so that the course of history is made up of an unending chain of choices. Any decision can be examined in the context of its alternatives, for it was in that context that it was made” (Zartman, 2005, 3). Both authors, then, exemplify the school of thought that enhances history and the study of not only events but these event’s context in order to find a common thread linking the development or demise of societies or other international alliances.

Context study can take many forms, based on different thesis and precepts that can be used to analyze decision making at different points in time. Russell (1996) uses a ‘system of beliefs’ in order to examine Argentinean foreign policy and its leaders during the XX century, Dyson (2006) takes intrinsic elements of Tony Blair’s personality to analyze his decision making and thus Great Britain’s involvement in Iraq, and Van Dijk (1993) will be one of the most renowned predecessors for the ‘discourse analysis’ theory. The author will focus on ideology and how it is translated through the choice of words and phrases (using elements such as social psychology, interactive communication and persuasion strategies). Discourse, Van Dijk determines, will be a complete communicative event within a certain social situation and context, which will focus on the phenomena and hidden meaning beneath the simple lines of a speech or proclamation. This is to say, it will study what is transmitted by said speeches, what is implied beneath the lines, what the holder of power at the time wants to generate and transmit to the public. Power is, according to the Dutch author, a key element in critical discourse analysis, “Power involves control, namely by (members of) one group over (those of) other groups. Such control may pertain to action and cognition” (Van Dijk, 1993, 254). Even though domination is seldom total, the cases shown in this study will, due to their nature, attempt to obtain most if not complete control of their situations. Characters like Hamilton will be able to use their discourse in order to materialize wants and needs

² Address at the Jefferson - Jackson dinner (February 19, 1948).

starting from an early age³. Characters like Wilson will not succeed in their discourse control and lose power; shown for example in his complete failure to create a strong League of Nations with the United States at its head.

Context study may take other forms such as a more focused study on the elements surrounding the events at the time they occur: societies, institutions, the world community, historical references, etc. Steinmo & Thelen (1992) base their studies in what they called ‘historic institutionalism’:

“At its broadest, historical institutionalism represents an attempt to illuminate how political struggles are mediated by institutionalized work with a definition of institutions that includes both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct” (Steinmo&Thelen, 1992, 2).

It is important to highlight institutional change not only because it alters the possible constraints in which actors make strategic choices, but because ultimately it can reshape the very basis of the goals and political ideas that drive political action. Studying a time in which said political ideas are ephemeral and where political goals are changing and fleeting, this hypothesis seems to grasp the underlying basis of why and how political structures evolve and adapt. Had Hamilton not been able to create the first National Bank, America’s financial and debt system might have been completely different. If the United States hadn’t obtained the bomb before the Soviet Union, they wouldn’t have been able to use it as a determining factor during the Potsdam Conference (1945) and then to end the war with Japan in a matter of months.

³ From the early age of 17 Alexander Hamilton used his writing to expand his ideas and advance in society: He got a Scholarship to King’s College in New York due to his writing in his native island Nevis, ascended to General Washington’s through the writing of memos and letters, obtained a spot in the Constitutional Convention because of his controversial and modern ideas for a banking system which he later defended through anonymous writings such as the Pacific Essays and the Federalist Papers, and finally became one of the most prominent decision makers of his time during his terms as Secretary of the Treasury and George Washington’s closer council. These writings would, in the end, get him killed in a fatal duel with Aaron Burr in 1804.

Pierson (2004) takes these authors as a starting point for his book *'Politics in Time'* (2004), where he states that “without a deep understanding of time, you will be lousy political scientists, because time is the dimension in which ideas and institutions and beliefs evolve” (Pierson, 2004, 2). Even though he bases his studies on Steinmo & Thelen’s (1992) historical institutionalism, he diverges in the importance of each aspect: Steinmo & Thelen, argues Pierson, highlight the ‘institutionalist’ factor, whilst he shines light on the ‘historical’ side of the concept. “Attention to a long-term sequence of causes (causal chain) can turn out understanding of social phenomena on their heads” (Pierson, 2004, 2) argues the author; examining and investigation temporal processes will allow us identify, exemplify and explicate fundamental social mechanisms throughout history. So why does history matter according to Pierson? Because in contemporary social science, history and past experiences serve as an ideal source of empirical primary sources, and because of path dependence. “In this conception, path dependence refers to dynamic processes involving a positive feedback, which generate multiple possible outcomes depending on the particular sequence in which events unfold” (Pierson, 2004, 22). These dynamic processes are not limited to institutions, as previously stated by Steinmo & Thelen, but to political actor’s decision making which might shift the rules of the game and thus the distribution of power and even the goals a certain country envisions and stands behind. Thus we must stress “the importance of seeing distinct processes as potentially linked in highly consequential ways, depending in part on the relative timing of their development” (Pierson, 2004, 54).

The key, argues Pierson whilst siding for a moment with his predecessor Thelen, is to pay special attention and specify certain mechanisms that help reinforce certain paths or particular trajectories. The key is to stress the importance of observing distinct processes as potentially linked by a causal and consequential way, so as to construct a certain path that will be delimited, but not guided by, the processes’ timing. Timing, decides the author, will serve merely as one more dimension that helps link these events, not as the deciding factor for their later connection. “Nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of human design” (Pierson, 2004, 122). Democracy, the author argues basing his thoughts on Charles Tilly (1995), is constructed in time by the formation and deformation of democratic premises both domestically and internationally. The

United States, we might argue, was constructed in the same way. “The point is that what is too easily dismissed as context may, in fact, be absolutely crucial to understanding important social processes” (Pierson, 2004, 169).

Methodology

Due to historical nature of the project, this thesis will use a descriptive research design so as to not fall in unwanted causal relations that will not enrich and expand the project, but will narrow its scope and determine correlations which might not have any significance. Descriptive because it will attempt to comb over historical facts from the different important moments, be it the political debates of 1790s or the military successes of the 20th century. Furthermore, this method will be selected due to the lack of concrete data regarding the cynosure of this paper: the possible connection between the ways the Founding Fathers saw and managed international relations and how this might have affected 20th century Presidents. Both periods, by themselves, count with numerous bibliography items, both primary and secondary, but the possible link this thesis is addressing lacks with the previous knowledge so as to create deterministic relations such as causal ones. Thus, this project will merely attempt to draw possible connections and lines, finding tentative continuities and ruptures, so as to try to explain the influence that the Founding Fathers might have had two centuries after their deaths. As a result, this work will use a purely qualitative approach, taking from different research methods in order to reach a cohesive conclusion.

On a first instance, a bibliographical revision will take place in order to obtain important information from the different eras. Following Goldthorpe (1968) and Pierson (2004), the thesis will mostly use primary sources for its main analysis, that is to say contextualized documents from each of the different ‘characters’. Thus, the writings of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, George Washington and even James Monroe will be analyzed. These will procure an insight into the minds of the different men, which will later be used in tandem with their actions and political statements, in order to create a sort of profile depicting their ideals, beliefs and personal thoughts on relevant matters to this study. For their 20th century counterparts, the thesis will analyze every speech,

proclamation or written document available during their terms as official Presidents of the United States. This will include, but will not be limited to: Congressional Addresses, speeches, executive orders, campaigning information, official statements, letters to foreign ministers or Presidents, joint addressed with other countries, and press conferences. These will, once again, be paired with the actual actions of said characters, in order to reach a sort of conclusion with which to describe their terms. Furthermore, the thesis will use a set of secondary sources in the form of previous bibliography and studies regarding the different men and epochs in order to enrich and expand the study, and to create a sort of cushion in which to place the specific analysis.

This analysis will be accompanied by an informal use of discourse analysis, that is to say how and why certain characters chose to employ certain words, phrases or concepts at a certain time and event. This analysis will center on elements delimiting the men's possible discourse towards a topic, for example, how these men will address the 'balance of power' concept: will they use the term naturally, will they avoid mentioning its existence, or will they employ terms that refute the basic ideas standing behind such concept, so as to deny its importance and replace it with a contrasting thought? It will study the weight laid on certain topics and issues, and the way the different leaders addressed countries and alliances. Finally, it will also observe how these men will interact with one another, despite the time difference. Will the 20th century Presidents quote their preferred Founding Father? Will they not address them at all? Will they exemplify both of them equally and quote them on their different areas of expertise and wisdom depending on the issue at hand? These are all questions that, through this analysis, the thesis will attempt to shed light on.

With the creation of these 'profiles' corresponding to each men, the project will attempt to create a sort of line or model that, through a later operationalization, could establish certain possible links between the Founding Fathers and their historic counterparts, thus creating a sort of relationship between some men or the others. "You will find inconsistencies and contradictions, but such is life,. You should arrive at a kind of "essence" of their approaches, certain basic principles and tendencies, and base yourself off there" ⁴.

⁴ Personal conversation with author John Harper (12/28/2016).

This mechanism will also allow to find the possible continuities and ruptures in their way of thinking, the agenda they privilege and how they view certain concepts and ideals central to International Affairs. Due to the deep and comprehensive study needed for said project, this thesis will only attempt to study two epochs in depth, and within those two, a certain number of men and events in particular. The ‘Founding Father’s category will begin in 1774, with Alexander Hamilton commencing his political career in King’s College and Thomas Jefferson abandoning Monticello in lieu of a new life in New York and later on in France. James Madison and other members of the elite group like John Jay will be featured on later years, after the triumph of the Confederation⁵. The end of this temporal universe will be set in 1826, with Thomas Jefferson’s passing. Due to its premature nature, Alexander Hamilton’s death cannot be chosen to delimit this era, as it would leave behind important events such as the 1812 War and the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. This historical cut will, of course, privilege the two men this thesis center on: Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, while signaling out certain members of their political group that will serve as examples of allies or foes during their years of action. On the other hand, the 20th century cuts will be more distinct and clear: due to timing and research reasons, the three most prominent and important moments of the 20th century will be studied. Woodrow Wilson (1913 - 1921) during both his presidencies and his impact on World War I and the attempt to create a League of Nations during the Peace Treaties of 1919 will be the first exponent of this epoch. Harry Truman (1945 - 1953) will follow with his crucial decision making for the end of World War II and the creation of the questioned United Nations, as well as the beginning of a latent Cold War. Finally, this thesis will skip ahead to the end of the 20th century in order to include the ‘end’ of the Cold War and the dismemberment of the Berlin Wall and consequently of the Soviet Union during George H.W Bush’s⁶ presidency (1989 - 1993). His term will also see the Gulf War, with the military invasion in Kuwait and the political and later military disturbances with Panama.

⁵ The term ‘United States’ will also apply to the years before its actual naming, thus including the period of time of the 13 states Confederation, in lieu of simplifying the amount of terms used.

⁶ Hereinafter to be referred to as President Bush or George Bush.

These moments are chosen in order to create a deep and exhaustive research of specific moments in time. It does not attempt to substitute as a historical review of all of the United States' Foreign Policy and its history, it just merely attempts to shed some sort of light on the echoes created by the political debates during the birth of the country. Thus, the thesis will start with a first Chapter based on Alexander Hamilton's life and political thoughts, accompanied by an analysis of his writings, thoughts and usage of certain terms. Chapter II will replicate this method, taking Thomas Jefferson as the center of its study, attempting to decode his agenda and letters in order to obtain a clear profile with which to work with. The following Chapters will then be allocated to the different 20th century Presidents and their analysis so as to determine possible links between these men, organized in chronological order. Thus, Chapter III will correspond to Woodrow Wilson's presidency, Chapter IV to Harry Truman's and finally Chapter V to George H.W Bush's term. These will all be followed by a conclusion which will, hopefully, shed light on how the early political debates affected these contemporary men and shaped their Foreign Policy approaches.

It is important to note that this thesis does not intend to create causal relations of any sort, or to establish determining links between the different Presidents. This thesis aims to clarify certain bonds that these important American figures might have, bonds which explain, up to a certain extent, the reasoning behind their actions, especially regarding foreign policy. This study will aim to research how the debates during America's formative years impacted Presidents whose peak of power occurred two centuries later, it attempts to analyze how the Founding Fathers etched their debates, system of beliefs, and reasoning into the American way of thinking, how they set certain precedents which would be later praised or ignored by other contemporary figures.

Chapter I: Alexander Hamilton & the Pursuit of Power

Alexander Hamilton was born in the island of Nevis in 1757⁷ from what some call an illegitimate union between a Scotsman and an island native. His early life, as many others, was plagued with discomfort and strife: his Father's abandonment, his mother's passing at an early age, and his need to work as a mere child to support himself and his brother are only a couple of circumstances that exemplify Hamilton's developing year. This, according to Brookhiser is the first element that sets him apart from the rest of the Founding Fathers, "many of the leaders of the American Revolution were rich powerful men - Washington, Jefferson, Hancock. None had come from so far back as Hamilton" (Brookhiser, 1999, 3). This, according to other authors such as Koch (1961) and Cooke (1982) is the drive that lies beneath Alexander Hamilton's impressive work. This cold reasoning, adopted at an early age, will eventually lead to his realist approach towards not only foreign relations, but to issues such as public debt, slavery, taxes and the government as a whole. Hamilton will, at a very early age resort to his forte: his writing. It will be his writing, most specifically a letter to his father retelling the chaos that ensued a hurricane, what would call the attention of American scholars who would later place him in a boat bound for New York City and King's College (now Columbus University), but not before Hamilton stated the phrase that would later define his approach to foreign affairs, "I shall Conclude saying I wish there was a War" ("Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to Edward Stevens, 11 November 1769", 2017). His scholar years, though short, were marked by decisive friendships and opinionated debates that made Hamilton a renowned man amongst the elite political group of the time. His friendships with Hercules Mulligan, Marquis de Lafayette, John Laurens and, ultimately Aaron Burr, would be the catalyzers for his public persona, starting with small announcements such as 'Farmer Refuted' in which he criticized George III's policies towards taxation and the colonies, and leading to his encounter with George Washington, who would become Hamilton's 'political godfather' amidst the Revolution. A Revolution which, for Hamilton and his peer's meant not only the liberation of their land, but a new start for their American Dream.

⁷ Or so is believed. Due to a lack of official papers, Hamilton's birth year ranges from 1755 to 1757, depending on the historian approached.

“In Hamilton’s private vision of himself as a Caesar he saw himself directing an energetic government, commanding an army, and working to create a vast American empire, and to bring this dream nearer to fulfillment, in an environment of sentiment for popular sovereignty, he became a practicing Machiavellian” (Koch, 1961, 75)

Koch, who agrees with Harper (2004) in stating that Hamilton indeed had similarities with a Machiavellian point of view, points out events such as the stealing of British cannons, the duel with Charles Lee after he failed to command the army, and Washington’s and Hamilton’s brief falling apart after the leader denied him the chance to fight in order to explain the latent realist point of view within Alexander’s actions. A point of view he wrote about clearly and directly, with no regard whatsoever as to political correctness. “Hamilton’s private life impinged on his public career. His origins shaped his view of the world, by defining what he wanted himself and others to get away from” (Brookhiser, 1999, 6).

Alexander Hamilton’s official political life begins not with his post as Washington’s right hand man during the war, or with his decisive role in the final battle of Yorktown, but with his election for the Constitutional Convention of 1787, where he lay the starts of a new financial system and a new form of government: federalism. This changes, he stated with a 6 hour speech, were the ones needed in order to advance past the post Revolutionary face they were in, “America, if she attains to greatness, must creep to it. Wellbe it so: slow, and sure is no bad maxim. Snails a wise generation” (“Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick, 27 February 1800”, 2017). To Hamilton, the primary incentive that lay behind any American decision, be it economic, political or diplomatic, was the establishment of a strong national state. The world would never take America seriously, he argued, if they did not show a strong state of affairs both domestically and internationally, “How can we hope for success in our European negotiations, if the nations of Europe have no confidence in the wisdom and vigor of the great Continental government? This is the object on which their eyes are fixed: hence it is, America will derive its importance or insignificance in their estimation” (“Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to George Clinton, 13 February 1778”, 2017). Hamilton’s awareness of the balance of power ruling the world was his driving point in all negotiations, America had to construct a government that not only was, but seemed, threatening to the rest of the world. If this were not the case, the American

project would falter, as the newly founded government would crash under the pressure exerted from other nations. His preference for a strong executive government would accompany this theory, stating that liberty is endangered just as much by too little power than by too much power. The President elect, he decided, needed complete international power, so as to be able to make rush decisions, without the need to wait for the bureaucracy to catch up, “In the Doctrine respecting war, there is a senseless abandonment of the just and necessary authority of the Executive Department, in a point material to our national safety” (“Founders Online: The Examination Number IX, [18 January 1802]”, 2017). Hamilton would use this, later on, to his advantage, which would lead to clashes with Thomas Jefferson regarding how and when a nation should declare war/neutrality. These opinions, and his close almost fatherly like relation to George Washington, will lead him to his political peak: his term as the Secretary of the Treasury.

Koch (1961) will state what he calls Hamilton’s fundamental propositions, based on his views regarding power and moral. The first one, the development of private capital and the national gain that resulted thereof, was one of Hamilton’s basic principles. A wealthy country required wealthy citizens, which is why the Founding Father not only founded the First National Bank, but was extremely determined and strict with economic matters. These matters will be the ones that, years, later, would cause the breakdown between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, which will lead to the later alliance between the latter and Thomas Jefferson. Madison had, according to Hamilton and his supporters, committed an “unconscionable betrayal of investors” (Cooke, 1982, 81). Hamilton believed that this first proposition had to be followed by a systematic government program which would enhance the development of private capital, that is to say, loans and tax-cutting programs, so as to help men financially, in order to increase their wealth and ultimately, their spending and investing. “Having risen from island poverty, he never forgot that economies are about the people who work in them” (Brookhiser, 1999, 97). Finally, Hamilton being the ever skilled writer, believed that this scheme needed a political theory as a basis, in order to associate democratic and industrial or capitalistic progress. Foremost, though, he believed in a sense of nationalism and patriotism and the need to view America as a country, and not a collection of states.

“We are laboring hard to establish in this country principles more and more national and free from all foreign ingredients, so that we may be neither ‘Greeks’ not ‘Trojans’ but truly Americans” (“Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King, 16 December 1796”, 2017).

Looze (1969), basing her studies on Koch’s book, will state five Hamiltonian premises which will guide him in his creation for a foreign policy. “American foreign policy should be flexible and facile Hamilton felt, so that its best interests could be served, if it were static it would atrophy. This theme is present in almost every strategy’s of Hamilton’s” (Looze, 1969,26), and it is present, to this date, on America’s foreign policy principles. Contrary to his counterpart’s opinion, Hamilton’s view on peace was not based on the fruitful way it lead to a sisterhood of nations, but on the way it allowed the United States to get their footing in the world, for “With peace, the force of circumstances will enable us to make our way sufficiently fast in Trade. War at this time would give a serious wound to our growth and prosperity. Can we escape it for ten or twelve years more, we may then meet it without much inquietude and may advance and support with energy” (“Founders Online: Remarks on the Treaty of Amity Commerce and Navigation lately ...”, 2017). Conversely, war for Hamilton was not the taboo that it represented for his counterparts: war was, merely, a way to advance with the nation’s needs, “The strict right to resort at once to war, if it should be deemed expedient, cannot be doubted” (“Founders Online: For the Evening Post, [8 February 1803]”, 2017). And, not known for his softness when writing, Hamilton also stated that “As to Foreign Policies, War will be a necessary mean of power and wealth” (“Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to James Ross, 29 December 1800”, 2017). Interest is, according to Looze, the second and most important of Hamilton’s basic premises. The interests of nations were, and still are, the formulators of national and international policies, and they are, usually, inherently selfish and realistic in their nature. Yet, national interest is possibly Hamilton’s biggest driving force, not only for the government, but for himself. The duty of a government and its rulers, said Hamilton, is not to the people, but primarily to the interests of the nation.

“But convinced by a course of observation for more than four years that there exists in this country an unprincipled and daring combination, to obstruct by any means, which shall be necessary and can be commanded, not short even of force, the due and efficient administration of the present government, to make our most important national interests subservient to those of a foreign power” (“Founders Online: Explanation, [11 November 1795]”, 2017)

Neutrality will, as a result, follow these two inherently realistic principles which guided Hamilton’s life and political movements. It will not be, though, a neutrality based on the possibility of a fertile moment that would lead to alliances between nations, but a neutrality supported by strong defensive power. Neutrality was, to Hamilton, not merely a way to avoid conflicts, but a message, a way to depict America’s strength, “The rights of neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being neutral” (“Founders Online: To George Washington from Alexander Hamilton, 8 July 1790”, 2017). The fourth concept introduced will be the concept of Negotiations, which, in Hamilton’s thinking was the preferred course of action in order to avoid material losses. But, it should be noted, it was inconceivable, for Hamilton, to incur in negotiations without any sort of preparation for war, “We ought to be in a respectable military posture, because war may come upon us, whether we choose it or not and because to be in a condition to defend ourselves and annoy any who may attack us will be the best method of securing our peace” (“Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [8 March 1794]”, 2017). Hand in hand with the negotiation premise, Looze will introduce as a fifth and final concept the ‘Obligation of Contract’. For Hamilton, an obligation of contract was related to the ‘gratitude’ a Nation either felt towards another one, or owed another one. America, Hamilton stated, didn’t owe any sort of gratitude to the other nations of the world, it’s gratitude was reserved to its patriotic men. Gratitude, said Hamilton, was based not on reason, but on feelings, and was thus a precarious element in which governments should not depend. Mutual interest and reciprocal advantage should be, according to the realist thinker, the criteria with which nations were carried. “Hamilton’s diplomacy sought to choose the appropriate means for pursuing America’s national interest. These were, we have seen: persuasion, compromise and a threat of force, all of which are the essence of diplomacy in the modern world” (Looze, 1969, 128).

Although Hamilton's views on Foreign Policy are clearly written out either on letters or Examinations, they are exhibited in more than one stance during his years as a Secretary of the Treasury, his 'official' years as part of the government (though he would remain to advise Washington until his departure in 1796). The French Revolution (1789 - 1799) fractured the commanding threesome (Hamilton - Washington - Jefferson) in half: "Washington clearly sided with Hamilton rather than Jefferson in this precedent - setting demonstration of the President's power to conduct foreign affairs" (Cunningham Jr, 2000, 111). But the divide is not merely the question of who declared America neutral when faced when the issue of how to react to the newly formed Revolution, but the controversies that lay behind it.

"In reviewing the disgusting spectacle of the French revolution, it is difficult to avert the eye entirely from those features of it which betray a plan to disorganize the human mind itself, as well as to undermine the venerable pillars that support the edifice of civilized society. The attempt by the rulers of a nation to destroy all religious opinion, and to pervert a whole people to Atheism, is a phenomenon of profligacy reserved to consummate the infamy of the unprincipled reformers of France. The proofs of this terrible design are numerous and convincing" ("Founders Online: The Stand No. III, [7 April 1798]", 2017).

Contrary to Jefferson's idealistic approach to the Revolution, Hamilton merely saw a disregard for the rules he held dear, and most importantly, a threat to America's interests and safety.⁸ America was, for Hamilton, the most important country in the world, one which would, in time, lead both in principle and in strength; but, the ever so pragmatic, the Founding Father knew this required time, and so, he pushed for a neutrality based on the President's role as the head of the State regarding foreign affairs. "Hamilton did not share Jefferson's justification for the violence in France (...) Hamilton never wrote or spoke of the Revolution in France without registering the horror, abhorrence and repulsion it excited in

⁸ To further understand Hamilton's persona, it is interesting to see that he prioritized America's interest on top of his personal ones. Marquis de Lafayette, one of Hamilton's first and oldest friends, beseeches his help, to which Hamilton responds with a long list of what he calls 'apprehensions' followed by his wish that his "personal success and that the cause of liberty are incessant" (Alexander Hamilton to the Marquis de Lafayette - 6 October 1789). This will differ greatly to Jefferson's personal approach towards the French Revolution, to be seen in a later chapter.

him” (Cunningham Jr, 2000, 110). Looze’s (1969) ‘Obligation of Contract’ principle can be utilized to explain the French Revolution question: America had signed a Treaty, in which France could beseech for their help in exchange of guns and ships during the American Revolution. America had signed the Treaty with Louis XVI, who was now dead, hence, was America obliged to follow through with the aforementioned contract? Hamilton viewed the Treaty as null due to the dismemberment of the monarchy it had been signed with. On the other hand, Jefferson believed in the existence of the Treaty due to its commitment to the ‘people of France’ attitude that Hamilton greatly disliked and mocked without printing retractions “I admit that his politics are tinctured with fanaticism, that he is too much in earnest in his democracy (...) That Jefferson has manifested a culpable predilection for France is certainly true” (“Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to James A. Bayard, 16 January 1801”, 2017). This attitude will be later ignored in lieu of Hamilton’s point of view, as was routinary with George Washington’s decision making process. “It is important to remember that General Washington shared Hamilton’s attitudes toward Britain and France” (Lycan, 1970, 72).

The Anglo - French War that started in 1778 was an event even more demonstrative of Hamilton’s views on Foreign Policy, introducing one of Hamilton’s most cherished ‘allies’: John Jay, who he defended via the various Pacificus Essays (after what is, arguably, a failed Treaty for the United States) in which, “As Pacificus, Hamilton was not only the advocate of *realpolitik*, but also the proponent of presidential power” declares Cooke while also adding that “Nevertheless, Hamilton’s view of presidential power has served as a model for strong chief executives, particularly in wartime, from his day to our own (Cooke, 1982, 128). The war presented a chance in which Hamilton could exhibit his preference for Great Britain over France, “At this time of day, a predilection for France is a very bad symptom” (“Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Lloyd Moore, 6 October 1799”, 2017). It also presented a concealed way in which he could slander his contender, labelling him as a ‘Francophile’ once more, and highlighting his idealism as a negative feature. Legally, Hamilton took to blaming the French’s unstable government on the war, so as to salvage Anglo - American trade relations and maintain the international order he deemed preferable, that is to say, one with Great Britain and America at its head. “France, it is certain, was the

first to declare war (...) the war is completely offensive on her part" ("Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 2 May 1793", 2017). Great Britain was, for Hamilton, the model of a good society, the stream of commerce that enhanced America's commercial growth, and the protector against possible issues with French imperialism. "In Hamilton's mind, only Britain could provide both the instruments of economic advancement and territorial expansion" (Kaplan, 1987, 57) It is important to note that it was not, in any way, a decision based on personal preference, but a decision made after cold calculations based on which country could do more harm to the growing interests of the United States, "Tis as great an error for a nation to overrate us as to underrate itself. Tis our error to overrate ourselves and underrate Great Britain; we forget how little we can annoy, and how much we may be annoyed" ("Founders Online: From Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [14 April 1794]", 2017). Chernow (2005) further expands this idea by declaring that Hamilton wished to imitate British practice in order to promote prosperity and self-sufficiency, so as to make the country less reliable on British capital. Hamilton wanted, by utilizing British methods, to defeat British economically; he wanted to win at their own game.

Finally, Hamilton's role as George Washington's right hand man is to be revisited. George Washington, having heard of Hamilton's renowned name (due not only to his writing but to his bold actions during the war), requested the Founding Father's presence at his stationary camp in Washington Heights, upstate Manhattan. The war, declared Washington, was doomed: defecting men, no ammunitions, and a lack of clear plans. He needed Hamilton as back up support, and Hamilton did not throw away his shot: he became, from the start, Washington's ally, creating a sort of Father-Son relationship Hamilton could never really process. "Having been abandoned by one Father, Hamilton allowed himself to feel no deep affection for a substitute, even one as reliable as General Washington. Such a surmise, perhaps, explains the unaccountable as well as any other" (Cooke, 1982, 27). After the war, Hamilton became not only the Secretary of the Treasury, but Washington's first and foremost adviser, domestically and internationally. Thus, we can observe a certain continuity between these two men's ideals in their writing. It must be noted though, that Washington's writings were rarely as determinant and abrupt as Hamilton's passion infused paragraphs. But the lasting element is not Hamilton's influence on every one of Washington's international

choices, which would disparage one of America's best and most renowned Presidents. Hamilton's influence can be seen and studied in one of the United States' most influential papers ever written: Washington's 1796 Farewell Address, in which Washington and Hamilton jointly warn upcoming Presidents about the possible dangers, both domestically and internationally. In his final address, Washington urged Americans to avoid partisan fighting, and excessive political party spirit. "I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind" (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp 02/26/2017). Internationally, he warned not to rely on geographical advantage, and advised against long term alliances with other nations, advice that American Foreign Policy would take to its heart. Following Hamilton's advice against sentiments of gratitude, Washington stated that

"constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard" (http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp 02/26/2017).

Thus, Washington's Farewell Address presented a less extreme version of Hamilton's writings and opinions. These, of course, might have been, and probably were, shared by General Washington, who trusted in his oldest advisor blindly.

Alexander Hamilton has been called many things: a Caesar, a portrait in paradox, the Father of the American Bank System, a pro monarch, a threat unto himself, and even a Creole bastard. Realists, Liberals, Internationalists, and others in between debate his persona to this day, questioning decisions such as his marriage to Eliza Schuyler, or his self inflicted public embarrassment caused by the publication of the 'Reynolds Pamphlet', his posse of friends and even his final decision to throw away his shot and aim at the sky after a lifetime of fighting passionately for his beliefs. What nobody questions is his mark on America, be it positive or negative, Alexander Hamilton has marked American Foreign policy both internationally and domestically for good. Hamilton taught America that a strict hierarchy of interests, with national interest at its base, was key and had to be determined early on for the success of the government. This was diplomacy for Hamilton, and he was certain that, if this did not work and the time was right, the only answer was war. The creation of the First National Bank, the tax reforms, the establishing of the New York Post, the creation of Federalism, the precedent for a strong Executive Power able to take fast and individual international decisions, and a strong military capability are only some of the elements that America inherited after Hamilton's early death in 1804. "But above it all, it was Hamilton who nourished the prophecy of an ever expanding American industrial economy - a prophecy that he tried, too precipitately, to convert into immediate policy, but a prophecy, nonetheless, that can hardly be considered irrelevant to our present strength" (Koch, 1961, 52).

Chapter II: Thomas Jefferson & the Pursuit of Happiness

Thomas Jefferson's early life was dramatically different from Alexander Hamilton's, but unsurprisingly similar to the rest of the Founding Fathers' upbringings. Born to a family of British descent in Virginia, Jefferson's early life was based around his studies, both in school and in college, and different professional practices in friend's businesses. Despite his Father's death in 1747 when he was merely fourteen, Thomas Jefferson's education was one surrounded by a tranquility he learned to love in the fields of Virginia, especially in the estate he inherited, which he later named Monticello and turned into his official dwelling place, and where he, years later in 1826 died of an old age. His aristocratic upbringing, as Nau (2013) describes it, defined Jefferson's world: he studied history, science and math, as well as every classic philosopher, and more than three languages. Jefferson, contrary to Hamilton, was ready for his moment when it arrived. At age 33, and being the youngest delegate at the Second Continental Congress in 1775, he was the primary author of the Declaration of Independence. Their starting points, career wise, already differentiate the two men. Even though "For both Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton, the American Revolution was a defining moment" (Cunningham Jr, 2000, 7), whilst Hamilton began his political career writing pamphlets and anonymous essays, Jefferson is considered the Father of the Bill of Rights. This role eventually led to his time as a liaison in France, a time which marked his personality greatly. During this time, states Nau (2005), Jefferson got acquainted with the French government and its laws, with the principles that guided the French, principles which would then guide them through his personal and political life⁹. "Throughout his long career Jefferson valued his ties with France and savored the way of life he had found there" (Kaplan, 1987, xiii). Just as Hamilton had an animosity with France, Jefferson presented an anti-British animus, which was deep rooted from his time at war and reinforced repeatedly during his career.

Both men, states Cooke (1982), had the nation's interests first and foremost on their minds. They differed, he declares, on the tactics utilized to secure them. Both prioritized diplomacy, one due to the weak state of the newborn country, the other because he repelled

⁹ Jefferson had, on the entrance of his estate in Monticello, a bust of Napoleon, a man he admired.

the mere concept of it: “I abhor war, and view it as the greatest scourge of mankind” (“Founders Online: From Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 13 May 1797”, 2017). Whilst Hamilton’s outgoing diplomacy was based on the idea of obtaining justice and guarding national interests through peaceful negotiations, always backed by military force, Jefferson’s favorite method of diplomacy was based on an array of perfectly demonstrated arguments that would beat down the opponent intellectually, relying on the strength of moral and economic forces, rather than on military strength.

“Jefferson never questioned what he wanted for America; he envisioned a society of cultivated, independent men on terms of equality with one another, keeping government as close to the local level as possible, living on farms rather than in cities because the agrarian life best propagated the good life” (Kaplan, 1987, 31).

This concept of morality ¹⁰ guided Jefferson’s beliefs both domestically and internationally. The question of how much it guided his actual actions reaches a different conclusion according to the author asked. Walter LaFeber (1993) deemed Jefferson as an occasional realist. His early beliefs in virtues, he said, conflicted with the actual needs of the international arena, which forced him to devise a new set of stronger beliefs in order to defend and define more broadly America’s national interests. Some of these changes, declares the author, included possible military action and a dominant presidency. “The implementation of Jeffersonian foreign policies helps explain contradictions and paradoxes” (LaFeber, 1993, 9). On the other hand, a bigger set of authors stands by the belief that Jefferson was guided by an idealistic point of view, an approach that rejected 18th century traditions such as *‘raison d’etat’* and the theory of balance of power. Authors like Tucker and Hendrickson (1990), will argue that Jefferson will leave those ideals behind, deeming them obsolete, in favor of a new diplomacy fit for a republic, and what he deemed an international *‘sisterhood of states’*. “The United States, Jefferson believed, was the bearer of a new diplomacy, founded on the confidence of a free and virtuous people, that would secure ends based on natural and universal rights of man, by means that escaped war and its corruptions” (Tucker &

¹⁰ It is true, though, that Jefferson was one of the biggest slave owners in Virginia, and was accused of having an affair with his slave Sally Hemings, fathering at least one of her children. Furthermore, he opposed Hamilton’s and John Laurens’ attempts to dissolve slavery, stating that the weak country was not ready for such change. This precedent will last until 1865, when slavery will finally be abolished.

Hendrickson, 1990, 8). This diplomacy was meant to break with old European traditions which Jefferson attributed specially to Great Britain, “The madness of the King of England has gone off, but left him in a state of imbecility and melancholy” (“Founders Online: From Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 11 May 1789”, 2017). Cogliano (2014) will present an idea in between these two: Jefferson, he will say, was guided by a clear set of beliefs that created his ideological vision for the young American republic, but regarding his actual actions, the Founding Father was more of a pragmatic regarding the means employed to protect its strategic interests. “While Jefferson’s ideological vision for the country was fairly clear, his statecraft, the means by which he sought to realize his vision, was grounded in his experience as a political leader” (Cogliano, 2014, 10). Woolery (1927) will approach Cogliano’s middle view, declaring that what Jefferson did in practice was to set a foundation for foreign affairs based on a comprehensive, logical and expedient view, borrowing important principles from other governments. Whilst Hamilton had a clear approach he duplicated in his actions, and which ultimately got him killed, Jefferson’s ideals were clear, but how these were replicated on his actions remains a point of controversy.

Nau (2013) will create a new label to identify Thomas Jefferson’s Foreign Policy: Conservative Internationalism. Thomas Jefferson, declares the author, introduced a new internationalist way of thinking, based on not only the ambition of changing domestic policies from monarchy to republicanism, but also changing world politics from war to peaceable trade and diplomacy. These set of men, declares Nau, will “take the cue from Thomas Jefferson that the first and best government is self-government, and that national and international governments should do only what local and national governments cannot do” (Nau, 2013, 57). Thus, he will adopt Pierson’s (2004) and Steinmo & Thelen’s (1992) theories based on historical institutionalism to state that this school of thought has deep historical roots that can be traced back all the way to Thomas Jefferson. The Founding Father based his foreign policy ideas on how domestic policies had to be managed, observing the balances and peaceful compromises that had to be made and trying to replicate them on an international level. Conservative Internationalism declares the author “combines the commitment of liberal internationalism to spread democracy and make the world a better place with the instruments of realism to back up diplomacy with military force” (Nau, 2013,

xii). That is to say, Jefferson did not advocate for a strong military force for the United States, “ the spirit of this country is totally adverse to a large military force” (“Founders Online: From Thomas Jefferson to Chandler Price, 28 February 1807”, 2017). This did not mean, declares Nau, that he did not ‘arm his diplomacy, on the contrary: Jefferson worked, out of his contemporaries, with the least amount of military power to act as leverage, but he made the most of it both inside and outside international negotiations.

“Unlike a realist, Jefferson, they argue, avoided the military means that would have been needed to accomplish such ambitious ends. He concocted the fanciful notion of ‘peaceable coercion’ that substituted economic sanctions for war” (Nau, 2013, 81). Thus, one of Jefferson’s and Hamilton’s biggest difference will be this: Jefferson focused his American policy on economic, not security concerns, unlike a realist like Hamilton. “Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none” (“Founders Online: III. First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1801”, 2017). Jefferson, declares the author, always calculated the need to use force against the size and nature of external threats, dissimilar to Hamilton, who, in the name of national interest was prepared to unleash full military forces on an instant. Furthermore, Jefferson did not share Hamilton’s view that America was born a leader of the world. This, by no means, made him less of a patriot, or a lover of the Constitution and the Confederation. It did, however, give him a different perspective from which to approach negotiations and possible Treaties. Thus, whilst Hamilton felt no obligation whatsoever to certain countries or past allies (and condemned the mere term), Jefferson remained loyal to past compromises due to honour and moral standards, which he believed the country had to follow if it expected its citizens to replicate the behavior.

“Jefferson combined liberal internationalist goals with realist military means, and he did so simultaneously and continuously (...) Altogether, his foreign policy strategy emphasized a strong role for both American ideas and American power. Jefferson was, indeed, the first conservative internationalist president” (Nau, 2013, 87).

Jefferson, Nau argues, was not an idealistic thinker functioning on utopianism, but a consequence of his republican views. Foreign actions had to be approved by the people, within reasonable times limits (Issue that caused one of the first big clashes with Hamilton’s

strong executive power, and issue that was undermined once Washington sided with his right hand man on the issue during the French Revolution) for them to be legit policies. People had to be well represented within the government, or it would become a carbon copy of the European monarchies; Hamilton's way of government, in Jefferson's mind, represented this possibility of a new monarchic form of government. The 1798 sedition laws promoted by Hamilton were, according to Jefferson an attempt to silence republican members of society and worst of all, their newspapers. "For my own part I consider these laws as merely an experiment on the American mind to see how far it will bear an avowed violation of the constitution" ("Founders Online: From Thomas Jefferson to Stevens Thomson Mason, 11 October 1798", 2017).

Jefferson in action

Jefferson, as can be seen in his writings, is a much less linear character when compared to Hamilton; he presents not only changes within his thoughts and opinions, but changes between his actions and his moral values or ideals. It is to be noted though, that this difference is almost imperceptible during much of Jefferson's life, only peaking out during his Presidency (1801 - 1809), by which time his precepts on Foreign Affairs and domestic issues were firmly set. Previous to his political post in France, Jefferson's role was more of a thinker and philosopher, than of a politician: his moral based writing will make up one of America's most important papers, the Bill of Rights. His liaison role will confront him with foreign affairs, which he will finally address, after years of focusing on Virginian based issues. "Jefferson's domestic views are crucial for understanding his foreign policy. His domestic conservatism is closely linked to his foreign policy internationalism" (Nau, 2013, 87).

The French Revolution was, perhaps, the incident that most clearly portrayed Thomas Jefferson's ideals regarding Foreign Policy. The Revolution, which Jefferson called "pregnant with the general happiness of the nation" ("Founders Online: From Thomas Jefferson to Madame de Corny, 2 April 1790", 2017) was, for the Founding Father, a similar event as to what had happened year previous in America. It was a replay of the American revolutionary feeling that had invaded the American colonies years previous. It was, according to him, a

battle against royal absolutism and aristocratic privilege that could very much so be compared to America's struggles. "The nation has been awaked by our revolution, they feel their strength, they are enlightened, their lights are spreading, and they will not retrograde" (To George Washington Paris, Dec. 4, 1788 "The Letters of Thomas Jefferson 1743-1826", 2017). Hamilton, however, disagreed: their struggle, he stated leaving Jefferson behind, was a moment of strife for self-determination, a defence of established rights combined with a need for the protection and expansion for the American liberty. It was not, he decreed, a social upheaval with the goal to uproot the royal tradition. Even though the Founding Fathers struggled to see eye to eye on this subject, it is important to note that "many Americans saw the French people as following in the footsteps of the colonist who had revolted against George III in 1796" (Cunningham Jr, 2000, 108). It is also important to note that George Washington, the most important decision maker on this subject, did not share this opinion.

Despite Jefferson's attempts to debate against the dropping of the Treaty, declaring that as a Nation the United States owed it to the people of France, Washington once again sided with his *protégé*, and remained neutral during the whole ordeal. It is important to notice here though, that none of the men were fighting over the involvement in the Revolution: Jefferson desired America's recognition so as to legitimate the Revolution internationally, Hamilton defended a posture in which America remained silent. What is certain, declares Kaplan is that Jefferson's determination rested on justice for his second home as well as utility. "Recognition appeased his moral sense while it appealed to his practical streak" (Kaplan, 1987, 23). His moral sense comes back into the equation as it will be, finally, what will lead him to leave his Office when George Washington refused to recognize the Revolution. His resignation was followed, according to certain authors, by a decline in Franco - American relations, decline that would only worsen with the Jay Treaty of 1794. This seems rational: Hamilton shouldered Anglo - American relations, it would only make sense that, with the only proponent for Franco - American relations gone, these would decline and America's relation with the British should be heightened. Furthermore, the addition of John Jay to the equation, one of Hamilton's intimate friends, only enhanced what seemed an inevitable decline in French international relations. Despite the historical precedent that the

French Revolution set, both domestically for the Executive Power and internationally, and despite the clear fracture it caused between the Founding Fathers which were now most definitely divided into factions, certain authors still declare that “Neither Jefferson nor Hamilton understood the French Revolution for what it really was” (Cooke, 1982, 127).

Nau (2013) utilizes three different moments in which he declares ‘Jeffersonian Diplomacy can be observed. The first one, the Barbary Pirates incident of 1801, in which the US was forced to dispatch the Navy to the Mediterranean in order to blockade Tripoli.

“At length, however, the inadmissible demands of the Bashaw of Tripoli and our determination to owe to our own energies, and not to dishonorable condescensions the protection of our right to navigate the Ocean freely, have induced us to send a squadron into the Mediterranean sea, for the protection of our commerce” (“Founders Online: From Thomas Jefferson to Hammuda Pasha, Bey of Tunis, 9 September 1801”, 2017).

A manoeuvre of the military might be enough to deem Jefferson’s actions as part of the ‘realist’ group but, argues Nau, we must study their reasoning. After attempts to unilaterally solve the issue, even though it most certainly involved European land, and after attempts to reach a sort of peace or solution with said Barbary states who were preventing a free navigation of the seas in parts of the Mediterranean, Jefferson’s only way out was through ‘force’. In seeing this distant threat, which did not affect the United States territorially, but affected the community of republic as a whole, Jefferson shed his realist skin in lieu of an internationalism that went beyond his time, and for which he was criticized and called ‘soft headed’ by his more strict peers. “We did not raise armies for glory to conquest” (“Founders Online: II. Jefferson’s Fair Copy for the Committee, 26 June–6 July 1775”, 2017), declared Jefferson; the military was, to him, a back up to his diplomacy and his economic sanctions. What differentiates Jefferson from Hamilton, in this particular case, is his commitment to the international sisterhood, as Jefferson called it. This event was not, according to Hamilton, on top of the hierarchical pyramid that stood above America’s national interest. This event did not require America’s full force and navy, it was ‘not worth it’. But Jefferson disagreed: a distant threat that menaced the international peace was a big enough issue to address at full force and speed. “From a fresh perspective, Jefferson’s Barbary policy looks very much like a

conservative internationalist strategy that stretched both American ideals and American power to the limit” (Nau, 2013, 93).

A second example can be placed during the war between Great Britain and France in the 1800s, where Jefferson, during his presidency, relied heavily on James Madison, one of his closest allies after the latter’s falling out with Alexander Hamilton years before, and the man who would sign the peace between the European countries on March 23, 1815. Following his anti war view, Jefferson decided on an Embargo against England, a policy that Federalists rapidly condemned for its lack of strength, and a policy which his party and contemporaries defended declaring that “Jefferson pursued an economic embargo not as a replacement for military power but as a manoeuvre to buy time to avert war if possible but prepare for it if necessary” (Nau, 2013, 87). Despite their siding with Jefferson when comparing to what Hamilton could have done (too much force with too little diplomacy due to a failure to tailor the amount of force needed), contemporaries do condemn Jefferson’s embargo as an ‘ill fated decision’: the President believed, falsely, that the cutting of Anglo - American commerce would affect both powers equally: “The embargo is salutary. It postpones war, gives time, and the benefit of events which that may produce: particularly that of peace in Europe, which will postpone the causes of difference to the next war” (“Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, January 3, 1808”, 2017). They argue though, that “by imposing the embargo, he used a new form of economic coercion, albeit initially peaceful (non military), to buy time and perhaps avoid the subsequent use of military force” (Nau, 2013, 103). An embargo must be noted, was quite an innovative sanction for the epoch, contrary to its subsequent use during the upcoming centuries.

A third case of Jeffersonian Diplomacy as Nau (2013) calls it, is the purchase of the Louisiana territory (which some writers actually adjudicate to Hamilton’s last years). This, according to the author, is the instance that represents Jefferson’s diplomacy the best, “Deftly combined force and diplomacy (...) Jefferson demonstrated not only how force backs diplomacy, but how diplomacy, through his proposed alliance with Great Britain, magnifies force” (Nau, 2013, 87). In the expansion of America, Jefferson saw the expansion of his Empire of Liberty, which would allow the morals and ideas it stood for to travel further

distances. It was, without a doubt, the crowning achievement of Jeffersonian diplomacy. A fourth and important case results from Jefferson's continued correspondence with James Monroe. Good friends, the men wrote each other frequently, both for personal and political matters. Jefferson is, thus, attributed with at least having helped inspire what would later become one of America's most important foreign affairs doctrine. A letter dated February 1802 depicts Monroe's approval and excitement over the possibility of buying the areas from Maryland to the South Branch, "they must be very valuable if they can be got"¹¹ (James Monroe, February 1802). A letter dated July 1804 discusses Alexander Hamilton's passing and highlights, with certain glee, "the remains of the Federalist wreck"¹² (James Monroe, July 1804). Despite not being directly linked, this is one of Jefferson's long lasting inheritance for the American tradition: 'America for the Americans' remained valid for at least a century, and is still quoted to this day.

"For all these reasons - spreading freedom, arming diplomacy, advocating small government, promoting education and civil society, and challenging but ultimately yielding to the will of the people - Jefferson was more of a conservative internationalist than a realist, nationalist (isolationist) or liberal internationalist" (Nau, 2013, 109).

Jefferson, just as his personality anticipated, is a combination of different views, ideals, morals, and actions, best described with Nau's (2013) conservative internationalism, which links liberal, internationalist and realist ideas, enhancing the role of domestic policies in regard of international affairs. A trend-setter for American diplomacy, Jefferson never lost himself in the utopia of a world without armies, or a world completely controlled by international institutions. The world Thomas Jefferson inhabited would have never been ready for a United Nations, so it is not that Jefferson would have been against international institutions, the Founding Father could not fathom the concept of what the United Nations stood for. "We deplore the event which shall oblige us to shed blood for blood, and shall resort to retaliation but as the means of stopping the progress of butchery" ("Founders Online: Draft of a Declaration on the British Treatment of Ethan Allen ...", 2017) is a phrase that could belong to Thomas Jefferson, or any contemporary President justifying an invasion,

¹¹ James Monroe - private collection - NYPL (microfilm #4,75).

¹² James Monroe - private collection - NYPL (microfilm #4,162).

or the entrance in a new war. Both Alexander Hamilton's and Thomas Jefferson's ideas affected the way Americans, and the world, view foreign affairs, the way they approach and address countries, issues, embargoes, wars, and the buying of lands. "Thomas Jefferson lies buried on his beloved hilltop at Monticello, sheltered from the bustle of the cities that he so much disliked. Alexander Hamilton fittingly lies buried in the Trinity Churchyard near the hustle and action of Wall Street in New York City. After more than two hundred years, the influences of both men still persist and compete" (Cunningham Jr, 2000, 171).



Universidad de
San Andrés

“The efficacy of these methods constitutes a crucial point in XX century diplomacy, and one on which Americans remains sharply divided”
(Lycan, 1970, viii).

Chapter III: Woodrow Wilson

Woodrow Wilson is, perhaps, one of the most paradoxical Presidents of the XX century. Serving his term (1913- 1921) in a convoluted time, the President didn't only have to face the First World War (1914 - 1919), but a time that Ninkovich (1999) compares, in its decisiveness, to the Founding Fathers': "The existence of two conceptual frameworks does not mean that US Policy was schizoid. It merely suggests that America's response to modernity, like modernity itself, was double edged" (Ninkovich, 1999, 12). America was faced, once more, with two different models of a country, two models which would offset each other, both in positive and negative ways. Furthermore, Perlmutter declares that "Like Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton a century earlier, neither Wilson nor Roosevelt could have depleted fully in his politics without the other as a foil" (Perlmutter, 1997, 44). But, it must be noted, these were not the 1700's anymore, thus presenting far more interweaving within this complex ideals. Whilst Hamilton and Jefferson could have been placed closer to the end of a spectrum, these men will tend towards the middle, still highlighting the issues and ideals that differentiated the two groups, but finding more touching points within them.

Woodrow Wilson, like his predecessor Thomas Jefferson, was born in Virginia, a place he held dear to his heart and a tranquility he longed for after moving to Washington DC. Just like most of the men before him, Wilson had spent most of his life studying not only science and law, but the history of his homeland. "Wilson believed that great Americans, such as George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, had created the new nation and epitomized its spirit" (Ambrosius, 2002, 22). He emphasized the importance of history; historicism, he said, explained the institutions and main values that characterized a Nation, values which had been absorbed only through a long historic process. According to Wilson, the American Civil War

had produced organic unity in the United States. According to Jefferson, the French Revolution had shaped a new and better society for France. Both men, it seems, believed on the power that a genuine social unrest could provoke in the long term. Furthermore, both men seem to use their beliefs and values as their drive: they were not after territorial gains or 'realist' pretensions, but after what both called the defense of humanity and the 'sisterhood of republics'.

“The foundations of all of Wilson’s political thinking were the religious and ethical beliefs and values that he inherited from the Christian tradition (...) A second main theme in Wilson’s political thinking with large consequences for his foreign policy was his belief in democracy as the most humane and Christian form of government” (Link, 1958, 153).

As with most Presidents, especially the ones who suffered big disturbances both domestically and internationally, authors will disagree when characterizing the subject. Woodrow Wilson, due to his dislike of journalists and his different points of view when regarding war, has been extremely questioned by realists till this day. Link (1954) will, for example, attribute the inconsistencies in his speech not to a genuine change of mind due to the horrors occurring in Europe, but to a rationalized policy with which to avoid war for the longest time only to get involved at the last minute, “Experienced and cynical diplomatist thought they saw some Machiavellian purpose in Wilson’s actions” (Link, 1954, 83). Ninkovich (1999), on the other hand, will undermine ‘Wilsonianism’, declaring it is merely Internationalism when faced with a crisis. How, Ninkovich asks, did Wilsonianism act differently than a regular Internationalism in practice? Ninkovich criticism is very reminiscent of what an Alexander Hamilton could have said of Woodrow Wilson’s ideals, and what he criticized of his counterpart: “By confusing the way the world is perceived generally, diplomatic historians have confused the way in which policy-makers have perceived the world of foreign relations” (Ninkovich, 1999, 6). Not only did America’s idealism once again misjudge the world situation, just as Jefferson miscalculated America’s strength when he implemented the Embargo against Great Britain, but Wilson’s plan (according to similar thinking realist authors) was “utopianism run amok” (Ninkovich, 1999, 3). It is important to notice that these authors are not the majority; they represent what appears to be a small group which does not focus on Wilson’s narrative and its heritage, but on his actual actions. Most

authors will praise Wilson's refusal of the balance of power, his new diplomacy based on the League of Nations and the international community that this produced, and his successful intervention during World War I, ignoring the fact that the League of Nations was a doomed project after the Senate's refusal to adhere the United States to the cause and that the principle of auto determination brought to the table by Wilson did not solve any problems for third world countries who could only see a small glimmer of hope before being pulled down again by the forces of colonialism.

There are, declares Ninkovich (1999), four Wilsonian assumptions which, despite their failure in the immediate future, will later become axiomatic for America. These all present faint similarities, to say the least, to Thomas Jefferson's guidelines for a successful foreign policy. The first one regards war, and the realization (once again) that it is no longer a useful or reliable instrument. This final opinion will change during his presidency, from an anti war speech before 1915, to a 'there are certain problems that might justify a war'. "We regard war merely as a mean of asserting the rights of people against aggression" ("Woodrow Wilson: Third Annual Message", 1917) Conversely, peace for Wilson meant "that all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world and in the political stability of free peoples and equally responsible for their maintenance; that the essential principle of peace is the actual equality of nations in all matters of right and privilege" ("Woodrow Wilson: Inaugural Address", 1917). This view will be similar to Jefferson's, who argued that war was not to be the first or even the second option, but that events such as the Barbary Pirates conflict required the mobilization of an army. Both men believed, though, in the fact that America did not need a big military presence. They did not, the men agreed, need to turn America into a 'military camp'. Hamilton, of course, would have disagreed with most of these precepts, specially with Wilson's apparent commitment to international honesty and peace, which he said was the utmost responsibility of America as the lighthouse of freedom for the rest of the world 'neighbourhoods, "The most distinguished nation in the world is the nation that can and will keep its promises, even to its own hurt" ("Woodrow Wilson: Address at Independence Hall: "The Meaning of Liberty", 1914). Despite their differences, neither Hamilton nor Jefferson would have placed anything above America's national interest, as Wilson is apparently suggesting here. It is interesting to see though, that this promise never

materialized. A second assumption will pertain mostly to Wilson's era, due to the lack of international communication during the Founding Fathers' time: the possibility of the international community being poisoned by powers hostile to liberal democracy. Wilson was very wary of this possibility, and it was this prospect that led him to declare

"I believe in peace, I love peace. I would not be a true American if I did not love peace. But I know that peace costs something, and that the only way in which you can maintain peace is by thoroughly enjoying the respect of everybody with whom you deal" ("Woodrow Wilson: Address At Soldiers' Memorial Hall in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania", 1916).

These powers either did not exist, or did not have the strength or resources to present an actual threat for either Jefferson or Hamilton, thus in this aspect, the men were more conscious of partisan in fighting than in a probable 'poisoning' of the world due to anti-democratic forces.

The third assumption will, once again, find its pairing during the Founding Father's era, and it is the question of the balance of power theory, which Wilson believed, happily but naively, had been disintegrated after the war. Wilson, a believer in 'humanity' believed in genuine friendship and mutual sympathy and understanding between countries. "Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace" ("Woodrow Wilson: Address to the Senate of the United States: "A World League for Peace"", 1917). Wilson believed, just as Jefferson, in a 'sisterhood of republics' that related with each other on an equal basis, not through power relations. Wilson did, just as Jefferson, disregard America's geographic location regarding this subject: America was part of the balance of power despite the ocean separating it from other strong countries. Hamilton, on the other hand, would not have agreed with this disregard of world dynamics, and would have argued that this misconception was to blame for Wilson's later failures. A fourth assumption is based on America's role in world problems. The necessity of America's involvement was, according to Wilson, crucial to the outcome of the war. This could be linked not only to Jefferson's view, but to Hamilton's opinion on America's predominant place in the world. Despite their similar opinion on the United State's preponderance, the men will differ on how the country

will react: Hamilton will, at least in cases where national security was not threatened, prefer to let the issue unravel. Jefferson, like Wilson, will debate for America's involvement. Just as Washington's Cabinet denied Jefferson's want for involvement during the French Revolution, the Senate denied Wilson's desire to get involved in the international community with the League of Nations."A fundamental change has taken place with reference to the position of America in the world's affairs (...) this is the hour of test and trial for America" ("Woodrow Wilson: 7th Annual Message", 1919). It is important to highlight that Wilson based most of his foreign policy on his version of the Monroe Doctrine, "the post war League of Nations, he hoped, would become the worldwide extension of the Monroe Doctrine" (Ambrosius, 2002, 129). He hoped to follow a Doctrine that allowed every nation to determine its own policies, development and plans for the future without the balance of power pressuring their decision making process, he hoped to live in a world which he described as "unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful" ("Woodrow Wilson: Address to the Senate of the United States: "A World League for Peace"", 1917). Hamilton, the hard headed realist, would have probably mocked this assertion, describing it as extremely naive.

Domestically speaking, Wilson presents more similarities with Jefferson's point of view than with Hamilton's. From a first glance, Wilson, just as Jefferson, won the presidency as a domestic reformer with new ideas for the Americans, disregarding, for the most part, international plans. Furthermore, "it was Wilson's belief that representative government, when properly constituted, is the best form to enable free people to govern themselves" (Wann, 1958, 48), a representative government that Jefferson defended so much it eventually led to the creation of an Electoral College in order to avoid discrimination to smaller states and to ensure every member of the United States was represented¹³. The government, declared Wilson, is fractured into sections that do not help its productivity. The doctrine regarding the separation of powers had, in his opinion, been applied too rigorously, so complete as to amount near isolationism declared the President, coinciding with Jefferson on the need to unify the government, especially with the Senate so as to avoid a strong Executive Power, which Jefferson avoided, but Hamilton favored.

¹³ Its actual success is questionable, especially in modern times.

One helpful way with which to analyze certain links between the Founding Fathers and the President at hand is to observe how much, if they do, they mention either Thomas Jefferson or Alexander Hamilton, and their respective ideals and goals. To see how much they take into account their views, if they incline towards Hamilton's realist view of a strong Presidential power and neutrality, or Jefferson's involvement. If they support elements like Washington's Farewell Address or Monroe's Doctrine. Wilson, being the complex character that he is, evidences references to both Founding Fathers, though there seems to be a predilection to Jefferson's posse: he constantly quotes the Monroe Doctrine, Jefferson's Inaugural Address and his involvement on the Bill of Rights: "Every American who has drunk at the true fountains of principle and tradition must subscribe without reservation to the high doctrine of the Virginian Bill of Rights" ("Woodrow Wilson: Third Annual Message", 1915). Hamilton, on the other hand, he only mentions once, and in the middle of a group when listing Founding Fathers, in his official papers as President: "I do not want to attempt any flight of fancy, but I can fancy those men of the first generation that so thoughtfully Set this great Government up, the generation of Washington and Hamilton and Jefferson and the Adamses" ("Woodrow Wilson: Address at Convention Hall in Kansas City, Missouri", 1919). It must be noticed though, that he does mention George Washington several time as one of the most patriotic members of the era, but he does not reconcile this idea with Washington's international affairs views, he merely cites the first President of the United States.

Woodrow Wilson has, throughout the years, been questioned by different authors with different points of view, his actions studied according to the school they were being scrutinized under. Though the former President presents certain meeting points where he resembles some ideas that might have been closer to Hamilton and thus a more 'realist' point of view, he seems much more inclined to side with a liberal, conservative internationalist like Thomas Jefferson. Their views, both domestically and internationally, seem to coincide, at least in the important and key aspects. Both seem to defend an America based on principles, values and ideals, at least when their rhetoric is involved. Both men seem to prefer diplomatic means, placing economic sanctions in a more favorable position than military involvement, But, both men address the issue of military deployment as necessary when the issue risks

affecting the international community, or ‘sisterhood of states’. Both men, when faced with America’s key interests threatened (be it by a World War or by Barbary Pirates) resort, albeit as a last resort, to military action. It is important to note, also, that these coincidences are adapted to the change in times, as both men are clearly set in a different context , living a century apart. Furthermore, the fact that Wilson represents his own tradition has to be highlighted: Wilson is, by some authors, considered one of America’s ‘Founding Fathers’ when regarding international affairs, as his involvement in the World War finished with a long period of isolationism during the XIX century. Despite their historic differences, we might say both men represent a sort of ‘political profile’, a similar way of addressing both international and domestic factors. They embody, up to a certain extent, the same way of thinking, of prioritizing (in their speech) values, morals and democracy as almost religious concepts.



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Chapter IV: Harry Truman

Harry S. Truman bears the burden of being the only President in the history of the world to have allowed an attack with atomic weapons. Thus, realists sometimes take the 33rd President of the United States under their wing. Nau (2013) disagrees, listing three reasons why the man was not to be covered by the realist shadow. Truman, the author argues, was very liberal when domestically speaking. The President had constant Press Conferences (more than 235 during his term), where he announced changes in economic policies to avoid inflation and reach full employment levels, and his Fair Deal which promised increased coverage in health care, Social Security and affordable education for all. “Millions of our citizens do not now have a full measure of opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health. Millions do not now have protection or security against the economic effects of sickness. The time has arrived for action to help them attain that opportunity and that protection” (“Harry S. Truman: Statement by the President After Taking the Oath of Office” 1945). Truman did not believe in a Foreign Policy dictated by a set of ideals, be it in a Republican/Democrat spectrum, or a Capitalistic/Communist one. Internationally, Truman opposed the Korean War and the Indochina Conflict that followed, until — it was of utmost necessity to intervene and stood strong in a non-military way against the Soviet Union: his delivery of packages through an air tunnel to solve the Berlin Blockade, his globalized containment policy, and the Truman Doctrine together with the Marshall Plan are only some of the non-military approaches the President took to face the communist country.

The Missouri native is one of the only modern Presidents to have reached the White House without a college degree. After moving from their farm when Harry was six, the Truman family sent their sons to a Presbyterian school, where they got a religious and formal education, which was then enhanced by their mother’s cultural interests: history, music, and reading. Thus, from an early age Truman studied war and law, two subjects he deemed interesting and useful. Due to financial matters, and knowing he could not pay his way to college, Harry Truman joined the military in 1918 and was deployed to France, where he was respected by his peers and earned his way to First Lieutenant. This military experience would not be forgotten years later, when the man finally reached the White House: despite his

idealistic and liberal ambitions, Truman knew the role force played in negotiations, and was ready to exploit it, at least rhetorically, if necessary. Ideologically speaking, the President saw himself following the footsteps of men like Thomas Jefferson. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, which he admired deeply, “We are the people who gave the world George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt” (“Harry S. Truman: Address at the Jefferson Day Dinner.”, 1947).

Harry Truman started his term in 1945, in the midst of the remains of what had been the Second World War. Unlike his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had the ‘simpler’ job of entering the war, Truman was forced to face the remains of an estranged Europe and a still fighting and bold Japan. His was the slightly Wilsonian job of managing the Treaties and negotiations after the war, and like his counterpart before him, Truman opted for a diplomatic approach at first. Diplomatic approach that was, though, backed by the threat of an unprecedented deadly weapon. This is exactly where Truman’s foreign policy, which is sometimes referred to as a continuation of Wilsonian ideals, Ninkovich calls it “the ideological legitimator for a United Nations Project” (Ninkovich, 1999, 7), shifted from Wilson’s. “But unlike Wilson and Roosevelt, Truman believed that diplomacy required a more assertive use of force to contain the Soviet Union, and an ideological campaign to promote liberty and stop the spread of communism in Western Europe” (Nau, 2013, 147). Despite his reliance on the atomic bomb, Truman is usually classified as a ‘liberal internationalist’, committed to the development of international institutions and the spread of freedom so characteristic of the American model. The United Nations and the fight against Communism seemed to fit his ideals perfectly.

“Conservative Internationalism does not advocate the use of more unrestrained force. It advocates the earlier and perhaps more frequent use of smaller force to deter, preempt, and prevent the later use of much greater force” (Nau, 2013, 7).

Having been named President on April 1945, Truman did not have to face a full on war with the Axis in Europe, but merely let the plan that Roosevelt, who he greatly admired, continue its course. Thus, Truman’s work really began with his plight to establish the United Nations and create a stable Europe which would allow the newly found democratic civil

societies or ‘sister republics’ (as Jefferson had once called the world order) to unfold and flourish. With this idealistic rhetoric of peace and calm, though, came a threat: “Lasting peace can never be secured if we permit our dangerous opponents to plot future wars with impunity at any mountain retreat - however distant” (“Harry S. Truman: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress”, 1945). He believed though, that once the Charter of the United Nations was set in place, the world would follow what he called “a revival of an old faith in the everlasting moral of justice” (“Harry S. Truman: Address to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco”, 1945). Truman had a respect and fascination with this Charter that can be compared to Jefferson’s beliefs and hopes placed on the Bill of Rights and the Constitution: both men viewed these Conventions as the starting of a new ‘era’, of a new phase for the United States and, as a consequence, the world.

The atomic bomb, then, seems like a realist glitch in his otherwise peaceful decision making processes. When asked, the creator of Conservative Internationalism defended his stance: “A CI might use the bomb, as Truman did, if he were in a situation of negotiating an end to the conflict. One can argue that by using the bomb, Truman titled the negotiations in Tokyo toward surrender (...) CI always advocate linking the use of force and diplomacy. In the case of unconditional surrender, negotiations are ruled out” ¹⁴ (01/23/2017). The bomb, seemed, at the time, the only way to address the ongoing war in the Pacific, after an attempt at diplomacy had failed in Potsdam with the Japanese refusal to abey for the war on July 26, 1945. Thus, as other Jefferson before him, and many other conservative Internationalists such as Polk and Wilson, Truman followed his diplomacy with force, in this case, the atomic bomb. “The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed against those who brought war to the Far East (...) The cruel aggression which Japan started eight years ago to spread the forces of evil over the Pacific has resulted in her total defeat” (“Harry S. Truman: Proclamation 2660—Victory in the East—Day of Prayer”, 1945). There are of course, counterpoints to this rhetoric: authors from diverse school of thoughts which argue that this ‘threat of an invasion’ did not exist, that Truman was never faced with a categorical decision between the real need of the bomb and an invasion that would hurt America’s mainland. “Truman remained primarily concerned with ending the war as soon as possible, and the

¹⁴ Private conversation with Henry Nau via email.

bomb was the most likely and least risky means to accomplish his objective” (Walker, 2004, 60). He had, argues the author, no compelling reason to avoid the bomb if it meant a later Japanese surrender, he was committed to following Roosevelt’s ‘fast and as little casualties as possible’ plan, and the bomb fit the description perfectly. “It occurred to me that a quarter million of the flowers of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities, and I still think they were, and are” (Harry S. Truman, 1955). This controversial point taints what seems to be a determined Conservative Internationalist who places his faith on international institutions and the newly found commitment of nations to a new world order without a balance of power ¹⁵.

The Korean War (1950 - 1953) presented a new point of conflict for Truman’s peaceful and institution based plan. A problem which can be once more explained through the views of Conservative Internationalism, which establishes that little instances of force are preferable to a bigger and stronger conflict; this was Truman’s point of view, similar to Thomas Jefferson’s attitude towards the Barbary Pirates. Both events did not affect American interest directly, both occurred far away from America mainland, and both events were symbolically important: one to depict America’s strength, the other to take a stand against a possibly on growing communism.

“Korea was a symbolic war (...) The danger of war does not arise from the intrinsic value to the Communists of the Korean peninsula, but rather derives from the prestige which the Communists would enjoy if they succeeded in destroying the nation set up and maintained by the US” (Ninkovich, 1999, 178).

Conservative internationalism considers America is an exceptionalist and indeed a leading liberal society in the world both for democracy and the defense of liberty in the world. Thus, for their goal (to spread freedom), they employ domestic and integrated force, focusing initially on material geopolitical threats. The Korean War, the World War I or the Anglo - French war, are all examples of events which forced this group of Presidents to respond with force after diplomacy seemed unavailable. The Korean War started, allegedly and according

¹⁵ The issue seems to present such controversy, that authors seem to prefer avoiding its mention: Henry Nau’s main book on ‘Conservative Internationalism’ does not address the subject, which will be later address in an accompanying paper (2015) and was answered via emails at request.

to Truman's point of view, because of what he called a "clear challenge to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter and to the specific actions taken by the United Nations in Korea" ("Harry S. Truman: Special Message to the Congress Reporting on the Situation in Korea.", 1950). America was not defending its mainland, the rhetoric said, neither was they trying to one up the communists; they were merely defending the United Nation's Charter and thus, the interest of the world. On the same interest, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan aimed at (or at least were defended by) the idea of unifying the world, both ideologically and economically, in order to create a cohesive unit of nations. Following Thomas Jefferson's argument that a strong Europe helped maintain and create a strong America, Truman believed that a unified and economically stable Europe lead to a better containment of the Soviet Union, and decreased the balance of power he constantly denounced. "The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were economic and political, not military. But they clearly implied that military defense was coming" (Nau, 2013, 162). They were, as Truman called them, important big steps in the building of universal peace and the erosion of the old and obsolete balance which used to lead world dynamics. "International relations have traditionally been compared to a chess game in which each nation tries to outwit and checkmate the other. I cannot accept that comparison (...)" ("Harry S. Truman: Address in Mexico City.", 1947).

Truman was a self declared follower of Jefferson's views, celebrating yearly dinners in his honor, and proclaiming his admiration for the man who had, in his opinion, saved America from a future dictated by aristocrats. Both men, for example, prioritize France within Europe, with Jefferson defending the Revolution and Truman declaring that "a strong France represents a gain to the world" ("Harry S. Truman: Statement by the President Following a Discussion With Foreign Minister Bidault of France.", 1945) and that "In Bastille Day the people of France have given the world an undying symbol of Freedom" ("Harry S. Truman: Statement by the President: Bastille Day.", 1945). Jefferson was, for Truman, the 'anchor of democracy'; so much most of his speeches barely mention any of the other Founding Fathers (with the exception of George Washington).

"We know that as long as we remain free, the spirit of Thomas Jefferson lives in America. His spirit is the spirit of freedom. We are heartened by the knowledge that the light he kindled a century and a half ago shines today, in the United States (...) When we hear the cry for freedom arising from the shores beyond our own, we can take heart from the words of Thomas Jefferson" ("Harry S. Truman: Address at the Jefferson Day Dinner.", 1947)

Throughout his long term the President enhances Jefferson's role constantly giving him full credit for successes such as the Louisiana Purchase, the creation of the Democratic Party, the Bill of Rights and the overall flourishing of the Confederation into what America has become and stands for. Different to Wilson, who does not address Hamilton (except briefly within a list of Founding Fathers), or other Presidents who choose to not mention the controversial Secretary of the Treasury, Truman criticizes Hamilton's persona and political decisions intently, comparing them constantly to what he deems were Jefferson's adequate actions.

"Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury, frankly affirmed his belief that government should be controlled by the rich and the well born (...) Fortunately for the people, there was also in Washington's administration a powerful man, Thomas Jefferson" ("Harry S. Truman: Address at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner.", 1948). What it is interesting to see, is that Truman had a member of his cabinet not far from Hamilton's character. Kennan, a proclaimed realist, served as his advisor and right hand man, just as Hamilton had taken the same role centuries earlier for Washington. Both men acted as the 'realist' view for Presidents who were further down the centre when placed in a continuum. Just as Hamilton wished to further expand more on the balance of power for Washington's Farewell Address, Kennan declared that the Truman Doctrine was missing a militarized promise in order to make good policy. If criticized, both speeches are usually accused of the same issue, which "Kennan's acute nose correctly detected the odor of universalism in the address" (Nau, 2013, 156). Truman took to quoting Woodrow Wilson constantly too, as the father of the United Nations, stating that this institution is merely his view materialized years later. He stands behind his predecessor's opinions and beliefs, declaring that his team was merely continuing what Wilson was not allowed to complete, going as far as to criticize his Senate, declaring that they had turned the clocks backwards and made the Second World War an immediate possibility. "We have taken the position of leadership that President Wilson

wanted us to take after the First World War” (“Harry S. Truman: Address in St. Louis at the Site of the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.”, 1950), he declares after the United Nations base their headquarters in New York, choosing to deliver this Address the Jefferson National Expansion Memorial.

So what were three decisive moments that made Truman a Conservative Internationalist, thus following the path and ways that Thomas Jefferson had established centuries earlier and Woodrow Wilson continued not long before? His shift from a rather geopolitical interpretation of the Soviet Union conflict in 1945 to a more ideological division in 1947, which further divided both blocs, and which will be reflected in the Truman Doctrine. Truman, just as Jefferson, will reflect his beliefs and values, be them religious or not, in his policies and addresses. The President’s decisions during 1947 - 1949 to deploy American military power peacefully in Europe and later during the Korean War. Both instances show (albeit different situations) the ‘armed diplomacy’ Conservative Internationalists prefer and use constantly after their diplomatic proposals. A third moment can be pinpointed at his decision in 1949 to shift away from negotiations with the Soviet Union within the United Nations frame, only to replace this action with his containment policy through short - termed alliances. As a true Conservative Internationalist, he never gave up on diplomacy, but backed it up with more force than perhaps both his predecessors had one, which surrounds both his terms with controversy and, for some people, shifts him further down the center towards the realists in the continuum. Context aside, Truman resembles Thomas Jefferson’s ideals greatly. Be it because he admired the man and constantly quoted his successes and words which inspired him, or because Truman adapted to a world that needed a view that resembled more a Thomas Jefferson than an Alexander Hamilton, the 33rd President of the United States had more than a deep sympathy for his Southern predecessor.

Chapter V: George H.W Bush

George H.W Bush witnessed perhaps the biggest shift in modern American foreign relations: the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus, the end of a bipolar model that paved the way for the unipolar position the United States has maintained, arguably, till today. “Bush governed during tumultuous years indeed. The Cold War ended, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, Germany was reunited” (Engel, 2010, 26). For some, his realistic approach was needed for the settlement of America in the new world order, others thought it was what caused the problems that America would face years later, for others, it was not forceful enough. “Never before has our leadership been so crucial, because while America has its eyes on the future, the world has its eyes on America” (“George Bush: The President-Elect's News Conference in Houston”, 1988). President Bush faced more international affairs in a 4 year term that perhaps most Presidents in history, through them all he maintained his realist perspective intact, defending it when the time came in Press Conferences: “You know I’m a realist, I’ve been around this track for a long time” (“George Bush: The President's News Conference”, 1989).

George H.W Bush had a typical upbringing, first in Massachusetts and then in Connecticut, where he proceeded to attend high school. Following the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour, the soon to be President join the U.S Navy, where he became the youngest naval aviator to date, and where he was later commended for a job well done and named Lieutenant. After his time in the army, which many authors pinpoint as one of the reasons for Bush’s faith on the military, he went back to Yale, where he obtained his degree. Whilst personal life seems to affect the lives and actions of an Alexander Hamilton or a Thomas Jefferson, it does not seem to have the same repercussion on George Bush’s life: his was an average and tranquil American life, affected by his time in the Navy, but otherwise uneventful. His decision making process and his system of beliefs was dictated, mostly, by his religious precepts and his context: how the world changed constantly around him, and how the ideal democratic epitome which he considered America to be would respond.

Despite his self anointment as a realist, “critics have long charged that Bush failed to match the potential of his era with commensurate level of conviction of international imagination” (Engel, 2010, 26). Onea (2013) will deem his international responses, except the events in the Gulf, as ‘restrictive’, declaring that the spirit viewed in Kuwait was the one needed to face these challenges, and stating that it would fully be seen during Clinton’s administration and beyond. Other authors such as Caraley (2013) defend his administration’s actions, declaring that the ‘bad press’ surrounding them was merely caused by a confusion in which issues the White House prioritized at the time: the Bush administration did not aim primarily (at least rhetorically speaking) to discover Iraq’s atomic arsenal, but to dissolve the tensions in Kuwait in order to allow for the oil businesses to continue their due course. “Needless to say, we view the situation with the utmost gravity. We remain committed to take whatever steps are necessary to defend our longstanding, vital interests in the Gulf” (“George Bush: Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait”, 1990). Hurst will agree, declaring that “Many accounts of the Gulf crisis have argued that the Bush administration used a variety of rationales to justify its actions and that it did so in an opportunistic fashion in order to rally popular support” (Hurst, 2004, 379), which, declares the author, ultimately did not work. Nau will decrease this realist aura, establishing that he pursued “realist goals of stability with liberal internationalist means of multilateralism” (Nau, 2013, 5), idea which Caraley will oppose, declaring that a strong military involvement was needed due to the “numerous challenges to American interests emerged that were too intractable for diplomatic solutions” (Caraley, 1999, 10).

Bush’s attitude towards the end of the Cold War can be taken as the first sign of a realist president. He, like others before him, considered America to be the ‘lighthouse of democracy’. Just like America was, for Hamilton, an example of what the world was to become, America was now, for Bush, a new beginning and a new leader in this changing world. His approach for this suddenly more peaceful world was, though, not a release on tensions and armament, but the complete opposite,

“We can’t afford to mistake a more stable environment as proof that we can spend less on national defense. The secret to our success can be summed up in a single word: strength. And let’s sustain the military strength that helped turn the world situation around” (“George Bush: Remarks at the Annual Conference of the Veterans of Foreign Wars”, 1989).

Alexander Hamilton would have agreed, declaring that despite the balance of power being on their favor, it could not be trusted to give up arms and depend solely on diplomacy, posture that is defended by authors such as Lodal when they declare that “Arguably, America’s maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent led to the end of the Cold War” (Lodal, 2001, 10). Jefferson, on the other hand, might have agreed on a relent in military spending, viewing the incident not as a success for power and strength as realists saw it, but as a win for the liberal and international community. “Richard Nixon and George H.W Bush believed only in balancing power” (Nau, 2013, xiv), thus enhancing military spending by the millions, in order to complete the military targets which would, in both instances and contexts, keep ‘America safe’ and ‘America first’. Consequently, the same can be said for his regard of the United Nations. Despite his full support, he did not (as did his XX century predecessors) praise the organization’s peacekeeping abilities. On the contrary, President Bush questioned the United Nation’s strength to command the changing world reiteratively. “No, the United Nations is not perfect. It’s not a panacea for the world’s problems” (“George Bush: Address to the 44th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York”, 1989). The United Nations could successfully be, according to the President, a mediator or a forum, especially when social and economic challenges were addressed. It could not, with the resources it had allocated to peacekeeping, act as a force to be reckoned with when troubles arose in certain regions of the world, such as in Kuwait and later in several other areas of the Middle East. As a realist, George H.W Bush saw America’s notion of power as the guarantee and guarantor of stability for what he called ‘the new world order’ (order that was never really defined). “For Bush, the liberation of Kuwait and defeat of Iraq eradicated the painful legacy of America’s loss in Vietnam” (Engel, 2010, 33). For Bush, as for many realists including Alexander Hamilton, international affairs were and still are based on a zero sum game, game in which the United States had finally evened out its score, thus eliminating the dishonor that Vietnam had brought upon America’s shores. The end of the Cold War was, for

the administration and for Bush himself, a sort of validation of America's belief system, core values and policies.

When criticizing the Bush Sr administration, authors tend to ignore Kuwait (due to its partial or complete success, depending on the point of view), and focus on the 1989 Panama affair, where realists usually declare Bush was not assertive enough, and thus not taken seriously. In what they call a tepid attempt at diplomacy, opinion with which Alexander Hamilton would have agreed, authors such as Caraley argues that America's failure to make clear a compelling threat was what ultimately debunked the possibility of a correct diplomacy backed by force (which Thomas Jefferson would have approved off). In what appears to be an attempt of a realist tackling diplomacy, authors declare that Noriega never had to contemplate a serious threat, and thus never had to resolve the issue until it was too late for him to yield. "Us leaders failed to press him into a defining moment" (Caraley, 1999. 20). The incident ended on a successful, though controversial, involvement of the United States to restore Endara to power and dilute Noriega's political capabilities, which did not help George H.W Bush's case. "Our national security strategy reflects these changes and joins in these hopes, but it is grounded in realism" ("George Bush: Statement on Transmitting the Annual National Security Strategy Report", 1990) declared the President after the 'success' of the military operation that finally restored peace in Panama. A more unified and tougher policy, followed by an articulated and threatening rhetoric, could have obviated the Panama invasion. This could be a case that would prove Alexander Hamilton right: the need for a fast and un-bureaucratic action should surpass the necessity of a Senate approval, the need for a strong rhetoric should compensate the little discussion for it within the administration. Hamilton believed in quick and decisive movements, which clearly stated America's view on world matters: either it was with France and its Revolution, or it remained silent, it did not send mixed signals, which some authors argue is what happened during the Panama Conflict. Hamilton would have argued that he stood behind George H.W Bush's intents, but that in this case, his actions did not live up to realist expectations.

The Gulf War, though, presented a completely different approach which Hamilton would have been much more content with. “In 1991, President George H.W Bush fought a hugely successful realist war to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty” (Nau, 2014, 3). The Kuwait invasion was not only an economic issue for President Bush, but an ideological and symbolic one too: the world could not allow, so close to the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the creation of the new world order, a disregard of international laws of this proportion.

“Bush believed it was a President’s job to shepherd this new world through its periods of change, to contain the violence and instability he could not control, and to impose structure and order whenever possible. Defeating Iraq and liberating Kuwait, removing Noriega, and punishing a humanitarian solution in Somalia were more than geopolitical necessities to his mind” (Engel, 2010, 33).

Following a pattern that Alexander Hamilton might have approved off, the President first tried an economic blockade as a ‘diplomatic approach’, an approach he did not value immensely, “I didn’t say I thought they would work (...) But yes, you’re right, there’s been a spotty record of economic sanctions working” (“George Bush: Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait”, 1990). Despite his starting out through a diplomatic move, it quickly escalated to a military level, which was accompanied by a forceful and military rhetoric which by no means could have been described as tepid, not even by the quick witted Hamilton himself. Bush, declares Hurst (2004), referenced aggression on 113 occasions during the deciding period, his use of this rationale employed constantly and successfully throughout the entire crisis. Caraley (1999) agrees, declaring that the threat was made increasingly credible by the rhetoric and later by the mobilization and deployment of several US and allied military forces within the region. It could not, in the author’s point of view, be ignored by Hussein as Noriega had done in Panama. “In justifying the buildup, Bush resorted to classical domino rhetoric about the consequences of aggression. The difference between this episode and previous credibility crises, however, was that this time the United States was intervening in behalf of a specific economic interest” (Ninkovich, 1999, 284) declared Ninkovich, defending Bush’s rhetoric, whilst critiquing his actual means for the invasion. The invasion’s real goal differs, depending on which school of thought is inquired, or whether a Democrat or Republican is answering the question. What cannot be argued, though, is Bush’s realist attitude towards the conflict and his determination to

increase military spending, first seen in 1989, during his speech at the Ceremony Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Department of War (7 August 1989), where he declared that it wasn't enough to be strong in conventional ways anymore and that America needed to modernize their ICBM force, as well as create and rely on advanced technology.

"But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms.

Appeasement does not work (...) We agree that this is not an American problem, or a European problem, or a Middle East problem: It is the world's problem (...) Standing up for our principle is an American tradition. As it has so many times before, it may take time and tremendous effort, but most of all, it will take unity of purpose" ("George Bush: Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia", 1990).

George H.W Bush was a self-proclaimed admirer of Alexander Hamilton's work, reason why he constantly quoted and honored the late Founding Father, similar to Harry Truman's stance regarding Thomas Jefferson. This President, though, will not criticize Jefferson as an adversary, as Truman pointedly did with Hamilton, but will merely refuse to mention the idealistic Founding Father, taking a stance similar to Woodrow Wilson's when regarding Hamilton. The President will merely choose to ignore his name on lists and will address successes such as the Louisiana Purchase without giving notice to its motor. "Recognizing the young Nation's vulnerability, George Washington joined a number of other American leaders - most notably, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison" ("George Bush: Proclamation 6097—258th Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington", 1990). Bush will go as far as talking about the Bill of Rights, without giving due credit to its author, and declaring that Alexander Hamilton's words and ideals represented the American spirit of freedom that endured to that day. The President will, on the other hand, not only quote Hamilton on foreign affairs or in events regarding the Treasury Department, but constantly refer to the Founding Father as a guideline both for George Washington, America and himself: "Two centuries ago just last year, Alexander Hamilton sent a letter urging General Washington to seek the presidency" ("George Bush: Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by the New York Partnership and the Association for a Better New York in New York, New York", 1989). History, the President retold, had its eyes on both Washington and Hamilton, and neither of them disappointed. In Hamilton's decisive realism and subtle religiousness, George

H.W Bush found an ally he could use in times of need, a predecessor that combined his views and the strength that America needed, and a role model that would allow for the use of force and military spending if needed. George H.W Bush found, in Hamilton, a different way to back up his military rhetoric.

George H.W Bush's presidency is often criticized and labeled as an unsuccessful term by members of different sides of the spectrum: some believe the President was not forceful enough, leading to the confusions with Noriega and then a late invasion of Kuwait which did not allow for the identification and termination of the weapons of mass destruction, others declare that his military stance was too strong, that both issues could have been solved by a better and more developed diplomacy. This seems to be the problem, throughout the years, of American foreign policy: not enough force, or an unsuccessful diplomacy. A late use of too much power, or a diplomacy too soft to actually threaten or move the country at hand. "Bush is best understood as the culmination of a long-standing American vision, not as the progenitor of something radically new" (Engel, 2010, 26), Bush is best understood as a realist who tried to incur in diplomacy, but failed and returned to his military roots. He is best understood as a military man who knew and understood the positive elements of a foreign policy based on the balance of power and the importance of strength (or the appearance of it) in the international community. He is best understood as a President who encountered more international threats than most White House residents encounter in their terms. All of these help understand George H.W Bush as a successor of Hamilton's ideals, of Hamilton's regard for the United States as the best and first country in the world, which had to lead not only by example (as Thomas Jefferson argued), but by force.

Conclusion

As with every historic event, what remains is a mixture of truth and story, a grey spot between the actual facts and the myth that has been recreated since. This is especially true when talking about renowned and questioned characters throughout time. Who lives, who dies and who tells the story determines how the story is told. It is our job, thus, to distinguish between accurate events and constructions that were added later through history, between legitimate reasons and what scholars through the years have declared as 'true'. As a result, context studying is key to understanding the genuine motivations, drive, and reasons behind historic events. Had Hamilton not been an immigrant desperate to show his worth, would he have stood out to George Washington from the crowd? Had Thomas Jefferson not been the proud and dedicated scholar, would he have gotten his post as a liaison in France that would later lead to his strict opinions when regarding the French Revolution? Had Wilson been able to complete his work with the League of Nations, would a Second World War have happened? Had Truman and George H.W Bush been in a position where America did not have the upper hand, would deadly events such as the nuclear bombings and Kuwait invasion could have been avoided? Everything, as is the norm with history, can be argued back in rhetoric questions, can be re-thought in 'what ifs' and different case scenarios. Goldthorpe (1968), warns against it: how will history advance, he argues, if we constantly fall on hypotheticals that do little to explain the actual event? Context studying is his answer. We must study, he argues, Hamilton and Jefferson's context, both personal and historical, the international and domestic situation for the three Presidents representing the XX century. Only then, fully comprehending these men at their time and place will we be able to really comprehend the motives behind their actions, the differences in their rhetoric and their behavior. Only then will we be able to shed them of the stigmas surrounding them ('the monarchist', 'the idealist', 'the institutionalist', and 'the realist').

These men seem to answer to one referent or the other, either to Thomas Jefferson's beliefs or Hamilton's decisive point of view. This is, though, because these men were forced, by their context, to have very distinct and contrasting views. Views which, over the years,

have merged and diffused towards the middle of the spectrum where we could place most of the Presidents selected in this thesis. Harry Truman will always resemble Thomas Jefferson's conservative internationalism and idealistic views based on a 'sisterhood of republics', and will choose to arm his diplomacy just as his predecessor did. But he also chose to deploy the deadliest weapon in history, an action that, although it can be explained from his point of view, resembles more of a realist attitude, more of an Alexander Hamilton actionnaire. George H.W Bush's military preference and hierarchization of America's national interests will mirror Alexander Hamilton's fast and decisive actions, which prioritized America first, disregarding, up to some point, the rest of the world's interests. Woodrow Wilson will be an interesting case, representing both men more ambiguously throughout his terms, relying on Jefferson's idealism for his creation of the League of Nations and his attitude during the Peace Treaties of 1919, but resembling Hamilton in his decision to enter the war in 1914 and deploy as many troops as possible. The three examples attempt to link and contrast, in a less extreme way, the Founding Fathers' main debate: realism vs idealism, balance of power vs a sisterhood of equal republics.

"It is easier to understand the Hamiltonian distrust of democracy than to comprehend the faith of Jefferson, a faith of tremendous significance in history" – (Claude Bowers, 1936, introduction).

It is easier, nowadays, to adopt Hamilton's distrust, to reconcile his feeling of constant alert to the world we are living in now. Hamilton and his realist, sometimes cold, statements and precepts seem to rule the world we live in now, they at least seem to shadow the Jefferson's. Hamilton's balance of power and national interest pyramid seem to be at one of their peak moments, as has happened during the XIX century and the end of the XX century with George H.W Bush. Their importance, just as with most things in social sciences, seems to come in waves, in cycles. These debates, it seems, have been through their cycles repeatedly and constantly. Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian ideas merged together as time goes by, and then separated again, as each one has its moment in the limelight. Both, it appears, need one another to advance, expand and ultimately, to survive. Because what would have been of the world without Jefferson's idealism to counteract Hamilton's decisive policies both domestically and internationally, and what would have happened to America without Hamilton's acute views on economics and foreign affairs? What would have happened if the

world did not have Wilson to stabilize the more strict actions of a Theodore Roosevelt? An Obama to replace an almost to the extreme military George Bush? Albeit their merging which results, through the years, in a smaller difference in between the different characters, this opposites still counteract each other, be it both in their rhetoric and actions, or just in their rhetoric to the world. These are, although, rhetorical questions. The rhetorical questions Goldthorpe (1968) and Pierson (2004) warned about, and the rhetorical questions which have no answer or explanation. We can only hope that this cycle continues, as it has done through centuries, mixing both ideals slowly into one and finally arriving at the perfect combination of Hamilton's drive and passion and Jefferson's idealism and hope.



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Annex

“Cabinet Battle #2” - Hamilton, An American Musical by Lin Manuel Miranda

[WASHINGTON]

The issue on the table: France is on the verge of war with England,
and do we provide aid and our troops to our French allies or do we stay out of it?
Remember, my decision on this matter is not subject to congressional approval.
The only person you have to convince is me. Secretary Jefferson, you have the floor, sir.

[JEFFERSON]

When we were on death’s door, when we were needy
We made a promise, we signed a treaty
We need money and guns and half a chance. Uh, who provided those funds?

[MADISON]

France.

[JEFFERSON]

In return, they didn’t ask for land, only a promise that we’d lend a hand and stand with them
If they fought against oppressors and revolution is messy but now is the time to stand!
Stand with our brothers as they fight against tyranny.
I know that Alexander Hamilton is here and he would rather not have this debate;
I’ll remind you that he is not Secretary of State!
He knows nothing of loyalty, smells like new money, dresses like fake royalty
Desperate to rise above his station, everything he does betrays the ideals of our nation.
Hey, and if you don’t know, now you know, Mr. President.

[WASHINGTON]

Thank you, Secretary Jefferson. Secretary Hamilton, your response?

[HAMILTON]

You must be out of your goddamn mind if you think the President is going to bring the nation to the
brink of meddling in the middle of a military mess,
a game of chess, where France is Queen and King-less.
We signed a treaty with a King whose head is now in a basket, would you like to take it out and ask it?
Should we honor our treaty, King Louis’s head? “Uh, do whatever you want I’m super dead!”

[WASHINGTON]

Enough enough, Hamilton is right.

[WASHINGTON]

We’re too fragile to start another fight.

[WASHINGTON]

Sure, when the French figure out who’s gonna lead ‘em.

[JEFFERSON]

Mr. President!

[JEFFERSON]

But sir, do we not fight for freedom?


[JEFFERSON]

The people are leading!

[WASHINGTON]

The people are rioting! There’s a difference!
Frankly it’s a little disquieting you would let your ideals blind you to reality!
Hamilton?
Draft the statement of neutrality.

Conservative Internationalism - Henry Nau (2013)



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